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UKRAINIAN CRIMEA

Vishorod
PP Serhiychuk M. I.
2014
This book includes documentary material which describes the common history of Crimea and Ukraine. Special attention is devoted to the Ukrainian majority on the peninsula during the Khanate, and the inclusion of Crimea to the Ukrainian economic system at the end of the XVIII century.

The unification of Crimea in 1918, and the transfer of the peninsula to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 is analyzed in detail.

Many arguments are presented that show the peninsula’s prosperity was always dependent on its close ties with Ukraine.

This book is written for scholars, students, and anyone interested in the history of Ukraine.

Translated from the original Ukrainian and revised by George Zahaykevich.
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INTRODUCTION

Crimea is a rich and complex land. It was colonized by the ancient Greeks as far back as the 7th century BC, and Romans settled here in the 1st century BC. It was the site of many old legends such as Jason and the Golden Fleece, the exploits of Hercules, Ipheginia, and Artemis. Old Greek settlements have been found in Crimea and southern Ukraine, evidence of vigorous trading activity.

Crimea had been inextricably connected to Ukraine since the mid 10th century AD. The ruler of the Rus empire, Vladimir the Great accepted Christianity in 988 in Khersones (today’s Sevastopol). After this, he pronounced the entire Rus empire, including today’s Ukraine and Russia, Christian from his throne in Kyiv.

Crimea has been settled by Tartars and their ancestors for hundreds of years, beginning with occupation by the Golden Horde in 1239 AD. It was an independent Tartar Khanate from 1441 to 1783, when it was conquered by Russia.

At the writing of this book, Crimea was an autonomy within the government of Ukraine. As I am now translating it, the Crimean peninsula has been captured and “annexed” by Russia. This is not the first time this has happened. This book seeks to disclose some of the history of this peninsula, and the repeated actions of the Russian government in capturing a valuable piece of property, and then, as has already begun, allowing it to deteriorate.

This is scholarly, not popular reading.

Emphasis is on documenting all historical events with original documents from government archives, newspapers, and journal records. All statements are supported by official records. This often makes reading slow or difficult, the thread at times hard to follow, because the events were complex and overlapping; alliances changed quickly and often.

Government actions in the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia were often convoluted and seemed to make no sense. The motives, to control diverse populations, resulted in arbitrary, in-humane treatment of the people. The mass deportation of Tartars from Crimea in 1944 (the entire population of almost 200,000 were loaded onto rail cars in one day, with over 46% dying en route) was among the worst. Whole-
sale resettlement of entire villages kept people in thrall of the government and prevented any popular organization. Any nationalism was a direct threat to Russian dominance and was quickly stifled.

The need for control was seen as far back as the beginning of Czarist Russia. The Russian people quickly adapted to this and in time actually needed a strong hand ruling them, controlling every aspect of their lives. Other peoples, principally the Ukrainians, and Tartars, were less tractable.

Events during the Russian revolution were extremely turbulent. The anti-monarch movement that started in Europe with the French revolution eventually rolled into Russia with a vengeance. The power vacuum that began when the Czar was deposed, coupled with a resurgent nationalistic freedom movement in Ukraine, made for extremely intricate political maneuvering. Old conflicts resurfaced and several groups competed for control of Crimea.

Russia wanted Crimea from the time of Katherine II (late 1700’s), but never seemed able to administer the area. Following Russian takeovers, beginning in 1785, Crimea deteriorated, with Ukraine coming to the rescue each time. Crimea was made a part of Ukraine in 1954, when it became clear that Russia could not cope with the aftermath of Stalinist actions.

Now, once again, Russia has decided to take Crimea. Using time-honored method, a quick referendum was faked, army was brought in, and the peninsula was annexed.

Perhaps this time the near outcome will be different.

George ZAHAYKEVICH.
COMMON ANCESTORS

Crimea — the most luxuriant medal that God gave this earth.

Pablo Neruda.

Nature gave Crimea great beauty and resources, attracting the attention of neighbors near and far. From ancient times, both Europe and Asia understood that whoever ruled Crimea controlled more than just the Black Sea. This land attracted many peoples, from the local Scythians from Pridnieprovya (the lower Dnieper region — GZ) to the Ellin-Greeks, and then the Genoese.

The Greeks, and later Romans, controlled only the inland towns founded by Greek colonists, and a narrow band of coastline. Efforts by the Greek and Roman governments to control the entire territory of Crimea were never successful. Greek sources, in the 8th to 6th centuries BC, describe the population of Crimea (then called Tauridia) and adjoining Ukraine as Scythians, and Sarmatians in the 4th to 3rd centuries BC, but in actuality this area was home to many different peoples and tribes. The Scythians and Sarmatians quickly picked up the arts and culture of the Greeks but, as historical artifacts show, the lives and culture of the Greek colonists were heavily influenced by them as well. Some Russian authors have attempted to explain Scythian art as derived from Siberian peoples based on the use of animal themes, but this imagery was only a part of Scythian decorative art. Closer to the truth were the conclusions of researchers Osovsky, showing a resemblance to art of the Caucasus region, and Rostovtsev, who showed a similarity to Hittite artifacts.

Several Greek and Roman sources call the native population of Crimea Tauridians and the Crimean peninsula Tauridia. (V. Sichinsky. Crimea — New York, 1954. pg. 6).

In the 2nd and 1st centuries BC Greek and Roman sources mention the presence of tribes called Roksolans and Alans along the coast of the Sea of Azov and adjacent Ukrainian lands. The opinion of most researchers is that these two are either related ethnic groups or actually an Iranian branch of an Indo-European ethnic group. The name Roksolan, according to philologists means “White Alans”, with Roks a derivative of “Ross” or “Russ”.

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The Greek writer Strabon states in his Book VII that the Roksolan King from Olvia, Scilur, with his forces, built three fortresses in Tauridia (Crimea): Palakion (now Balaklava), Habon and Neapol (now Kremenchuk near Simferopol). King Scilur used these cities as military bases in the war with Mithridat Evpator. Khersones was also captured by “Tauridian and Scythian tribes”, leading to the war between Mitridat and the Roksolans. Strabon states that Roksolans under the command of Tasiy came to the aid of Scilur’s son Palakov in the battle against the commanders of Mithradat Evpator. “Although they looked battle ready, they were no match against the well trained and equipped phalanx (Roman style). Even though they numbered 50,000 against the 6000 troops of Mithrador’s commander Diofant, the battle was lost with many casualties.” (V. Sichinsky, pg. 8).

These events are dated at 94 BC by researchers, and are a good indication of the level of strength and organization of the natives of Crimea, the Roksolans.

Excavations in 1946 in the city of Neapol near Simferopol revealed a burial site of Roman times where a picture of a house was found that closely resembled those in Ukraine of that time. The walls had very realistic drawings showing scenes from the life of the deceased — a horseman, dogs attacking wild boars, and a man playing a lyre. The appearance of the people in the drawings was definitely not Greek or Roman, but native Crimeans — Roksolans. These types of people, and weapons of the Roksolans, are found in the detailed descriptions of writers of that period, and are also seen in drawings and statues.

Although Mithridat Evpator drove the Roksolans from the “Bay of Symbols” (Balaklava), they and the Alans occupied the interior of Crimea, keeping some bases and ports on the peninsula.

The Alans are mentioned in the writings of Pliny the Second and Tacitus. According to Marcelin Amian (4th century), the Alans raided Greek colonies of the Bosporus Kingdom including Fanagoria, Kini, and other cities of Tauridia (Crimea). The Alans built Suday (today Sudak) and Ardavda (today Feodosia) in the 3rd century. These cities served as important bases and ports during attacks by
the Huns, and later (9th century) the Hungarian and Pecheneg tribes. According to the unknown author of “Tales of the Black Sea”, Feodosia was first called Ardvada by the Tauridians, which meant “City of the seven Gods” or “City of the seven lights or planets”. The city was renamed Feodosia in honor of the sister of Bosporus King Leykon, who captured the city from the Miletian Greeks.

When the Germanic Goths approached the city in 250 AD, they were not received peacefully by the Roksolans and Alans, who later were forced to pay tribute to the Goth King Hermanrich in 350—375 AD.

The Roksolans took part in the revolution of so called minor Scythia or Zadonia under the leadership of their great prince Bolemir. According to the Gothic historian Jordan, the Roksolans organized an assassination attempt on King Hermanrich; he could not continue the war with the Huns, and soon died. Jordan continued to write about the warlike attitude of the Roksolans toward the Goths, calling them Anths. According to historians they were allies of the Huns in the war with the Goths. They destroyed the army of Hermanrich and pushed back the East Goths. The Roksolans and Alans were Christians at this time as also were many of the Huns. A 4th century Greek writer characterizes the Alans as follows: “They were more cultured than the Huns, handsome in appearance, light complexioned, lightly armed but quite warlike and freedom loving. They considered themselves social equals with others.” (V. Sichinsky, pg. 9).

The Goths were in Crimea about 125 years. Even though they were considered by Russian and German historians as very important in Eastern Europe, they did not have much influence on the inhabitants of Crimea.

The passage of several tribes through Crimea left behind them an appearance of ruin, but the Crimean cities continued their existence. It was in Crimean cities that Christianity spread from early times on. Christian communities existed in Pantekapei and Khersones, as early as the 3rd and 4th centuries. In the gathering of Christian leadership in Nicea in 325 AD the Bishop of Bosporus stated that he was part of the Crimean and Kuban patriarchies. The Eparchy of Suroz
is mentioned in the 5th century as a part of Crimea. Early Christian examples of art and architecture, beginning from the end of the 4th century, are preserved in Crimea in great numbers. In Khersones alone there are 27 churches dating from the 4th to the 10th centuries. The oldest churches in Khersones, dating from the 4th to the 6th centuries, feature a Greek cross with equal arms that became a standard feature of Ukrainian architecture. Round buildings called rotundas that were built in Crimea in the 4th to the 6th centuries were seen in smaller Ukrainian churches in the 11th to the 13th centuries. Another type, known as the Basilisk, built in Crimea from the 6th to the 9th centuries, became widely used in Ukraine during the “Princedom” era, from the 10th to the 13th centuries. This new type of construction, built in the middle of the 8th century, is seen in the church of St. John Predtech in Kerch and in the so-called Partenids Basilica near Hurzufa, built at the end of the 8th century.

Other basilicas, built in the 6th century, located in Mangun and Eski-Kermen, are rare and priceless examples, important not only to Ukraine but also to Europe.

The Roksolans and Alans were conquered by the Huns in 375 AD. They used their bases in Crimea, especially in Sudak and Feodosia in this conflict, and hid in the hills in the center of the peninsula, thereby preventing their total destruction.

The Khozars were formed in the 7th and 8th centuries, its influence reaching Crimea. According to Feofan, during the reign of Emperor Justinian III, the Alan king Saroyes (Sarody) was allied with Byzantium in 703 AD. The Byzantine writer Constantine Porfinorodny said that the Alans were not only independent, but also prevented the Khozars from establishing ties with Crimea. Among the Eparchies under Leo the Wise, Alania was rated 62nd, and under Paleolog the Elder, “Alania Metropolitan” was rated 74th. Alania is mentioned as late as the 14th century in historical documents in Crimea citing “Alan parishes”. Arguments between the Metropolitans of Khersones and the Goths are mentioned in the writings of Marini and other sources.

Crimea, in the 6th century, comes under the control of Byzantium, who had naval bases in Khersones, Kerch, Sudak, and other
small towns in the south. As in other times in the past, Byzantium occupied only the southern coastline of Crimea. The native Roksolans and Alans stayed in the interior, maintaining strong relations with Kyiv. The Kyiv government had a strong influence over Crimea and viewed it as a part of Ukraine. (V. Sichinsky, pg. 12).

Ukrainian ancestors, even before they saw themselves as a nation, formed as Kyivan Russ, looked toward Crimea. Colonization of Crimea from central and western Ukraine began in the 5th century, settling primarily near the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. By the 6th century they had settled the entire coastal area of the Black Sea, from the Danube to the Don. From this time on they had to accept the geopolitical effects of their position near the steppes of Central Asia.

By the 4th century the Roksolans settled almost the entire territory of today’s Ukraine, except the extreme northern areas. The areas along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, including Crimea, were extensively settled by this farming culture. Influenced by the Bosporus kingdom, the Roksolans developed their own material and spiritual culture. They were a sea-going people and signs of this were often seen in their various artifacts. Structured symbolic writing, dated to the 4th century were found on stone tablets in Olvia, Eupatoria, and Kerch. This symbolic language was the precursor of the Slavic written language that was mentioned by Constantine (Kirilo) during his stay in Khersones in 860 AD.

The noted historian Ivan Ohienko wrote that Constantine found “The Bible and Psalters written in the Russ language”. These were translations from the Greek to Eastern Slavic, more precisely in the language used in Kyiv. This was necessary because excerpts from the Bible and Psalters were used in the religious services — the Mass. (I. Ohienko, Russ translations in Khersones in 860 AD// Jubilee collection to honor Academic Dmytro Ivanovich Bahalia — Kyiv, 1927, pg. 377 ).

But Constantine (Kirilo) found books written in the “Russ language” in Khersones. He met with local people who spoke this language and lived together in entire neighborhoods. (O. Mindiuk, Ukrainians-the native people of Crimea, K. 2000, pg. 18).

The language of today’s Ukrainian ancestors was already in use in Crimea in those times. I. Ohienko wrote that “Constantine ar-
rived in Khersones in 860 AD and there learned to speak the Kyivan language with the proper accent”. (I. Ohienko, pg. 377).

Obviously, Ukrainians had to settle in this area considerably earlier for the Kyivan language to be so firmly rooted. Academic Michailo Hrushevsky, using various sources, wrote: “At the end of the 4th century AD we have definite indications that tribes of eastern Slavs, the ancestors of today’s Ukrainians, began to spread in the south — and coming from the north approached the Black Sea and in time occupied the lands that they occupy today, and settling eastern territories like Donetsk, the Caucasus, and Crimea somewhat later”. (M. Hrushevsky, Who are these Ukrainians and what do they want, Kyiv. 1991, pg. 39).

These areas were occupied by eastern Slavs, Rusichi, ancestors of today’s Ukrainians.

These were the people that Ukraine’s northern neighbor likes to call “ancient Russians”.

As a matter of fact, the name of ancient Ukrainians, “Rusichi”, appears in Byzantine chronicles as early as the 6th century AD. Most importantly, these people, the Rusichi, were first mentioned in middle age Byzantine writings as connected with the Crimean peninsula. (P. Nadinsky, Points about the history of Crimea. Simferopol, 1951, part 1, pg. 46).

For example, the Byzantine writer Eustakhiy, writing in the 12th century, saw the Tauridians the same as the Rusichi, stating that Tauridians (or Rusichi) lived near “Achilles’ steps”, in other words near the Tendrivska spit. In 1153 the Arabian geographer Edrisi called the Kerch inlet “the mouth of a Russ river”. He also knew the city “Rusia” not far from today’s Kerch. (P. Nadinsky, pg. 46).

As seen in charts and maps in the middle ages, the Crimean territory had several names connected with the Rusichi — “Kosal di Rosia”, “Ross”, “Rosia”, Rosofar”, “Rosso” (Tendrivska spit), “Rossika” (near Evpatoria) and others. (P. Nadinsky, pg. 47).

These names came into general usage on the peninsula much earlier, possibly as early as the 6th century AD when eastern chronicles mention Rusichi (people of Russ) who lived north of the Sea of Azov. (V. Krisachenko, History of Crimea from various sources and

Analyzing writings of the Arab scholar and encyclopedist of the first half of the 10th century Ibn Ruste, regarding the country of the Rusichi, which is located on an island surrounded by a lake, he writes: “Of course it is a great temptation to call this land Tauridia because it is the only land surrounded on all sides by water (Perekop is understandably not taken into account)” (V. Krisachenko, pg. 204).

The basis for this hypothesis by Krisachenko is provided by old tradition, beginning with Al-Indrusi in the 12th century which equated the island of the Rusichi with Crimea. (ibid, pg. 204).

Even the Black Sea, from the 9th century, was called Rusian, that is, Ukrainian. And so, the Arab geographer Al-Masudi, in the middle of the 10th century, called the Black Sea Rusian because, in his mind, no one other than the Rusichi who lived on the northern shore sailed on it. He called these tribes Al-Lud-Aana, in other words, the ancient Ukrainian tribe called Ulichi. (O. Mindiuk, Ukrainians, the native people of Crimea, pg. 191).

Academic Boris Grekov, in his researches regarding the beginnings of the word “Russ”, announced that in Byzantine chronicles it corresponds to “Scythians” or “Tauroscythians”. (B. Grekov, Kyivan Russ, Moscow, 1949, pg. 422).

Based on excavations of a middle age city built on a hill called Tensen (near the village of Planersk) it was learned that this was a city built by Slavs in the 7th or 8th centuries. An oven was uncovered that was very similar in design to ovens used by the Rusich people. Also a church was found that closely resembled churches in Kyivan Russ. (P. Nadinsky, Points of Crimean History. Part 1, pg. 47).

Documentary sources show that various Crimean territories belonged to Kyiv during the rule of Prince Svyatoslav. (ibid, pg. 52). Information from this time period mentions evidence of the existence of a Rusian Princedom, Tmutarakan, which joined the territory of the Kerch peninsula and Taman, the lands of the former Bosporus Kingdom. The son of Volodymir the Great, Mstislav. There was considerable in-fighting among the local princes, including attempts on the throne in Kyiv.
We know about the attack of Rus forces on Surozh (now Sudak) under the leadership of Prince Bravlin from the life of Stepan Surozky. About the year 800 AD the Rus forces destroyed the entire coastal area from Korsun to Kerch. The Tauridians (Crimeans) took part in the Asia Minor campaign in 842 AD with the Rus forces. Understanding the Crimean attraction to Kyiv and “Meotic Rus” (Tmutarkan), Byzantium carefully watched its rule over these and other peoples. It had military superiority, especially naval, and strove to limit the rights and influence of the Kyiv nation in this area.

For example, in the agreement of Prince Ihor with Byzantium regarding the “Korsun lands”,

the Prince could not rule over these lands, could not wage war in these lands, and could not declare any allegiance to him. An agreement between the Byzantine emperor Tsimiskhy and Prince Svyatoslav forbad the Prince to attack Korsun. Finally, the capture of Khersones by Volodymir the Great around 987 AD (allegedly because of a betrayal on the part of the defenders) clearly shows a Old-Ukrainian presence in the Khersones area.

It was very important for the Kyivan nation to have a continuous trading and political relationship with Crimea as a natural extension of its territory. The ports of Kozlov (Evpatoria), Korsun (Khersones), Surozh (Sudak), and Kirchev (Kerch) were especially important to Kyiv.

Surozh was especially convenient for small ships, and had a strong trade with Trapesund in Anatolia in Asia Minor. A good road connected Surozh with Kyiv, running through Oleshki. The center of trade shifted from Surozh to Caffa (Feodosia) in the second half of the 13th century.

From the time Constantinople was conquered by the Crusaders in 1204 AD, the Crimean coastline was controlled by the Venetians and their large commercial fleet of ships. This control shifted in the 13th to the 15th centuries to the Genoese, who had large trading bases in Caffa, Sudei, and Balaklava. The influence of the Genoese extended inland in Ukraine, running up the Dnister river to Bilhorod (Akerman), Bender, Sorok, and to Khotin. (V. Sichinsky, Crimea, pg. 14).
In the Genoese period (13th to 15th centuries) Arab, Latin, and Italian sources constantly mentioned a Russ population in Crimea. The settling of Russ people in Old Crimea is often mentioned in Arab writings in the second half (circa 1260) of the 13th century. Y. Dashkevich described the appearance of the word “kozak” in a 1360 AD Italian-Tartar language text in the Ukrainian rather than Tyurksk pronunciation, showing a rising influence of the Ukrainian language. Even earlier, in 1316 AD, a Russ church is mentioned in a statute in Caffa, saying that it was there from olden times. Russ is mentioned about twenty times during this period. (Y. Dashkevich, Ukraine yesterday and today. Kyiv 1993, pg. 102).

Another contemporary researcher, S. Mashchenko, stated that Ukrainians lived in every major city in Crimea during this period. They had their own churches, even their own neighborhoods. (S. Mashchenko, Ukrainians in Crimea: Ethnographic aspects (8th to 20th centuries) //Ethnic history of the peoples of Europe. Kyiv, 1999, pg. 42).

The flood of Tartar-Mongols into Ukraine also touched Crimea. The Tartars occupied the northern steppe-like area of Crimea as early as 1239 AD. V. Rubrukves from Brabanda, the French ambassador from King Louis IX to the Tartar horde, describing the sea-coast of Crimea in 1252 AD, said that the coast from Sudak to Khersones had at least 40 fortified cities all of which seemed to speak a different language. A traveler across the north of Crimea, through Perekop, stated that the people who previously lived in this area, the Kuman, were attacked by the Tartars and were condemned to death by starvation. Many were driven to cannibalism. This same fate awaited the 40 coastal towns and interior of Crimea.

The formation of Crimea under a Khan and the takeover of Ukraine by the Lithuanian Kingdom temporarily ended any Crimean assimilation. At that time “The boundaries of Ukraine were marked from the coast of the Black Sea in the South to Donets and Tikha Sosna in the East”. (M. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Russ. Kyiv, 1995, volume VII, pg. 10).

The first to attempt to enlarge the borders was Kyivan Prince Semen Olelkovich. He defined the border with the southern neigh-
bor as: “…from the river Murafa which flows from the Dniester to where the Dniester flows into the sea, from there across the bay to Ochakov to the mouth of the Dnieper, and from the mouth of the Dnieper to Tavana and on the other side…from over Samara all the way to Donets and from Donets to Tikha Sosna”. (Acts regarding the history of Western Rus, SPB, 1851, volume 2, pg. 98).

The Tartars, under the leadership of Hadgi-Girei, formed a separate Khanate, with the capital at Bakhchisarai, under the protection of the “Golden Horde”, in Crimea in 1427. In 1475 the Turks captured Caffa, and in 1478 destroyed all West-European colonies in Crimea. The Turks forced the Khanate to be vassals of Turkey. This status continued until 1774. The flowering of the Crimean Khanate took place from the 16th to the beginning of the 17th centuries when Moslem building and art became highly developed. The Tartars learned written language, literature, and culture in general from the Turks. However many examples of Byzantine, Renaissance, and Baroque influences were seen, most of which came to Crimea from Ukraine.

Other examples were mosques in Evpatoria built in 1552, Feodosia and Bakhchisarai in 1740, the Palace in Bakhchisarai and also various wooden buildings.
THE UKRAINIAN MAJORITY OF CRIMEA

In the Lithuanian period in the history of Ukraine, relations with Crimea were mostly friendly and centered on trade. However, in the 15th century a fierce war began with the Crimean Tartars.

Instigated by Moscow, Tartar attacks began on Kyiv in 1482, Podil in 1485-1487, and Galicia in 1498. Regional attacks were carried out on Kyiv, Volyn, Chernihiv, and other regions from the end of the 15th to the entire 16th century. Despite this, commercial relations started to build. With Crimea acting as middle-man, goods from the East, from Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, and India flowed into Ukraine through Caffa. Western European goods moved through Ukraine to Crimea and from there on to the East. These included textiles, paper, glass, and metal goods.

Ukraine itself exported leather, oils, grains, wax, honey, and wood.

The constant threat of attack from the Tartars from the eastern coastal areas of the Black Sea and Crimea caused the inevitable growth of defensive capabilities in Ukraine. Constant attacks on the peaceful farmers in the area led to the formation of the Zaporosian Sich and active warfare with the Tartars.

During this period the Ukrainian people suffered enormous casualties. Large numbers were taken to Crimes as slaves. The Lithuanian ambassador Mikhailo Litvin wrote in his journal that when he visited the central slave market in Caffa, he was astounded by the large number of Ukrainian captives. Someone asked him “Where does such a large number of people come from, and then how can there be any people left in Ukraine?” (Memoirs regarding the history of Southern Rus. Kyiv 1881, Volume 1, pg.45).

This terrible time is remembered in the songs and poetry of Ukraine:

_Ukraine is worried that there is nowhere to live,
The horde trampled our children under their horse’s hooves.
The little ones were trampled, the older ones taken away,
Tied their hands behind them and took them to the Khan...

Only the Kozaks, with their sea going battles, could rescue the slaves from Crimea. There are many records of Kozak campaigns on Crimea in 1502 and 1503, and that of Dashkevich in 1523 which de-
destroyed many Tartar-Turkish bases. The middle of the 16th century was distinguished by the destruction of Tyahin and Ochakov in 1545, the campaign of Dmytro Vishnivetsky on Crimea in 1556, the attack on Kozliv (Evpatoria) in 1567, and the capture of Tyahin by Nalivaiko in 1595. A large number of naval campaigns on Crimea took place in the beginning of the 17th century — in the years 1601, 1602, 1605, and 1606. Perekop was attacked in 1608 and 1609. Naval campaigns against Caffa were especially successful in the years 1613—1620. The capture of Caffa by the Kozaks under the leadership of Konashevic-Sahaidachny in 1616 was especially famous for the liberation of all the slaves held there. Additional campaigns against Perekop and Caffa followed in 1623 and 1624.

Ukraine and Crimea formed alliances against the Turks, the vassal relationship of the Tartars to the Osman Empire chaffing at the Crimea. An example of this was the agreement between Shagin-Girei and Hetman Mikhailo Doroshenko which had the Kozak fleet attacking Turkish galleys in 1624. Doroshenko fought for Crimean interest at Bakhchisarai in 1628, where he died. The insecure relations with its neighbors often forced Crimea into an alliance with Ukraine, especially when Ukraine was fighting for its independence.

The repayment for favors between the two sides was very interesting. At one time when the Kozaks came to the aid of the Tartars, the Khan took all available horses, even those belonging to the Russian embassy, and gave them to the Kozaks. (L. Savelov, From the History of the Relations of Moscow with Crimea under Czar Mikhail Fedorovich, Simferopol, 1906, pg. 70).

The Russian ambassadors reported to the Czar what the Kozaks told them: “Now that we have seen Crimea, we have not seen any indication that Crimea is strong and the people warriors, Crimea is worse than a countryside and the people are all thin and can’t fight. We will help Crimea, and not bother Crimea, now that you told the truth to the Czar, and they took the payment, and now God’s Crimea will be ours; Crimea does not have any fortifications and is accessible by both land and water, Bakhchisarai is close to the sea, in the summer we will send half by sea and the other half by land on horseback through Perekop, once we are here we will take Crimea,
Moskovite cities are larger and stronger and the people are better fighters than the Crimeans”. (Savelov L., pg. 98).

Ukraine often made alliances with Crimea against Poland and Moscow beginning with the middle of the 17th century. The military action in 1628 by the Ukrainian army through Perekop to Bakhchisarai to aid Shagin-Girei against the Muskovite army led by Kantemir was well known. The second naval campaign with Crimea against the Turks in 1628 further strengthened the alliance, although it did not last long.

The emergence of the Ukrainian Kozaks was marked by constant contact with the Crimean Tartars. Thus, when Bohdan Khmelnitsky was elected leader of the Zaporozhian Kozaks and began a national revolt against the Rech Pospolita (Poland), Bakhchisarai could not be ignored. The outlook of the Khan as regards this campaign was critical to its success. Even his neutrality could guarantee security from the South.

But, for Bohdan Khmelnitsky as an expert in military strategy, it was important to get actual armed assistance from Crimea. Understanding tactics and strategy, knowing when and how to make use of fortifications, when to use artillery, infantry, and when to adopt a defensive posture, he understood very well that he would have a very difficult time with a Polish army, which included a powerful cavalry. The Tartar cavalry, even though it was relatively light, would be a great help against the Poles.

The foreign researcher M. Melnick felt that “Bohdan Khmelnitsky overestimated the strength of the Polish army and therefore possibly did not need to ally himself with the Tartar horde in his Ukrainian Kozak revolutionary war with the Poles”, but at the same time states that “indeed the Ukrainian Hetman needed a mounted cavalry which the Tartars could provide”. (M. Melnick, Ukraine and Crimea in Historical Similarities// Path of Liberation, 1982, part 8, pgs. 1005—1006).

Future success required a change of tactics and strategy on the part of the Kozaks who, until now, fought from a fortified camp. The Tartar cavalry could be a great help in this change. Its mere presence would serve to demoralize the Polish army and, at the same time raise the spirits of the Ukrainians.
The goal was to combine the greatest infantry in Europe, the Kozaks, with the strong Tartar cavalry. This combination would assure the security of Ukraine. The forming of the alliance with the Crimean Khan was a very important first, and perhaps most important, step taken by Bohdan Khmelnitsky.

At the end of January 1648 Zaporozhian ambassadors, led by the experienced colonel Yatsko Klishey, joined the Khan’s representative in Perekop, Tuhai-Bey, and together they traveled to Bakhchisarai to begin negotiations with the Crimean Khan regarding an alliance against the Rech Pospolita (Poland). Islam-Girai promised to complete the negotiations as soon as the Zaporozhians convinced the Don Kozaks to stop raiding Crimean territories. (V. Serhiychuk, In the Name of the Zaporozhian Army, Kyiv, 1991, pg. 145).

At the end of March 1648 a second group of Kozak ambassadors, led by Bohdan Khmelnitsky, his son Timish, and Kindrat Burlei arrived in Bakhchisarai. The Hetman, officially recognized by the Zaporozhian Sich and accompanied by 2,500 Kozaks, began to finalize the terms of the horde’s participation in the war with Rech Pospolita (Poland) with the ruler of Crimea. Even though forces with Bohdan Khmelnitsky were, at that time, not very large he was able to successfully negotiate with the Khan. Circumstances in Crimea forced the Khan to accept the Hetman’s proposition. First, Islam-Girei was encouraged to form this alliance by his Mirzas as a way to improve conditions in Crimea with booty from the war with Poland. Second, Khmelnitsky’s agreement to leave his son with the Tartars insured that the Tartars would gain something from this war. Thus the agreement for an alliance with the Crimean Tartars was signed in Bakhchisarai. (V. Serhiychuk, pgs. 146, 147).

It must be noted that Islam-Girai did not go into Ukraine at first but ordered his representative in Perekop, Tuhai-Bey, to send 4,000 Tartars, suspecting him in trying to form some sort of treasonous alliance. The thinking was simple — if the Kozaks and Tartars lost it would give the Khan someone to blame for the alliance. In addition the Khan would not mind very much if Tuhai-Bey did not return. (V. Serhiychuk, pg. 147).

The Tartar presence had a significant effect on the battle of Zhowti
Using a very quick advance in the first minutes of the battle Tuhai-Bey caused a large number of casualties to the Polish army. According to the authoritative researcher of the military tactics of the Khmelnitsky period I. Storozhenko, “Tuhai-Bey brilliantly accomplished his task as the commander of the front line forces of the Ukrainian army. Using tactical intelligence he engaged the enemy, brought him to a halt and forced him to adopt a defensive posture. This gave a cover for the main force of the Ukrainian army to deploy and eventually to surround and defeat the enemy. Further Tartar attacks became impractical as the Polish army fired musket and artillery rounds from behind wagons used as a barrier. Tuhai-Bey, waiting for Bohdan Khmelnitsky who commanded the main Ukrainian force, focused his forces on tactical intelligence and information gathering about the activities of C. Pototsky. (I. Storozhenko, Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the Military Arts in the Revolutionary Uprising of the Ukrainian People in the 17th Century, Dniepropetrovsk, 1966, book I, pgs. 122 and 123).

After destroying the Polish army at Zhowti Vody the Ukrainian Hetman did not wait for the Khan’s “army of Islam”, but rather chose to take advantage of the demoralization of the Polish royalty and continue its destruction, which came about at Korsun.

This was in great part due to the actions of the Crimean Tartars, successfully conducting reconnaissance around the Polish encampment near Korsun. The Crimean Khan Islam-Girai never actually took part in the battle of Korsun, but “the movement of his horde in the area had a demoralizing effect on the Polish army and a very positive uplift to the Ukrainian side”. (I. Storozhenko, pg. 168).

Bohdan Khmelnitsky notified Islam-Girai about the latest success and asked “His eminence the Khan to send a few thousand of his horde soon because the Polish were regrouping at the Visla (river) and are readying a large army against me”. (Documents of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. Kyiv, 1961, pg. 37).

The Khan arrived at Bila Tserkva on June 1, 1648 with a large horde where he met with Bohdan Khmelnitsky. The next day a large parade was held by the combined forces to celebrate the recent victories.
After his return to Crimea, Islam-Girai was persuaded by Khmel-
nitsky to leave 15,000 warriors under the leadership of Tuhai-Bey. They were camped near Siny Vody and were in constant contact with the Ukrainian Hetman. (The Joining of Ukraine with Russia. Documents in three volumes. Moscow, 1954, Vol. II, pgs. 46 and 47).

The news about the victory of the Ukrainian and Tartar forces spread beyond the borders of Ukraine. On July 18, 1648 the French newspaper Gazette de France published the report of its correspond-
dent in Danzig: “The mightiest Polish magnates ran to Moldavia to save themselves from the Ukrainian and Tartar armies…the latest reports show that the rebels, Kozaks, and Tartars are already four miles from Yaroslav…” (Three hundred years ago in Ukraine. After the Parisian newspaper Gazette de France // Ukraine (Paris). 1949, part I, pg. 35).

That Khmelnitsky factored in the influence of the Tartars bril-
liantly is seen in the battle of Pilyavtsi: He did not begin the battle until a contingent of Tartars arrived. Even though their numbers were not very large, he sent a large detachment of troops to greet them. After this the sounds of guns and artillery salutes rang throughout the night, which had a very demoralizing effect on the Polish army. (I. Storozhenko, pg. 203).

The Hetman listened to the advice of the Tartar commanders and decided together with Tuhai-Bey, that the combined armies would head west after the victory at Pilyavtsi. (V. Serhiychuk, In the Name of the Zaporozhian Army, Kyiv 1991, pg. 156).

Bohdan Khmelnitsky gave his final evaluation of the Ukrainian-
Crimean alliance at the negotiations with Polish Commissars at Pereyaslav in 1649: “I will turn you all (lyakhi) upside down and trample you under my feet; then I will turn you over to the Turkish Czar as slaves…

You threaten me with the Swedes—they will also be mine, even if they raise an army of five or six hundred thousand they will not be able to stand against the Zaporozhians and Tartars…I will have an army of two or three hundred thousand and the entire Tartar horde. Tuhai-Bey is very close to me, we are like brothers, he is my soul, the only falcon on earth who will do whatever I ask. Our friendship
is eternal, nothing on earth can break it up”. (The Joining of Ukraine and Russia. volume II, pgs. 117 and 118).

At the negotiations in Pereyaslav Bohdan Khmelnitsky emphasized his alliance with Crimea before the Polish delegates and announced his plans for building a Ukrainian nation: “We will not wage war outside our borders, we will not raise our swords against the Tartars or Turks. We have enough here in Ukraine, Volyn, and Podil; the lands of Lviv, Kholm, and Halich complete all we need. Now, standing at the Visla I say to the lyakhi (Poles): sit and be quiet. There I will send all the important lyakhi, dukes, and princes. If you cause trouble there I will find you. I do not want a single footstep of any royalty or princes here in Ukraine…” (The Joining of Ukraine and Russia. Vol. II pg. 118).

Emphasizing the Ukrainian Crimean alliance in understanding the events of 1649, especially the battle of Zboriv, which ended with the signing of an agreement (named after this battle) between the Ukrainians and the Poles it must be said: The prevalent idea that the battle was halted because the Khan betrayed the Ukrainians is explained differently by some researchers, notably I. Storozhenko. He argues that Bohdan Khmelnitsky stopped the battle at Zboriv and forced the Khan to also do so. (I. Storozhenko, Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the Military Arts in the Revolutionary Uprising of the Ukrainian People in the 17th Century, Diepropetrovsk, 1966, Book I pgs. 228—231).

Of course this idea must be studied from all points of view to determine its veracity, but in any event it is clear that the position of the Khan had a great influence on the outcome of the battle.

Bohdan Khmelnitsky could not forego help from the Tartars, his peace accord with Poland being quite tenuous. And so, on May 15, 1650, a delegation of Kozak ambassadors arrived in Bakhchisarai and asked the Khan “to help them once again in a campaign against the Lithuanians”. A week later ”two men from Zaporizhia arrived and asked for an audience with the Khan and asked him to help because the King (Lithuanian) was moving against them with many men”. (V. Serhiychuk, In the Name of the Zaporozhian Army, 1991, Kyiv, pgs. 9—17).
The question of Tartar assistance became extremely important that year because the Polish Seym (Parliament — GZ) voted to resume the war with Ukraine. With this new development, the gathering of the Zaporozhian Rada (a kind of parliament — GZ) voted to ask the Khan for assistance and immediately sent a delegation to him. (V. Serhiychuk, pg. 186.)

Counting on the Khan to join him, Bohdan Khmelnitsky wrote to King Jan-Kasimir stating that in case of any aggression there will be a vigorous reply. He continues to say that he already has a very close alliance with the Crimean Khan and the Polish army dare not approach the Ukrainian border or garrison themselves on Ukrainian territory. (ibid, pg. 186).

The seriousness with which the Ukrainian Hetman approached preparation for the war in 1651, which presumed cooperation of the Tartars, is seen in his sending several delegations not only to Bakhchisarai, but also to the various Mirzas near the border, and finally to the Turkish Sultan who could influence them. For example, a delegation was sent to Ochakov on January 9, on February 15 “two men, sent by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, arrived in Bakhchisarai to ask the Khan for military assistance because a large army comprising the Polish army, led by Radziwill with Pototsky and Kisel, the Lithuanian army, and also the Swedish Germans…” (ibid, pg. 186).

As we now know, his expectations of help from the Khan were fruitless, the Khan abandoning the field of battle at Berestechko causing a major loss for the Ukrainian army, and a resulting de-meaning peace agreement signed at Bila Tserkva. However, because the Russian Czar refused requests for military assistance for the Ukrainian people, even though they had a common Orthodox faith with the Russians (the Poles were Catholic), and the unacceptable terms demanded by the Turkish Sultan for any help, Bohdan Khmelnitsky repeatedly turned to Bakhchisarai.

Despite the disappointment by the Tartars in the battle of Zhvanets in 1653 and Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s short alliance with Moscow and agreement to the “March statutes”, he never refused relations with Crimea. He not only sent delegations to the Khan to ask for assistance but also asked for this assistance through the Russian Czar.
At the behest of Khmelnitsky from Chehyrin, the Russian Czar even ordered the Don Kozaks to refrain from raiding Tartar land either by land or by sea if the Tartars agree to help with the war against Poland and Lithuania. They were told that if the Khan did not help and went to war against the Ukrainians, then they should cause as much trouble to the Tartars as possible. (Russian Historical Library, SPB, 1913, Volume 29, pg. 788).

At the end of April 1654 Islam-Girei received a Kozak ambassador, Colonel Semen Savicha, and tried to talk him out of the alliance that the Zaporozhians were forging with Moscow saying “How can your Hetman and all you Kozaks forget my friendship and advice?” (Acts regarding the history of southern and western Russia, collected and assembled by the Archeographic Commission SPB, 1878, volume 10, pg. 589).

The Crimean Khan once again tried to talk Ukraine out of an alliance with Russia sending a representative to Chehyrin, Alkas Kohit. However Bohdan Khmelnitsky said that this idea was hopeless, understanding that the Tartars could form an alliance with the Poles against Ukraine: “If the Khan comes at us with the Poles or sends his people, we will fight him as an enemy on land and sea with as much strength and reason God gives us.” (M. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Russ, Kyiv 1928, volume 9, part 2, pg. 897).

Indeed Bohdan Khmelnitsky had to fight the Tartar horde to the end of his life, since the Tartars refused an alliance with Ukraine and instead allied themselves with the Rech Pospolita (Poland), causing great suffering to the people of Ukraine. The Crimean Tartars worked against the interests of Ukraine from 1654 until 1657, when Ivan Vyhowsky was elected Hetman.

The new Hetman drastically changed the direction of Ukrainian politics and actively pursued a restoration of relations with Bakhchisarai. According to contemporary Moscow historian G. Sanin, “the politics Vyhowsky pursued already in 1657 took on a distinct anti Ukrainian and anti Russian character. Implementing treasonous ideas of returning Ukraine to the rule of Rech Pospolita (Poland), he courted relations with Crimea with completely different intentions than those of Bohdan Khmelnitsky.
As the old Hetman wanted an alliance with the Khan for the purpose of fighting the Polish-Lithuanian alliance, Vyhowsky sought this alliance to fight the Kozaks and peasants, who were already fomenting a revolution”. (G. Sanin, Relation of Russia and Ukraine to the Crimean Khanate in the Middle of the 17th Century. Moscow, 1987, pg. 229).

It is hard to agree with these statements, especially since G. Sanin does not explain who inspired the anti-Hetman demonstrations in Ukraine, which forced Vyhowsky to seek assistance from the Tartars.

Another thesis of this author is quite believable, that Vyhowsky sought the alliance with the Tartars in order to fight the Moscow government. The Hetman and senior staff finally understood the real intentions of the Orthodox Czar when he replied to the five year long requests for assistance against Catholic Poland by trying to bring Ukraine under his domination by various underhanded political means as well as military actions.

However, Ivan Vyhowsky, after his election, did not rush to bring the horde onto Ukrainian soil. In a letter to the Khan dated September 10, 1657 he described his position as follows:

“I, having lived as a neighbor and close acquaintance of your Eminence, would like to live in harmony and brotherhood with your Eminence, just as my forefathers and your forefathers did, and I sincerely hope that your Eminence will permit me to express this to your Eminence with this letter.” (Acts, regarding the history of southern and western Russia. SPB, 1872, volume 7, pg. 181).

We see that there were no intentions on the part of the Crimean Tartars to harm or conquer the Kozaks and peasants. The revolt does not come until January 1658, and Vyhowsky already had been engaging in dialog with the disgruntled parties. However when he understood that this revolt was backed by Moscow he turned to the Crimean Khan for assistance. This step was forced on the Hetman but it showed that he was very much aware for the need of an independent nation for a more loyal ally than Moscow.

With the arrival of the horde, as told by V. Herasymchuk, “the fatal step, by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and then Vyhowsky, was taken
and any ties with Moscow were cut in their early flowering”. (V. Herasymchuk, Vyhowsky and the Hadyatsky tract// Notes NTSh. volume 87, pg. 58).

It is entirely possible that this alliance of the Ukrainian leadership with the Crimean Khan was partially inspired by the fact that the population of Crimea at that time had very close historical ties with Ukraine.

This is not an exaggeration. All Tartars, stated a contemporary of that time, wanted to marry a (Ukrainian) slave…Sayeen-Girai was born of a Christian woman and married a Christian woman…” (cited: A. Lokhvitsky, About slaves according to an old Russian law, 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries. Moscow, 1855, pg. 6).

When our ancestors came up for sale, the auctioneers called out that “these slaves are the latest, simple, not devious, recently brought from a royal people, not Muscovites…Muscovites were regarded as cheap due to characteristic deviousness. (A. Lokhvitsky, pg. 6).

The census of 1666 in the Crimean peninsula is unusually important to understanding Ukrainian Crimea. While in Crimea at the time of the census, the Turkish traveler Evlia Chelebi was a witness to the gathering of taxes, which always accompanied a census. It was seen that in the 24 centers on the peninsula “the Kozak slaves numbered four times one hundred thousand”. (E. Chelebi, Book of Wanderings. Campaigns with the Tartars and Travels throughout Crimea. 1641—1667. Simferopol, 1996, pg. 172).

This announcement by Chelebi was astounding but he had to admit: “Even if the rocks were to crack, but in Crimea there are not more than eighty seven thousand warriors, and besides those only about one hundred thousands followers of Allah, but there are four times a hundred thousand Kozak slaves”. (E. Chelebi, pg. 172).

Of course, as a person of the same faith as the Crimean Tartars, he worried that “if the worse happened, Allah be merciful, and such a high number of unbelievers were to revolt, they would turn Crimea upside down. But, thanks to the blessing of Mohamed Mustaffa (that is, Allah), they are not capable of revolting at all” (ibid, pg. 172).

The taxes from one hundred thousand Crimean Tartars and four
hundred thousand Kozak slaves were given by the Khan to his Mirzas and warriors, continued Chelebi. The taxes from an additional three hundred thousand slaves went for other budget expenses of the Khanate. Among the latter group of slaves Chelebi mentioned specifically one hundred twenty thousand female slaves, calling them “girls” in Turkish, meaning Ukrainian young women. In addition to these he mentioned two hundred thousand Ukrainian young men. (ibid, pg. 172). Chelebi talked about at least 720,000 Ukrainians living on the Crimean peninsula during the census of 1666. This cannot be exaggerated since, even with rough calculations, the Tartars and Turks took two and a half million people out of Ukraine, and about half of these remained in Crimea. (Y. Dashkevich, Ukraine, yesterday and today. pg. 103).

How did the fate of Crimea develop?

It must be remembered, with sadness, that the constant raids on Crimea by the Zaporozhian Kozaks in the 1670’s led by Sirko, who killed everyone who did not want to return to Ukraine, caused many to turn to Islam and consequently were absorbed by the Moslem world.
One Economy

The politics of Hetman I. Mazepa included the weakening of the Turks and the downfall of the Crimean Khanate, and had as its goal the control of the coast of the Black Sea and Crimea. This was the dream of many generations of Ukrainian patriots, back as far as the times of the old princes of Kyiv. Mazepa fortified the Black Sea coastline to facilitate the rebirth of shipbuilding. Mazepa’s campaigns with Golitsin in 1687 and 1689, the capture of Kizikirmen and other Turkish forts along the lower Dnieper in 1695, Azov in 1696, and his campaign of 1697—1698 on Perekop, seriously threatened and weakened the Crimean Tartars. The “Europäische Pata Fama”, an important annual publication which mirrored the thoughts of important chroniclers and members of the royal courts of Europe, in 1704 wrote about these campaigns that “The commander from Moscow, Golitsin, with 50,000 men allowed himself to be enticed by the Turks and French into an unbelievable betrayal. However, the shrewd Mazepa discovered this plot and removed Golitsin and his men from the territory with clever diplomacy.” (V. Sichinsky, Crimea, pg. 18).

Possibly the most important step taken by Mazepa was a secret attempt at an agreement with the Crimean Khan using Petrik, who entered into an agreement with the Khan in 1692.

This document confirmed the support of the Crimean Khanate in Ukraine’s desire to be accepted as a fully equal member of the international community and subject to its laws.

The basic pact, wrote O. Ohloblin, stated that “the Crimean nation will assist Ukraine in taking back its territory from under the rule of Moscow” (O. Ohloblin, Ukrainian-Crimean Agreement of 1692// Journal of the Organization of the Defense of the Four Freedoms of Ukraine, New York, 1957, part 2, pg. 22).

Further developing this idea, Ohloblin pointed out that this agreement was an expression of “an exact concept of national independence of Ukraine” and the striving for independence and sovereignty which “clearly understood that the national interests of Ukraine went completely against those of Russia and Poland. The agreement of 1692 was undeniable proof that Ukraine was ready to cut all ties with Moscow and enter into a decisive war for its independence.
This was a complete contradiction of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 and negated the Pereyaslav tradition. The agreement of 1692 between Ukraine and Crimea, arranged by the anti-Hetman opponent of Mazepa Petro Ivanenko (Petrik), in its foundation became the political agenda and ideological basis for Mazepa’s revolt against Moscow in 1708” (O. Ohloblin, pg. 20).

It must be noted that different parts of this agreement showed that both sides had plans for integration, understanding full well that without tight economic relations this alliance did not have a future. The rights of Ukrainians to mine salt and engage in fishing in the lower Dnieper without having to pay for this were guaranteed. Free trade between Ukraine and Crimea was also assured. (ibid, pg. 22).

During the war with Turkey in 1735—1738, during the siege of Kozlov (Evpatoria), Balaklava, and Caffa, beside 50,000 Ukrainian infantry, sea going Kozaks engaged in naval skirmishes.

In 1736, in the attack on Bakhchisarai, 16,000 troops under the Hetman and 4,000 Zaporozhians took part in the battle.

The capture of the entire Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea and the coast of Crimea at the end of the 18th century was due almost entirely to the efforts of the Ukrainian army, the troops from Moscow usually following in the footsteps of the Ukrainian Kozaks. After the Zaporozhian Sich was liquidated, the Russian Empire, anticipating a war with Turkey, was forced, in 1776, to organize a strictly Ukrainian army with Ukrainian commanders because only the Ukrainian Kozaks could form a force that the Russian military could count on for control of the northern Black Sea coast.

Conquering Crimea was very important for Russia. The founders of “the third Rome” planned this for some time. As soon as Katherine II was crowned Empress, plans for the acquisition of Crimea were begun. Counselor Count Voronstov, among various important points of Russian politics, advised the Empress “It is important that in the near future Russia regains control of the Crimean peninsula, the mouth of the Don or some other place where we can keep a Black Sea fleet. From this base we can control the near Asian, European, and Ottoman Porta territories, including Constantinople, keeping the Turks and Tartars in fear of us and under our laws. We
must return commercial trade to our advantage, extending our trade to southern Europe. (V. Ulanitsky, Bospor, the Dardenelles, and the Black Sea in the 18th Century. Moscow, 1883, pg. 142).

A publication appeared at that time, “About little Tartary”. It contained statements to the effect that “The Crimean peninsula is sufficiently important that it could be the key to Russian or Turkish rule; as long as it remains under Turkish rule it represents a threat to Russia, but if it were under Russian control or under no one’s control, Russia’s safety could be assured, and if the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea were controlled by Russia, she could threaten near eastern and southern lands and therefore take advantage of the commercial potential of that area”. (ibid, pgs. 142 and 143).

However, this was not realized in the 1760’s.

There is yet another document which anticipated a future takeover of Crimea by Russia, a project “to sever the Crimean Tartars from dependence on Turkey”, prepared in 1770 by the Russian minister of foreign affairs Count M. Panin, and the chief of Ukrainian affairs P. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky. The execution of this plan was left to the commander of the Ukrainian armies, Prince V. Dolgorukov. After he went to Moscow, it was left to the chief administrator of Kharkiv, E. Shcherbinin. He could not carry out this plan despite continuous correspondence with influential Crimean Mirzas. (Notes of the Odessa association of history and antiquities. Odessa, 1881, volume 12, pg. 249).

Only with the appearance of G. Potemkin as the governor general of Katerynoslav did this project begin to move towards completion. However, the prime mover of this idea was Count Alexander Bezborodko, who had great influence on Empress Katherine II, constantly being near her as her first secretary.

A native of the Chernihiv region, he always paid attention to the history of Ukraine. Thanks to his efforts, Vasil Ruban was able to publish his “History of Little Ukraine” in 1778. A common affection for Ukraine joined them together for the publication of this historic work, of which Bezborodko was especially proud. In a letter to his father dated March 31, 1778 he noted “I have the honor to present to you a short publication about Little Ukraine up to the year
1776...written by the court adviser Ruban, occasioned by a love for our native land so that, no matter what happened, the accomplishments and fame of our great ancestors were not forgotten.

You will notice, honored father, that there are many instances that my advice and comments on recent events were included in the publication by V. Ruban”. (Collection of Historical Russian Facts  SPB, 1876 , volume 26, pg. 46).

It is difficult to say what moved Bezborodko, as an avid student of Ukrainian history, to take this step, a desire to remove the Tartar threat forever to his people, as well as for all Russia, or an understanding that Crimea will always be a part of Ukraine's territorial and political life, and the Zaporozhians, who were denied their freedoms in 1775, will take an active role in the colonization of the Crimean peninsula.

Immediately after the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Sich, Alexander Bezborodko prepared his work “A picture or short description of the wars between Russia and the Tartars beginning with the middle of the 10th century and continuing practically without interruption for eight hundred years”, where he gave a succinct chronology of Tartar raids on Ukrainian and Muscovite lands, stressing “Russia has suffered much for two hundred years, especially Little Russia”. (Collection of Russian Historical Facts. pg. 369).

Differing from the project proposed by the Orlovs which proposed conquering a wider swath of lands, extending to the Greek archipelago, Bezborodko was more realistic. He felt that “Russia has no need to conquer territories other than: 1. Ochakov, 2. The Crimean peninsula, and 3. One or two islands in the Greek archipelago to facilitate trade.” (ibid, pg. 369).

With this he emphasized that conquering Crimea today will be easier, especially if the proper means and approaches are utilized”. (ibid, pg. 370).

As he writes in his autobiography, he proposed these ideas to the diplomat Batunin in 1777 “who received from Her Eminence instructions to Fieldmarshal Rumantsev that outline the unacceptability of Crimean independence, and further orders to plan the taking of the peninsula”. (ibid, pg. 444).
Regarding this situation the following document appeared in 1778, “The thoughts of a Russian patriot about battles, dealing with the Tartars in general, and methods that would enable them to be stopped for ever”. (News TAUK, No. 56, pgs. 7—11).

“If heaven had not smiled on Russia and had not brought us the wise and brave Czar Ivan Vasilovich, said the “patriot”, then perhaps the Russian people would still be paying tribute to the Tartars today. It is seen from this how important it is to use the correct approach against our constant enemies, so that the threat would be removed once and forever, giving our country a reliable peace. Today seems to be a good opportunity to do this, given the political situation in Europe and our current superiority over the Tartars, but first, before approaching Crimea, the following preparations should be made.

1. Strengthen the fortresses at Kerch and Yanikal as much as possible, and guarantee their ability to withstand an attack by either the Tartars or Turks. At least one of these should be able to resist a long siege like, for example, the British fortress at Gibraltar, which is next to Spain, yet has no fear of this potential enemy. Our fortress in Crimea need to be strengthened, there they are surrounded by an actual enemy.

2. The Turkish fleet can cause problems when we are building our fortifications. To counter this we must occupy the fortress at Arabat with our garrison so that our troops can move freely through Kerch and Yankul, almost avoiding Crimea itself. Without this, the abovementioned fortresses will always be in danger from the enemy. Also, our couriers will be safe to travel to Or Kali across most of Crimea, where many have died in the past.

3. Try to use all political means to stir up dissent between different generations of Tartars. Also among Krimchaks, Nohaitsi, Budgaks, Edisans, Embuluks, and other Kuban peoples. Divide them as much as possible. This will serve to conquer Crimea more easily and effectively.

4. Prepare, beside the usual provisions, large quantities of wheat in Tahanros, in the fortresses Petrovsky, Nikitinsky, Oleksandrovsky, the old Zaporozhian Sich, Kerch and Yankal. A quantity of wood and other building materials that can be used to construct peasant
houses, and tools such as plows, scythes, axes, shovels, and other similar tools. These should be prepared ahead of time and not assembled when they are already needed; smart planning should anticipate such needs.

5. When all these things are in place, then as large an army, both infantry and navy, as large as is necessary to conquer Crimea is sent. As soon as the people capitulate (this can be done in one campaign, if there is a competent general to lead), the Tartars living there can decide, if they completely surrender to Russian rule they can continue living there. If not they must leave and move to wherever they wish.

6. After conquering Crimea in this fashion, 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry must be stationed there to protect the peninsula, taking a battalion from each infantry Polk and one Rota from the cavalry Polks. Just like in the time of Peter the Great, who formed a Lower Corps and stationed them under General Levashow in Persia, we should add the Latmilitski Polks, which are now stationed to guard the Ukrainian border, as they will no longer be necessary there. All the soldiers and dragoons that remain in Crimea should marry so they can leave sons to take their places.

7. To fill Crimea with Russians, people should be taken from current Volosts (towns) and monastery villages, starting with 10,000 and settle them in appropriate places. The villages, complete with housing, should be already prepared for them. They should be taught the rudiments of the fighting arts so that they could defend themselves from the enemy when necessary. These will be free people, loyal to their country. Moving people into Crimea may be a moot point since the Tartars captured many of our people and brought them here and will continue to do so unless Crimea is fully subjugated. The Kozaks have ended the destruction of Russian lands caused by the Kazan Tartars, events barely recorded by history.

8. Invite the Don Kozaks and Maloruses to live in Crimea and give them proper places to farm and fish, there should be many who would want to do this.

9. In addition to these, other free people should be invited to live Crimea, including Greeks, Armenians, Volokhi (Romanians), and
Bulgarians. This will result in quickly populating Crimea with people that will always be Christian and forever Russian.

Inasmuch as Crimea is located between 44 and 46 degrees north latitude the climate should warm, as in Italy and the southern provinces of France. Many people from Russia will want to settle there because of the climate, especially in their later years.

10. Let us call Crimea by its old name, Khersonea and Caffa, Feodosia. In memory of Prince Volodymir’s baptism, we should build a large church. The Czar who will conquer Crimea should be honored with a large bronze statue with a proper plaque in the finest square and call it Victory Square as in Paris, which has such a Square in memory of King Louis the 4th. To further remember this Czar, an annual church holiday should be declared.

11. When Russia completely subjugates Crimea, it will be completely surrounded by seas and large rivers thereby being protected from enemies and sudden raids by Tartars. It will become the largest and most prosperous Empire in the world, being able to enjoy its peace and prosperity much like Israel in the times of King Solomon, who ruled from the lands of the Philistines to Egypt (Russia from the Baltic Sea to the Bosporus), from the river Fapsa to Gaza (from the Dnieper to Kamchatka), and there was peace in all adjacent lands, where Juda lives safely in Israel under their grapevines, eating and drinking and making merry, as long as Solomon lives” (News, TAUK, pg. 11).

Comparing this document to the work of Bezborodko, even individual sentences are similar. There are individual comments and additions to the text. As regards the taking of the fortresses Arabat and Orkap (Perekop. — V. S.), it was declared the “whoever holds the keys to these fortifications in their hands can claim rule over all of Crimea”. (ibid pg.12).

At the same time there is another task without which there could not be a full control over Crimea: “The fleet must be brought to the mouth of the Dnieper, to be constantly ready to protect and defend against a naval attack by Turkey. It would be useful to control Ochakov, then Crimea would be cut off from Turkey on all sides. The gates to the Black Sea would then be open to us, and would have access to the trade controlled by the Ottoman Porta. (ibid, pg. 12).
Indeed, Russian merchants at that time had no access to the Black Sea. If there was any trade between Russia and Turkey “it was realized by Greek and Armenian traders who came to Ukraine, Russian merchants were never seen or even heard of in Constantinople”. (V. Ulanitsky, Bosporus, Dardenelles… pg. 75).

Trade on the Black Sea was possible only if the Crimean peninsula was in contact with the mainland; without the territorial continuity of Crimea with Southern Ukraine it would not be possible to maintain any activity in the northern part of the Black Sea.

The necessity of joining Crimea to Russia was emphasized in “Additions”: “In order to support the Khanate, we must increase our presence in Crimea, so that, if the Khan should die, the peninsula would always remain under Russian control. This can be accomplished with clever politics and a minimal army. (ibid, pgs. 13, 14).

Count Potemkin, who was given the task of bringing these plans for the conquest of Crimea to fruition, studied the plans, and being in complete agreement with them, started to convince the Empress to hurry this process along. In his notes he tried to convince Empress Katherine II to begin this project as quickly as possible; a project well known to all Russians, of expanding their territory: “There will a great deal of material gain and peace for the people, exclusive control of the Black Sea, addition of Imeretia (Georgia — GZ), an unbroken border between all allied nations between two Seas, the mouth of the Danube will be under Your control. You will not have to ask the Turk’s permission to sail through the Bosporus, but they will ask permission for their ships to be allowed to leave the Danube. The income from this peninsula will increase, salt alone being very valuable, not to mention wheat and wines. We must hurry to accomplish this, You will see that later it will be much more difficult. Our places are now scattered throughout Crimea, causing problems.” (ibid, pgs. 15, 16).

Few people know, however, that many propositions attributed to Potemkin were really Bezborodko’s. This included the addition of Imeretia. (Collection RIO. volume 26, pg. 469).

The thought, that the addition of Crimea to the Russian Empire was due exclusively to Potemkin, dominated Russian history to this
day. An entirely different picture is seen when studying the comments of Bezborodko and his contemporaries. Bezborodko, in his autobiography, wrote: “How much of my work involving commerce with the Porta (Turks — GZ) and Crimean matters!... It is clear that there were other ministers before me, but they either did not know how to, or did not want to work. The extreme self confidence of some people seemed to cloud their perspective, but I fought with difficulties, did not esteem enemies, was not afraid, despite the many reasons for fear. I refer to Prince Potemkin, who will confirm my efforts in these matters; he agreed that the plans for Crimea were ours together, and we equally contributed to their execution.” (ibid, pg. 444).

Finally, the actual Manifest about integrating Crimea into the Russian Empire was written by Bezborodko, in his own handwriting. This was indeed clear, inasmuch as his contemporaries thought “not one of the ministers could present such a concise report to the Empress as could Bezborodko, even in difficult situations, on any facet of national government. One of his greatest talents was his command of the Russian language. Whenever the Empress ordered him to write a decree, letter, or something similar, he would retire to another room, and return in a short time with the assigned document written in such an excellent form that no change could possibly improve it.” (ibid, pg. 59).

As a matter of fact, to memorialize the acquisition of Crimea, Katherine II ordered a memorial medal to be minted, a project also handled by Bezborodko. (ibid, pg. 95).

Bezborodko, along with Potemkin, was featured in an Ode, “The return of Crimea”. In the works of Derzhavin, published by The Academy of Learning, Bezborodko was described as an active participant in this affair; the lines “…the cane carried by a wide-ranging mind had an eternal palm wound around it” are explained by the poet as “just as Bezborodko’s pen on Potemkin’s thoughts achieved success, his advice conquered Crimea.” (ibid, pg. 96).

As is known, Katherine II announced the addition of Crimea to the Russian Empire on April 8, 1783. The Czarist manifest “About the acceptance of the Crimean peninsula, the island of Taman, and Kuban lands into the Russian nation” described this as follows: “We
decided to take the Crimean peninsula, the island of Taman, and the entire Kuban land into Our Nation” (PSZ. volume 21, pg. 898).

Up to this time, until Gregory Potemkin announced the swearing of allegiance of the Crimean Tartars, diplomats in St. Petersburg were quiet about the status of the peninsula. Only after a dispatch from the Governor-General of Novorosiysk “about the subjugation of our Crimean population and the Tartar people”, Katherine II wrote: “We ask You (Potemkin, V. S.) to express Our kindness and good will towards our faithful subjects”. (PSZ volume 21, pg. 985).

But this “kindness” turned to tragedy for the Crimean Tartars; not only for them but also for the Ukrainians. A well known Ukrainian scholar, V. Dubrovsky, wrote: “The history of the Crimean Tartars has many things in common with the Ukrainian people: this is not only a confluence of chronological events but rather a common form of socio-political existence —

1. Neither people saw complete independence a long time; the kinds of dependence were similar, the Crimean horde was dependent on the “Golden Horde” just as Ukraine was controlled by Lithuania; the mobile warlike life of the Tartars was in some ways similar to that of the Ukrainian Kozaks; the autonomy of the Crimean Khan under the protection of the Ottoman Empire was similar to the status of Ukraine under the rule of the Russian Empire, both autonomous ending at the same time; they both come under pressure of the Russian Empire simultaneously, and after undergoing a similar socio-political evolution they went through a short period of attempts at liberation they fell under the Bolsheviks and endured life as contemporary Soviet republics; the only difference between the two peoples was the extent of their territories and the number of participants.

2. Not only external but also internal analogs of socio-economic forms are seen: as the situation is complicated by the influx of capital from Moscow, Poland, and Turkey, creating feudal forms, the best example of which is the military and territorial division of the Crimean horde and the Hetman — led Kozaks, as, at last, weak Ukrainian national capital gives way under pressure from mighty Muscovite capital, as, almost simultaneously, new nationalist forces
arise, a new nationalistic intelligentsia and educated cultured movement is created which then leads to massive national uprisings.

Therefore it can be seen that the two countries, European Ukraine (and eastern Ukraine) and Crimea are like two twins, one next to the other, connected both geographically and historically.

With this similarity their roles were slightly different: as Ukraine was the European boundary for the Tartar and Turkish hordes, Tartar Crimea was Ukraine's boundary with the Near East. Strengthening cultural and economic ties between them is necessary for the success of both countries, their people and the development of our relations with the East”. (V. Dubrovsky, Ukraine and Crimea in Historical Relations. (Geneva, 1946, pg. 19).

With Crimea and Kuban having been joined administratively to Southern Ukraine, called “New Russia” in St. Petersburg, the Russian Capitol did not hurry to settle the peninsula. On August 14th, 1783 Katherine II decided “to resettle the Kalmiks to the Crimean steppe”, and in a month an order was signed transferring the Nohai horde to the near-Ural area (ibid, pg. 993).

However, independent administrative existence of the former Khanate as the Tauridian territory under the Imperial Crown proved to be impossible. The independent existence of only the peninsula was completely untenable.

Because of this, from the first days of the subjugation of Crimea, Potemkin had to treat the peninsula as part of the entire area of which he was Governor-General which included all of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. Actually, this was part of the original plan to form a strong administrative entity on the lands previously controlled by the Zaporozhians. So therefore, after the Kyuchuk-Kainardginsky agreement, the Crimean fortresses at Kerch and Enikal were transferred from the Khan's control to the Azov Guberny, which was on traditional Ukrainian ethnic territory. (Y. Novitsky, Description of The Boundaries and Cities of the Former Azov Guberny (1775—1783), Alexandrovsk, 1910, pg. 23).

The official decision to include Crimea in the Southern and Eastern Ukrainian administrative territory appeared on February 2, 1784. That day, Katherine II declared in a decree “the Tauridian ter-
ritory …since an increase in population is anticipated with the attendant increase in organizational structures this area will be proclaimed a Guberny, appointing Our General, the Governor-General of Ekaterinoslav and Tauridia, the Governor-General, Prince Potemkin…As to the Kuban area, it will be part of the Caucasus Guberny”. (PSZ. volume 22, pg. 18).

And thus as Governor-General of Ekaterinoslav and Tauridia he was given the authority to divide the territory of the new Oblast into seven parts (povits), (Simferopol, Levkopolsk, Evpatoria, Perekop, Dnieprovsk, Melitopol, and Fanahoriy), and to organize “the building of new fortifications on the borders of the Ekaterinoslav Guberny”.

The Empress included Crimea into these boundaries: “…7. Perekop remains as it is, with certain changes; 8. Evpatoria or Koslov, small fortress, keep a battery there from Serbulat, as one of the areas where it is convenient to accept ships; 9. The fortress at Sevastopol, where today Akhtiar and later the Admiralty should be, should have a wharf capable of housing first rate ships, a port, and housing for military personnel; 10. Balaklava will be as it is and will have the Greek army as a guard. 11. Feodosia and Caffa will have their forts repaired with artillery positioned there. 12. Instead of Kerch and Enikal, build a single fortress called Bospor at the Pavlov redoubt, by the entrance to the Cimmerian Bospor (local names, not related to the Bosporus — GZ). 13. Fanagoria, on the island of Taman will have strong fortifications. 14. A patrol station in Enichi will be built on the Arabat spit. 15. The Eysk patrol station will be fortified. (ibid, pg. 22).

That Crimea will be only a part of the South-Ukrainian administration is seen in Potemkin’s plan. The Governor-General saw its center not just some Crimean city, but Katerinoslav, where he planned to build a large church similar to that in Rome, St. Peter and Paul. (D. Miller, The Settlement of the New Russia lands and Potemkin. Kharkov, 1895, pg. 40).

Kherson, which was founded by the people who lived in the surrounding areas, was planned to be transformed into another St. Petersburg. The resettlement of a large number of Ukrainians from the Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv regions to the newly founded, at the lower end of the southern end of the river Bug in 1779, Mikolaev
provided an opportunity, already in three years, to construct a fort
tress and an Admiralty, on the wharves of which already lay ships.
(ibid, pgs. 38, 441, and 442).

Mikolaev remained the center of the Black Sea fleet of the Russian
Empire for almost one hundred years.

Proof that Crimea, from the very beginning of integration into the
Russian Empire, was not considered separate from Southern Ukraine’s
organizational administration was Katherine II’s edict about free trade
among the cities on the Black Sea dated February 22, 1784: “This city
(Kherson, V. S.) and together with the coastal cities in Our Tauridia
Oblast, Sevastopol, previously known as Akht-Yar, having a first rate
port, and Feodosia, known as Caffa, because of its suitability, are in-
structed to be open for trade with Our subjects to all people who are
friends of Our Empire”. (PSZ. volume 22, pg. 50).

All previous economic wisdom of the peninsula bore witness to
the positive effects of this decision. It was unthinkable to refuse con-
tinuous trade with Ukraine, as was confirmed by foreign merchants.
In his notes, the French consul in Bakhchisarai, Charles Pessonel
wrote in the 1750’s: ”every year the Kozaks brought 60 to 80 barrels,
each of which contains 500 ok (each ok is about 1 ½ liters) of Aqua
Vitae (Vodka). Each ok sells for 6 or 7 Par (Turkish currency). The
Kozaks also bring 30 to 40 barrels of sour cherry wine. These are the
same size as those in which the Vodka is brought…

Also, 30,000 barrels of Russ tobacco are brought yearly. This to-
bacco, called Kazak-Tobacco, is of 2 varieties: the first, Marie-Bache,
sells for 6 or 7, the other, Ouzu-Sobak, sells for 3 or 4 Par for each ok.
These are brought from Zaporizhia and Ukraine by Ox drawn wag-
ons, each containing 1000 ok.

The southern provinces of Russ deliver large quantities of textiles,
import of which is not forbidden. One Russ (Ukrainian) buyer,
called Alexis, with whom I spoke one day regarding textiles, told me
that if I wanted to agree on a contract with him, he could get these
textiles for me.

Earlier, Ukrainian Kozaks brought in high quality wool. I heard
much about this and wanted to see some of it for myself. When I asked
a Kozak buyer about buying a small quantity of various grades he
replied that he couldn’t give me any at all because the Moscow Court strictly forbade export of this wool out of Ukraine. This wool is of very good quality, almost all white. Many people told me that was very good for weaving, and it left me very sad that I couldn’t get any…

A great quantity of textiles is brought to Crimea from Russ, but it is all sent to Constantinople. The Tartars keep only a small quantity of the coarser grades that are used for lining boots, some of the better grades are used for shirts. Textiles that are exported to Constantinople come in three grades: the first costs 8 Par for one Pika (24 inches), the second 6 Par, and the third 4 to 5 Par. Good quality textile is called Marie-Bache and is narrow. Beside this, the Russ bring to Crimea textile called “Vibivanka” (Kitaika, V. S.). A large part of this, which is 9 to 10 Pik in length, stays in Bakhchisarai…

Sometimes the Kozaks sell salted hides in Crimea which are better quality than those made here. They are readily sold in Perekop. It would be possible to send a factor there who would buy them…

The Kozaks bring large quantities of cheese, which is called “angry”. Practically all is consumed in Bakhchisarai and Khoslev. 30 tons of this cheese are brought annually, each of which contains from 400 to 500 ok. Each ok is sold for 3 Par…

The Kozaks bring 7000 to 8000 Pipenstaube (oak wood for barrel staves). Each of these sells for 13 to 14 Par…

Every year the Kozaks brought a quantity of iron. An ok costs from 6 to 7 Par.” (D. Olyanchin, On the History of Trade between Ukraine and Crimea (1754-1758), Notes of the Scientific Society in the Name of Shevchenko. Lviv, 1933, volume 152, pgs. 142—145).

Large quantities of Ukrainian wheat, and also large herds of Ukrainian cattle were imported into the peninsula. (M. Slabchenko, Economy of the Hetman Era, 17th and 18th Centuries. Odessa, 1922, pgs. 344, 346, and 355).

Another important product exported to Crimea by the Zaporozhians was fish. (Historical and Geographis Monthly for 1786.SPB, 1786, pgs. 1—16).

On the other hand, goods that were exported to Ukraine were very important for the economy of Crimea, chiefly wines and salt.
Each year about 100,000 ok of wine was bought by Ukrainian merchants. (D. Olyanchin, pg.145).

Thanks to Ukrainian merchants, mainly the Zaporozhian, the Crimean treasury gained a quantity of gold and silver coins, which were used to pay for the salt, notwithstanding the ban by the Czarist administration. (Copper Russians coins were not accepted on the peninsula).

When the Russian consul in Crimea, Nikiforov, reported that the Ukrainians are violating the official ban, and strict orders came from the Russian Capitol to punish the guilty parties, the Ukrainian merchants (Chumaki) brought along with them horses and oxen to sell along the way for Crimean coins in order to pay for the salt. (M. Tishchenko, Outline of the History of Trade Between Left Bank Ukraine and Crimea in the 18th century. Historical-Geographic Collection of VUAN, Kyiv, 1928, volume 2, pg. 91).

Naturally, Potemkin knew all these facts and understood that the transformation of Crimea into a flowering paradise, and a good base for the Black Sea fleet depended on its complete integration with the South Ukrainian economy.
The first ships in the Bay of Akhtyarsk near Khersones, the first military base of the Russian Empire, were all from the Dnieper and Azov flotilla, commanded by Zaporozhians. In 1789 the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, which consisted of 4 large and several smaller ships, was also manned by former Zaporozhians. An official release from Potemkin July 19, 1788 stated that during the taking of the Black Sea coast the Black Sea fleet consisted of “200 smaller rowed boats, each containing 60 Zaporozhians”… continuing “these boats are commanded by Zaporozhians, of which there are now a total of 20,000 commanded by Sidor Biliy”. (V. Sichinsky, Crimea, pg. 19).

The Zaporozhians became the chief armed force for the protection of the newly conquered lands which got the name Tauridian Oblast (region). The Black Sea Kozaks, as an army, were garrisoned not only on the territory of the Crimean Khanate, north and west from Perekop, but also moved out to the main border of possible raids of the Turkish army — Kuban.

In 1784 the Buzhke Kozak army was formed, later called the Famous Black Sea Army, under the command of Zaporozhian military judge Colonel Anton Holovatiy. This army was credited with the capture of heavy fortifications, built by French and Dutch engineers, on the island Berezani, Ochakov, Kinburn, Hadgibei (Odessa) and the entire coast of the Black Sea and Crimea during 1783—1790.

For loyal service the Chornomortsi (Black Sea soldiers) were promoted. In 1795 praporchiks (equivalent to seargent) Lozinsky and Filonovich were promoted to pidporuchniks (junior lieutenant), Polk officers Navrotsky, Tukhivsky, and Sokolovsky were promoted to poruchniks (senior lieutenants), and poruchnik Ezuchevsky was promoted to captain. (News TAUk, 1896, no. 24, pgs. 4 and 8).

Even those who were discharged for medical reasons were given promotions. That year, in this category, commendations were given to praporchik Pavlo Chernyavsky, poruchnik Fedor Hladky, Polk officer Musiy Chorny, lieutenant colonel Zakhar Sutik, captain Pavlo Reyts, poruchniks Stepan Hochar, Andrij Chernyavsky, Kiril Lati, Yukhem Makarenko, and praporchik Vasily Shipotinnik. (News TAUk, pgs. 11 and 13).
Together with the problem of defending the newly acquired territories was the problem of assimilation. Due to the massive emigration of Tartars away from the peninsula, the population fell to almost nothing. According to approximate figures in 1784, there were only 55,000 people of the Moslem and Jewish faiths in Crimea. Over 30,000 Christians were resettled out of Crimea before its takeover. (S. Sekirinsky, On the Question of Settling Crimea at the End of the 18th Century. Simferopol, 1956, volume 22, pg. 74).

Tartar enterprises began to close when they migrated to Turkey, and the Zaporozhians, who were quick to grasp the economic value of the peninsula, tried to fill the vacuum that resulted. First of all was the production of salt. Documents from 1785 showed that army friends Marchenko and Paskevich alone sold salt for the reserves of the Russian army in the amount of 21,949 rubles. (ZOOID. Volume 12, pg. 320).

So, not long after the subjugation of Crimea, Potemkin gave orders to the manager of the Tauridia Oblast, Kakhovsky, to take control of farming. At issue was not only wheat production, but also orchards and vineyards. The new vineyards planned by the orders of the Governor-General were to be not only in the vicinity of Sudak, Old Crimea, in the valley of the river Kacha, but also along the coast of the Black Sea and the river Dnieper all the way to Khortitsya. Also, the production of silk in the area of Old Crimea was developed by experts from the Kharkiv area. (E. Zahrovsky, Economic Politics of Potemkin in Novorosia (New Russia), Odessa, 1926, pgs. 4, 5).

Further proof that many Zaporozhians settled in the former Crimean Khanate can be seen in the orders of captain Khariton Chepiha to commander Andriy Biliy on November 27, 1787, in accordance with those given by Gregory Potemkin, to “look for possible Kozak volunteers for both infantry and cavalry positions in various parts of the Tauridia Guberny”. (Collection of Historical Materials About the Kuban Kozak Army. SPB, 1896, volume 3, pg. 5).

Later documents also confirm the settling of the peninsula by Za-
porozhians. By the Czar’s decree on July 1, 1792 the Tauridia governor was given “the authority to properly and legally assign selected land to officers of the Black Sea army, and those Kozaks that served in Zaporozhia before it was closed, and were resettled with their families to different areas against their will”. (ibid, pg. 734).

However, the Czarist government did not want a wholesale settlement of Crimea by Ukrainians inasmuch as it would lead to further colonization by Ukrainians with attendant problems of nationalism and independence. That is why, from the very beginning of Crimean subjugation, Prince Potemkin paid special attention to settling this region with “Russian émigrés to strengthen Russian influence and insure the Russification of recently acquired Oblasts.” (News TUAK, no. 7, pg. 91).

One of the easiest means of settling Tauridia was to encourage discharged soldiers to remain. Soldiers that ended their active service were given some ammunition, money, provisions and, under the command of selected officers, were led to areas set aside for them. By the orders of Potemkin, 511 lower grade soldiers were discharged in 1784 and settled in Tauridia. (S. Sekirinsky, ibid, pg. 75).

This process continued for several years. In 1787 Potemkin gave orders to settle 411 soldiers from the Kuban Don regiment, who were discharged for various problems, in the Tauridia region. (ibid, pg. 75).

So that they were sure to establish themselves in the area, the administration of the Czar decided to help the discharged soldiers start families. Already in 1786 six groups of women were settled in Tauridia, totaling 1497, most of which were wives of discharged soldiers. As a rule, they were from the central Russian Gubernies. They were the beginning of Russian settlement of the peninsula and mainland. (ibid, pgs. 76, 77).

As a matter of fact, the settlement of women provided a whole new commercial possibility, backed by Potemkin. In 1785 he praised his assistant Kakhovsky for arranging a deal with businessman Shmul Ilyevich which promised him “5 rubles for every woman he brought to Tauridia”. (ZOOID, volume 12, pg. 317).

However this plan did not entirely work — in 1793 there were
only 591 left in the entire Tauridia Oblast. (S. Sekirinsky, pg. 78).

Different climatic conditions than those the people were used to, and difficulties in general acclimatization were the reasons for leaving Crimea. In an attempt to stop this process, which was very negative for the plans of the government, the administration decided on strict surveillance of the isthmus at Perekop, deciding that this would at least limit desertions: in 1797 the local garrison was formed as a battalion. (ZOOID. volume 12, pgs. 65, 66).

The resettling of Russian serfs did not show any noticeable results. In 1793 only 266 serfs were counted in Crimea. (A. Skalkovsky, A Chronological Survey of the History of the Novorosiysky region, part 1, pg. 221).

Potemkins had another idea, that the “Rozkolniki” (a religious sect) would be suitable for these resettlement plans: “one good point is that, given to fantasy and extreme faith in their beliefs, they would be inclined to follow custom and everything Russian. (S. Sekirinsky, pg. 90).

On April 19, 1787, Potemkin wrote to the administrator of Tauridia, Kakhovsky, that “we are sending four thousand church members to You for resettlement in the Oblast”. (News TAUK, no. 24, pg. 5).

The Governor-General demanded that he “take appropriate measures to find them good places for settlement on the Tauridian steppe, good farming land, and provide them with everything they would need to build homes and begin farming using state funds; make sure they have all conveniences that we have promised them”. (News TAUK, pg. 5).

251 members of that church arrived from the Vyatskoy Guberny, 40 from the Kazan, 151 from the Yaroslav, 1288 from the Penzensky, 897 from the Ryazansky, 149 from the Tambovsky, 104 from the Smolensk, 27 from the Pskovsky, and 326 from the Voronezh and Kharkiv Gubernies. Altogether 3,233 people were resettled. Later 1,122 were added that had not been ready for the initial settlement. (News TAUK, pg. 6). And thus that year almost 4,000 church members were settled in Crimea. (News TAUK, Ark. 56).
However, all these attempts did not yield the desired result. According to the figures drawn up by S. Sekirinsky, the “Russian resettlers” comprised only about 13% of the peasant population of the entire Tauridia Oblast at the end of the 18th century. (S. Sekirinsky, pg. 86).

Not all segments of the Russian population agreed with the government of the Czar regarding the settling and the Crimean Tartar people in general. Proof of this can be seen in the book written by Evgen Markov, “Highlights of Crimea”, which was published a third time in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1902.

What interest would this book have for readers today?

First of all, it provides a deep historical analysis of Crimea of years past, especially the Tartar’s attempts at nationality, and also talks about the cruel fate of the Tartars in pre-revolutionary days. Today’s generation knows only of the Tartar evacuation in 1944, but it was not the first in their history. The first took place after the Russo-Turkish war, from 1768 to 1744, when Russia began to take Crimea into its hands.

Evgen Markov wrote about this as follows:

“It seems that the Tartars should feel a sense of calm; they had Khan Shagin-Girei, who did all he could to co-exist peacefully with the European and Christian world — turned over to Russia a few fortresses, traveled about in a carriage, ate sitting up, dressed his guards in European styled uniforms, and even tried to keep his Moslem beard under a large tie.

Of course, to further demonstrate his affection for European civilization, he moved from Bakhchisarai to Caffa. However not all Tartars joined the Khan in his acceptance of European ways, especially regarding his beard, and giving away their fortress. They elected a new Khan and Shagin had to quickly abdicate. The Russian army came in from Kerch to convince the sons of Ghengis the worthiness of a civilized Khan. Seven thousand Tartars were killed outside Bakhchisarai. Bakhchisarai and Caffa were taken and burned again. The greater part of the inhabitants of Caffa were killed as traitors. A separate part of the Tartar army under Selim-Khan was destroyed near Balaklava.”
This convincing then took another tack. Suvorov was told to move all Christians, Greeks and Armenians, who included some of the best artisans and merchants of Crimea. In 1778, over three thousand of the most talented Crimeans were forced to move to the coast of the Sea of Azov, on lands between Berdyansk and the Don. Many died en route because of harsh winter weather. Entire regions were destroyed. On April 8, 1783, a manifest is issued announcing the joining of Crimea to Russia. Retired Shagun-Girei travels to Kaluha so that from there he can go to Rhodes and later get the Sultan’s rope around his neck.

Civilizing the Tartars has begun. In 1785—1788 thousands of Tartars in the coastal areas sold their land and belongings for whatever they could get for them and fled to Natoli and Rumelia. Some of the Mirzas and the entire Girei clan also escaped there. Crimean judge Sumarokov, who was there in 1802, felt that about 30,000 left, all at the will of Potemkin. When the census was taken in 1793, the population was over 500,000, and now it was reduced to 205,617. Also included in this number were Russian soldiers, Kozaks, administrators, and all recent settlers of the previous ten years. The Tartar population was counted as 60,000. When the census was rechecked in three years, in 1800, the total Tartar population was 120,000. It must be remembered that in Minikh’s time one Crimean fortress held 100,000 Tartars. Bronevsky reported that in his time (16th century) the Tartar army stood at 130,000 warriors and perhaps even more. A noticeable deportation of Tartars occurred again in 1812, but those events are recorded only as oral history.

N. Den was forced to admit that the coming of Russians worsened already difficult conditions in the land. The first hit was in 1779 when 30,000 Greeks were resettled by force from the southern coast to the Mariopol Povit. However, the worst was the change in social relations initiated by many details of Katherine’s manifesto which started a massive migration of Tartars to Turkey.” (N. Den, Crimea, Moscow, Leningrad, 1930, pg. 21).

As a first effect this began the deterioration of agriculture in Crimea, as a result of which the population became more dependent on imported food and other goods.
“Into this land, populated by farmers, goods are brought from the Zaporozhian steppes, from Ukraine, even from Russia. These include cows, butter, wheat and other grains, skins, textiles, thick textiles, tin products, rope, and so on” (P. Nikolsky, From the Crimean Khanate to Our Day, Simferopol, 1929, pg. 17).

This disastrous state of affairs signaled the total collapse of the Czarist plans to colonize the peninsula with Russian settlers. Crimean farming continued its existence, using illegal land by various refugees, mainly Ukrainians. The Russian population in Crimea, transplanted by governmental politics, began to dissolve in this wave of Ukrainians which was constantly growing, cultivating more and more of the steppes by using the better farming and cultivation methods that Ukrainians knew well.

The positive role the Ukrainian population played, with advanced techniques in farming and animal husbandry, and their ability to cultivate the steppes was systematically emphasized in the reports of the Tauridian governors in the beginning of the 19th century. One of these reports clearly stated: “The proximity of Malorosia (Ukraine) and its inhabitants, most of whom were resettled, improved the breed of steppe horses with selected breeding stock”. (E. Druzhinina, Southern Ukraine, 1800—1825. Moscow, 1870, pg. 234).

Despite the efforts, the territory of the past Crimean Khanate was not really able to sustain itself by farming, so the Tauridian Guberny continued to be dependent on grains imported from its northern neighbor, especially in years when the harvest was poor. For example, when a locust infestation destroyed the fields in 1824, there was not even enough grain harvested for next year’s planting, leaving none to feed the population. Great numbers of cattle died that winter for lack of feed. The sale of bread in the cities came to a virtual standstill causing extreme problems to their inhabitants. The Administration had to, yet again, ask for assistance from the Katerinoslav and Kherson. To alleviate this crisis almost 3,000 Chetey of grain was bought, and wheat was imported from the northern Gubernies of Ukraine when travel was eased in the spring. (E. Druzhinina, pg. 246).
According to the well known scholar, E. Druzhinina, the Tauridian Guberny could not supply enough of its own bread. There was a great demand both from the city dwellers and from the garrisoned army; besides, it was economically convenient to ship grain through Crimean ports, it was only necessary to get the grain to the Black Sea coast. In the beginning, the biggest importers of grain were the Chumaki, who came Crimea from the nearby Ukrainian farming Gubernies to buy salt. (E. Druzhinina, pg. 326).

The increased export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea ports increased the rate of development of farming in the northern Black Sea region, including Crimea. For example, in 1802 the general export of grain from southern Ukraine was 43.3 % of the total export of Russian goods, in 1817 this rose to 69.2 %, and in 1822 to 96%. (E. Druzhinina, pg. 339).
UKRAINE AS THE CENTER OF BLACK SEA SHIPBUILDING

Crimean exports depended on Ukrainian goods and products. The Russian Imperial fleet was built by Ukrainian hands beginning with the first wharf built in 1738. (V. Serhiychuk, Seagoing Campaigns of the Zaporozhians. Kyiv, 1992, pg. 58).

The leading cities for shipbuilding on the Black Sea at the end of the 18th century were Kherson and Mikolaev. The primary movers were recently disbanded Zaporozhians and people from nearby areas. The registry, by name, of people resettled from Kherson in 1779—1780, showed that Ukrainians made up the majority of shipbuilders at that time. (Institute of Hand Written Documents of the National Library of Ukraine named after V. Vernadsky, file 14, matter 6047, pg. 1).

A foreigner whose letters, written in French, were found in a British library, stated that when he was in Mikolaev, where the stores of the Black Sea fleet were located, he did not see a single completed ship at the docks: as soon as they were completed they were sent to Sevastopol. (Letters About Crimea, Odessa, and the Sea of Azov. Moscow, 1810, pg. 40).

Among various writings about Crimea in the first half of the 19th century there was an interesting remark written during the travels of French Marshal Marmon in 1834. He mentioned the docks in Sevastopol which were then just being built. We know from other sources that most of the skilled workers were Ukrainians, many of them ex-Zaporozhians. Marmon also described an astrakhan (lamb skin product — GZ) factory in Evpatoria, gathering salt from dried salt lakes near Evpatoria and Perekop.

He wrote that 400 ships passed through Kerch yearly, mentioned a thriving fishing industry, and the preservation of fish using the “Dutch process”. He ended his description of Kerch as follows: “Of all the pleasant things we were surrounded by, the most memorable were the Kozak songs, the finest voices sang sad, melancholy songs with sweet melodies”. (V. Sichinsky, pg. 22).

Verifying the language of the Black Sea sailors, a Russian officer M. Berg wrote in 1855: “The sailors spoke badly, with a specific
southern accent, probably Malorosiyskim (Ukrainian).” (N. Berg, From Crimean Comments, separate copy, B/m, id, pg. 6).

Similar comments were noted by a Russian traveler at the beginning of the 20th century, “The sailors spoke with a distinct southern accent.” (V. Krivenko, In the Country — SPB, 1901, pg. 15).
Almost one hundred years after Russia conquered Crimea, contemporaries had to admit that most ethnic Russians did not take to life on the peninsula. “There is almost no Russian population here. Russians of all classes, living here for tens of years, did not feel at home; “back home in Russia” was heard everywhere. The common Russian worker is seldom seen as a settled person in either cities or villages. They are there temporarily to make some money, and return “back to Russia” as soon as their term is up. It must be said that he, here as everywhere, takes advantage of his reputation as a brave and industrious worker, but it must be said that he likes to have his drink. This does not detract from his usefulness as someone who can work hard. Unfortunately, the love of drink is seen altogether too often. They came up with a new vulgarism, not heard in Russia, “Jewish meat”, which referred to comrades that have totally succumbed to alcohol and sold their souls to the Jewish bartender. It must be seen how badly alcohol affects a man under the hot sun. When I see this my heart tightens with sadness and the thought comes to mind: why did you, Mother Russia raised your children unwisely for so long, leaving them for the damnation of their souls, in darkness, not giving them the knowledge and wisdom that every Moslem and Jew seems to have.” (A. Mnohohrishniy, The Meaning of the Southern Part of Russia. Odessa, 1877, pgs. 33,34).

There were other thoughts that were widespread in Russian society. A pre-revolutionary chauvinist expressed himself as follows: “Arriving Russians in Crimea say that the newly arrived Russians, conquerors and colonizers, bring with them a higher culture and are therefore the masters of this land, and the de jure rulers of this country. (German in Russia, pg. 85).

Evgen Markov angrily described how Russian bureaucrats took advantage of handling provisions for the army during the Crimean war (1853—1856), how they did not get to the soldiers and often rotted: “Amazing! Instead of arresting and shooting the thieves-bureaucrats, they shot the most honest part of the population, the Tartars. No one was hurt more than these quiet and useful people. They
were accused of treason; they were driven from their ancestral homeland, the only place they could live happily. Whoever visited Crimea, even for one month, saw that Crimea died when the Tartars left. Only they could stand the hot weather in the steppes, find water, raise cattle, and plant orchards in places where neither German nor Bulgar could survive very long. Hundreds of thousands of patient hands, skilled at farming, the herds of camels, are almost all gone; where there were 30 flocks of sheep there is now one; where there were fountains there are now dry basins; where there was industry and prosperous villages, there is now dead, deserted land. These deserted lands, which recently were villages, cover a large part of the entire region. Traveling through the Evpatoria region one would think he is on the coast of the Dead Sea. After the Tartars left, the increased prices for labor and food hit unbelievable highs, raising the possibility of disintegration of Crimean cities. After the Tartars left, Crimea was like a building after a fire. However, perhaps the Tartars did change and had to leave this area. I had such thoughts when traveling through Crimea, and my driver even told me about the treasonous Tartars. This is held as a fact in Russia. But, on my travels in Crimea I never met a single native who would not literally bristle at any negative allusion to the Tartars. As one voice, they all said they would have died in the Crimean war if it were not for the Tartars. All medical treatments and food resources were in their hands. After the battle of Almin the entire northern part of the peninsula was without an army; enemy bands came into Bakhchisarai, where were only ten Kozaks; the enemy was camped at Evpatoria, and Evpatoria was only 63 verst (about one kilometer — GZ) of smooth road from Simferopol. With all officials and police leaving Simferopol, what better time for a revolt? Bakhchisarai was entirely Tartar; this was the center of Moslem fanaticism, Moslem wealth and reason; Simferopol was three quarters Tartar. Surrounding steppes and valleys had old Tartar villages.

What stood in the way of a general revolt? The Tartars had many reasons to be discontented. They were under the thumb of the Mirzas, worse than serfs. All their time and labor was demanded as payment for their right to live on the land of landowner; they could
be evicted at any moment, a liberal Tartar told me “We would go into fire to get away from the Mirzas, not just Turkey.

What the officials were doing can be only imagined, looking at what they do today; on the other hand, our officials who know how to look after their own interests, couldn’t stop the propaganda of the Moslem fanatics in time. They spread throughout Crimea, sent by the Porta (name for Turkish authority, taken from the large entrance to the Sultan’s palace — GZ), and used all means possible to stir up the population in the region and sow hatred.

Thus, it was not unusual that some people were recruited to fight against Russia. But, the peace in the cities and surrounding areas, where the Tartars were concentrated, was definite proof of the loyalty and peaceful nature of these people. The chief of Police in Bakhchisarai, Mr. Sh. was very competent in matters of judging the Tartars and relations with them in general, and held that post from the days of the dislocation. Even during the most dangerous times, when there was no army, there was not one instance of disobedience; it was widely said in Simferopol that the Tartars would kill all the Russians if the gendarmes and police left; there is no doubt that the Tartars heard these comments and were very upset with them; the gendarmes did leave and yet not a single hair fell from anyone’s head. The incident at Evpatoria, where Tartars were shooting at Russians, is given as proof of the Tartar’s treason; however, one might ask if very many people would not even shoot their own people when they were ordered to do so by the enemy who held rifles pointed at them, ready to shoot. This was exactly what happened at Evpatoria, where the allies stood behind the Tartars and ordered them to shoot the Russians. The dissatisfaction was especially prevalent in the Evpatoria area where the Tartars no longer obeyed the Russian officials, who were either running away or sitting around as if they were already prisoners. Rather, they listened to the new leadership which was brought in as soon as the allies took the Povit (area the size of a county — GZ). Would we, Russians, not have done the same? It is true, the Tartars insulted and punished their former officials when they fell into their hands: I know, from the words of a person who was an official in that area, a prisoner, that the Tartars
punished only those who had taken bribes or were very cruel; the good people that were captured were treated like guests.

Once again one asks, was this treason against the government? Even in the area where they just arrived, the Tartars were calm and loyal. One of the landowners I knew arrived on his land, near Burlyuk, the day after the Tartar’s arrival and ordered the wheat and hay burned as soon as the enemy came near; the Tartars, with their hands on their hearts, promised to do so. When the enemy came, the hay was burned. These are traitors? Even so, if the Tartars did rebel, this could be excused. You would have to be true follower of Allah and a complete fatalist to tolerate all these poor people had to endure during the campaign.”

Besides, during the time when Crimea was full of Russian soldiers, their ruination of cities, monuments, and architecture exceeded the sum total of destruction by all the wild hordes that ever came through the Crimean area. The British traveler, E. D. Clark, professor at Cambridge University, who visited Crimea and especially Khersones, wrote: “The ruins of Khersones had been preserved, even doors were left standing…but when the Russians came, everything was demolished”. Clark saw this demolition with his own eyes; Russians laid mines under ancient churches, pulled marble blocks down with large hooks, all done systematically on orders from above!

He writes about Bakhchisarai: “The Russians satisfied their barbaric desire for entertainment by completely destroying this capitol”. In Kerch they leveled 500 buildings to the ground, and in their place built about 30 primitive barracks”…

Archeological excavations did not fare any better, the Russian “graverobbers”, looking for valuables, destroyed tombs and above ground memorial structures. When building roads, military structures, and “modern” buildings, they dismantled priceless examples of ancient architecture and old Christian era buildings. So, therefore, nothing now remains of the art treasures of Crimea, especially anything aboveground.

The attitude of the Russian administration as regards to religious art treasures exceeded all concepts of barbarism. In 1833, on the or-
ders of the Tauridian Governor, all written documents, books, and old journals were taken from the Tartar population and burned. The limiting, persecution, and destruction of Tartar schools, societies of learning, and institutions by the Russian administration of Crimea is a separate page of history, full of unbelievable barbarism. All this was done contrary to the manifest of Katherine II dated April 8, 1783 (the year Crimea was invaded) where she swore “I and my heirs will extend to the Tartars the same rights as “Our other subjects” and assured that they “ will be resettled with their full agreement and legal regulations”.

An unbelievable picture unfolded as one entered Sevastopol. An eyewitness described it thus: “The heart bleeds upon entering the city, which not long ago was, and now is not, even though it still seems to be there. The impression is that of Pompei after the destruction caused by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. (Y. M. Impressions of Ukraine and Sevastopol. SPB, 1859, pg. 39).

Especially moving were the drowned masts of ships by Sevastopol which meant the death of the fleet. Besides this “on both sides of this straight are unsung graves and it is a bottomless grave even though this killing ground shines with the light of heroes, a place where all the evil things that men can do to each other were done, and of all the terrible things there remains only one terrible memory.

As long as the bloody maw of Sevastopol, with its broken jaw, exists there is no peace for the Russian heart, and no possibility to enjoy the beauty of the southern shore.

Only after forty years the Russian heart could rejoice, seeing a reborn Sevastopol which then looked “very pleasant to look at. The buildings do not look like the usual Russian tasteless colored boxes. There are almost no ruins to be seen…

How greatly the Primorsky (coastal) boulevard has developed, how nice it looks in the spring, all covered with flowers! The eyes can rest, looking at the artistically arranged flowerbeds and groupings.” (V. Krivenko, In the Country. pg. 14).

The comments of the eyewitness about the character of the new structures of Sevastopol being not very Russian was very true, speaking volumes about the rebuilding of Sevastopol and the peninsula
after the Crimean war, because Russians did not participate in this. In connection with this, another wave of Tartar emigration to Turkey led to a further degradation of the farming sector. Only truly gifted and experienced farmers could maintain it at the levels formerly achieved. These, by their nature, were the Ukrainians. If, at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries the Ukrainian migration to Crimea was more opportunistic than planned (with no help from the Russian authorities), now, with the next serial exodus of Tartars from the peninsula, it became clear that Ukrainians were the only hope of supplanting the Tartars as farmers, fruit, and vineyard growers.

After the Crimean war, in the years 1860—1863, according to official records, 192,360 persons of both sexes (one third of the population), immigrated to Turkey, but a significant percentage of the emigrants were not recorded. Also not recorded were the Tartars who disappeared from Crimea during the Sevastopol campaign, and also those who disappeared earlier on various pretexts, such as going on pilgrimage to Mecca.

According to official records, 784 villages were completely abandoned in the Tauridian Guberny; in Perekop alone 278 were abandoned,

If one adds the 784 abandoned villages to the 1000 villages burned by Count Minikh, and adds the unknown number of villages destroyed by the Italian Prince, and Prince Dolgoruk, and also the number of villages emptied in the period 1788—1812, when thousands of Tartars left the peninsula, then the question of how much improvement European civilization brought to the barbarian Moslems will always remain a question. It would seem that sacrificing three quarters to civilize the remaining quarter was accomplishing the goal, or so the reader may think. It is not difficult to accumulate data regarding this. How much real improvement to the lives of Moslem people could Christian civilization really bring?

High Christian morals, European erudition, and properly organized economic activity should lead to moral certitude, power of reason, and material well being. Did the Crimean Tartars become Christians? The opinion of this author is that there was not a single
Christian Tartar in the years 1783—1869. If there was, it was a rare exception and was not known to anyone else. However, it was possible that the average Tartar, while keeping to his faith, was influenced by the teachings of Christ and began another phase of religious development which allowed him to get closer to Christianity. Orthodox churches were built in the mountainous regions of Crimea with the contributions of Tartars. An example is the church in Alushta. Even so, the Tartars did not know anything about orthodox Christian religions, their alienation from any Christian thought was absolute. No one tried to acquaint them with the precepts of Christianity; it would be surprising if there were ten priests in Crimea who could even speak the Tartar language. It is true, there was a person with the official title of missionary in the capitol city, but his sphere of activity and any results were not known to anyone, including the missionary himself, the orthodox population, and the Tartars. It was clear that the Tartars, while understanding the need to learn the Russian language, did not send their children to Russian schools because the teachers were Orthodox priests.

Characteristically, in the villages of Duvanka, Karalez, Dair, and Sarabuz, several Tartar boys attended a Russian school, but there were no priests there and there were no churches. When there was talk in 1863 about forming a separate Tauridian Eparchy, the Tartars again started to escape to Turkey, so that the “coming of the great Pope”, as the Tartars saw this, was one of the biggest reasons for this Tartar migration.

It was the Ukrainians who could replace this void in the population, Ukrainians who were recorded as “Russian”.

There was a meeting of farmers in the Kharkiv region in 1874 where the main topic of discussion was the regulation of incoming villagers at harvest time so that the gathering of the harvest would be timely. However, they could not reach a consensus when they realized that the use of seasonal workers would not solve the general problem of cultivating the southern steppes.

One of the propositions put forward was the permanent settlement in the area: “First, there must an administrative decision to designate the area that could be settled. These areas could be, first,
the many populated areas of the south-west region, second, Malorosia (Ukraine) in general, and third, some of the poorer regions of central Russia". (A. Mnohohrishny, The Meaning of the Southern Part of Russia, pg. 61).

In order to promote marine trade on the Black Sea, the people in Oleshk and Nikopol, who wanted to work as sailors, organized a free society of sailors in 1834. Its members were free from taxation, and obligatory military service; the membership was by recruitment. Before being accepted for membership, the recruits had to serve a minimum of five years in the Black Sea fleet. Only one out of twenty young men between the ages of 15—20 were accepted for this service annually.

In 1839, under these conditions, free societies of sailors were allowed to form in areas along the Dnieper and the Sea of Azov. (A. Semenov, A Study of Historical Facts About Russian Contributions to Trade and Commerce from the Middle of the 17th century to 1858. SPB, 1859, Part 2, pgs. 278, 279).

Beside this, a school for mercantile development was opened in 1834 in Kherson. 24 students were at government expense and 14 paid their own tuition. (ibid pg. 281).

Resettlement of Ukrainians to Crimea in the second half of the 19th century strengthened their position there. The census of 1897 showed a Ukrainian population of over 63,000. However, a serious analysis of these census figures leaves some doubt as to its accuracy regarding the Ukrainian population in Crimea. There were 3399 persons of this ethnos counted in Simferopol (First General Census of the Population of the Russian Empire in 1897, Tauridian Guberny, SPB, 1904, pg. 94). At the same time this book shows that 6314 people from Volyn, Katerinoslavsk, Kyiv, Podil, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv Gubernies were counted in Simferopol. (ibid, pg. 44). It must also be noted that a significant number of Ukrainians resided in this city, having moved from the Besarabska, Voronizka, Hrodnenska, and Kursk Gubernies, as well as from the area of the Don army — the people from these areas totaled 1936. (ibid, pg. 44). There were also many Ukrainians who were born there and were considered residents of the city.
A similar picture is seen in Sevastopol. There were 7322 Ukrainians recorded at that time, when permanent residents, born outside the borders of the Tauridian Guberny in eight different Ukrainian Gubernies totale 13,182. (First General Census… pgs. 47 and 94). There were also many Ukrainians among the residents who were born in the Don, Voronizhchin, Kurshchin, and Besarbska Gubernies. (First General Census…pg. 47).

The last of these showed 198 natives. To call them Moldovans is impossible as there were only 35 people from this country in Sevastopol. (First General Census…pg. 95).

Especially evocative is the fact of altering the data regarding the Ukrainian population in Balaklava. At that time the census showed only 17 Ukrainians, yet there were 76 listed from strictly Ukrainian Gubernies. (First General Census…pgs. 47, 94).

The ignoring of Ukrainians in the census was noted by the Bolshevik government in the 1920’s. Pointing out mistakes in the “Census of the cities of the Russian Empire, Tauridian Guberny 1865” and in the “Memorial book of the Tauridian Guberny for the year 1889”, it was emphasized that this showed “the political chauvinism of the Czarist Empire which wanted to erase the national boundaries of the Ukrainian people at this time (1920’s, V. S.) making it very difficult when and how the Crimean peninsula was settled by Ukrainians. This difficulty was exacerbated by the fact the Crimea bordered Ukraine by land and also by sea, and a part of this Novorosiysk land was included in the Ukrainian RSR and part in the Crimean ARSR. This means that, in several instances, the settling of Ukrainians in Crimea went practically unnoticed. (The national Archive of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea: fund R-137, description 6, matter 42, pg. 1).

Truly, the attention that the Crimean Bolsheviks drew to the circumstances of the census explained a great deal about the number of Ukrainians that settled Crimea from surrounding areas, Berdyansk, Dnieprovsk, and Melitopol Gubernies who were counted as Russians. In Perekop, for example, in 1897 there were shown 13,277 people who came from other parts of Tauridia, and in Simferopol, 20,317. (First Census…pg. 40).
Just before the First World War, Ukrainians settled not only the northern steppes of the peninsula but also built whole villages near Simferopol, and even near the mountains. As a matter of fact, these settlements near the city provided provisions for the central Crimean commercial areas and provided necessary labor. This was especially felt in the commercial and military fleets. Detailed analysis of these processes enabled the well known geographer Stepan Rudnitsky to write, before the World War, “The main part of the ethnographic mosaic of Crimea without any doubt is Ukrainian. In 1914, the percentage of Ukrainians in the population was 65%, Russians totaled no more than 12 %. (S. Rudnitsky, The Basis of Farming Expertise of Ukraine. pgs. 215 and 235).
UKRAINIAN REBIRTH IN THE PENINSULA  IN 1917

The strong feeling of Ukrainian spirituality which came in 1917 from (St. Petersburg — GZ) the then capitol of Russia, started a process of national rebirth that spread to all corners of the Empire, including the Black Sea fleet, manned predominantly by Ukrainians. After the February revolution, the group “Kobzar”, comprising mostly officers, came out of the underground. Already in March they organized the first meetings of Ukrainian sailors, who were then organized into a Sevastopol Ukrainian Group, and at the end of March the Black Sea Group, mostly made up of Ukrainian officers.

The first public gathering of the Sevastopol Ukrainian Black Sea Group, to discuss its statute, was held in the circus and was attended by several thousand people. The stage was decorated by blue and yellow flags and featured a portrait of Taras Shevchenko. (Russian Morning, 1917, April 14).

In subsequent meetings of these Ukrainians which took place at the beginning of April, the Rada of the Ukrainian Black Sea Group was elected, headed by the director of the women's gymnasium and the leader of the group “Kobzar”, V. Lashchenko. His associates were the teacher M. Kolomiets and the sailor M. Pashchenko. It was voted at this meeting that Russia was a democratic republic; Ukraine had autonomous rule, with Ukrainian churches, courts, schools, and army. Realizing that it was very important to increase national self awareness in order to fuel the Ukrainian movement, it was decided to immediately form national schools, libraries, reading rooms, and especially publication of newspapers. The Ukrainian Black Sea Group, already from that time had active military, educational, and propaganda sections. (A. Ivanets, The Crimean Political Direction of the Ukrainian Central Rada — The Culture of the Peoples of the Near Black Sea area. Simferopol, 1998, no. 3, pg. 144).

The Ukrainian Black Sea Group, the Kozak flag with a white cross in the center as its banner, first proclaimed a Ukrainian military doctrine:

1. Have a fleet at least 1 ½ times as large as any in the Black Sea area.

2. Join all Ukrainian naval forces to the fleet at Sevastopol. These included forces in the Baltic, and Caspian areas and also in the Japanese area of the Green Triangle.
3. Include, at first, three brigades of ships of the line, a brigade of cruisers and hydro-cruisers, three divisions of mine-laying ships, submarines, and some special purpose ships.


The actions of the Black Sea Group of Sevastopol were actively supported by the commander of the Black Sea fleet, Admiral Kolchak. Speaking on April 7, 1917 at the first Ukrainian gathering in Sevastopol he announced: “I have the honor of speaking with Ukrainians who have gathered here to declare their existence. The Black Sea fleet which I have the honor of commanding is 90% manned by the sons of this nation. I simply had to greet the Ukrainian nation that gave me the finest sailors in the world. (V. Trembitsky… pgs. 147, 148).

Of course, the support of the commander influenced Ukrainian nationalistic activity in the fleet. By the end of April, 1917 the majority of the ships in the Black Sea fleet, in the infantry of the Sevastopol marine fortress, and the naval aviation division had Ukrainian committees and groups. A key role in Sevastopol was held by the leader of the Crimean organization of the Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries, member of the Central Rada and executive committee of the Sevastopol Rada of deputies of the army, fleet, and workers, K. Velichko. He also headed the Sevastopol Ukrainian Rada in June. (A. Ivanets, pgs. 144, 145).

A delegation from Ukrainians in the Baltic fleet arrived here in the first part of May, 1917. They had been instructed to express their intentions to the Sevastopol Ukrainian Rada “regarding the future autonomy of our Ukraine which now spread from the Black Sea to the mountains of the Caucasus”. (Russian National Archive of the Military Naval Fleet (RDAVMF) F. 183, desc. 1, SPR 23, pg. 94).

A delegation from the Black Sea fleet arrived in Kyiv in June, 1917 and took part in a meeting of the first All-Ukrainian military conference. Its delegates asked that the Black Sea fleet be made a part of the armed forces of Autonomous Ukraine and also that Ukrainian
experts from other ports of the old Russian Empire be repatriated and a Ukrainian naval school be organized. (V. Trembitsky, pg. 148).

When the dreadnought “Volya” sailed in to Sevastopol on July 4, 1917, the Primorsky (coastal — GZ) boulevard was thronged with a large crowd among which the Ukrainian organizations stood out waving many flags. (Crimean News, 1917, July 5).

The Ukrainian spirit affected not only Sevastopol and the fleet but also the infantry. The soldiers and officers of the garrison in Simferopol soon organized a National Military Rada.

At the meeting of the Rada on May 29, 1917, members Matsko, Titarenko, Tyutyunnik, Shimansky, Markov, Butenko, Stadnichenko, Bohdan, Tishchenko, and Bort from the organizational committee who intended to form a Ukrainian military club with more than 50 members, including soldiers and officers.

There was no dissention when the first point of the agenda was debated, that of forming a Ukrainian reserve unit stationed in Simferopol. The only arguments were about how to accomplish this so that there would be no organizational problems with the soldiers.

After several speeches, some of them heated, the meeting entrusted the forming of an organizational resolution to colonel Bilyavsky, sergeant Tyutyunnikov, lieutenant Martinich, and private Drakov. After this was done and certain corrections were entered, the following resolution was unanimously approved:

“1. The organizational committee of those elected from rotations 32, 33, and 34 decided: all the soldiers in the Simferopol garrison will be organized as a separate Ukrainian reserve unit.

2. This unit, comprised mostly of Ukrainians, will have its own Ukrainian commanders and officers.

3. Appoint a date for a meeting of the General Assembly of the Organizational Committee and the Rada of the Club and invite the commander of the garrison and acquaint him with the proposed formation of the Ukrainian unit and invite him to participate in further organizational activities.

4. Ukrainian Sotni (groups of one hundred) would be commanded by Ukrainian officers when on maneuvers. These would be
selected with agreement of the commander of the garrison and the Club Rada.

As to the second point in the agenda, regarding sending representatives to 35 regiments, it was decided, with a majority of the votes, not to send any at this time but rather complete the organization of the Ukrainian reserve regiment and only then turn to other places” (Central National Archive of Higher Organs of Administration of Ukraine, CDAVOVU: fund. 1076, desc. 3, matter 14, pg. 3, 3 back.).

One of the first places that the Ukrainian military club named after Hetman P. Doroshenko wanted to organize was the garrison in Feodosia where Ukrainian soldiers from Simferopol were expected to gather to begin preparatory work. (Central National Archive… pg. 3).

A group of free Ukrainian Kozaks was formed in Kerch under Levenko. (A. Ivanets…pg. 145).

The Central Rada supported the national rebirth in the Black Sea area, and the sailors there in turn supported its efforts in forming and maintaining an autonomous Ukraine.

Only five Gubernies voiced strong objection to the Temporary Government’s limiting the autonomy, the Volyn, Podil, Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Poltava Gubernies. The Black Sea fleet also joined this objection even though they and the entire Tauridian Guberny, including Crimea, was to remain outside Ukraine. Sevastopol spoke out vigorously on this subject: “A general meeting of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Black Sea fleet, the infantry garrison, the workers and citizens of Sevastopol, having discussed the instructions issued by the Temporary Russian Government to the General Ukrainian Secretariat from August 4th of this year, protest in the strongest possible terms against the form and content of this instruction and demand:

1. Ratification of the statute of the Ukrainian General Secretariat by the Temporary Government. This statute was voted on and approved by representatives of the Ukrainian people in the person of the Central Rada.

2. Obligatory recognition of the General Secretaries of a) military affaires, b) justice. c) roads, d) post and telegraph.
3. Recognize the Ukrainian General Military Committee as a legal military entity.

4. Introduce a General Commissar of Ukrainian Military Affairs into the staff of the Commander of the Black Sea fleet as agreed by the Temporary Government with the Central Rada in Kyiv on July 7, 1917.

5. Recognition of the Black Sea Ukrainian Military Committee as an official administrative entity dealing with the Ukrainian soldiers in the Black Sea fleet and the garrison in Sevastopol.

6. Treating the exclusion of the Gubernies of Katerinoslav (the eagle’s nest of the Zaporozhians), Kharkiv, Kherson, and the mainland part of the Tauridian Guberny, all settled exclusively by Ukrainians, as an attempt to separate one part of the Ukrainian people from another, this meeting demands the inclusion of the above named Gubernies into the structure of Autonomous Ukraine.

7. Disturbed by the ever increasing counter revolutionary movement in Kyiv and the open activities of dark forces, the Ukrainian soldiers of the Black Sea fleet and the garrison in Sevastopol declare that in the event of any violence done to the Central Rada, they will all take up arms in its defense and risk all for the freedom of beloved Ukraine.

8. This meeting awaits the Temporary Government’s approval of all demands of the Central Rada.” (RDAVMF: fund. 183. desc. 1. matter 46, pg. 94).

The Central Rada then sent a delegation (V. Vinnichenko, D. Korobchenko, Pismenny, D. Rovinsky, N. Kovalevsky, O. Pilkevich, A. Chernyavsky, C. Efremov, I. Snizhny, and H. Odinets) to Petrograd to decide the question of the Crimean peninsula be included in the territory of Ukraine.

V. Vinnichenko describes the reaction of these professors: “in the course of the debates, the professors revealed, from under their scholarly mantles, their real over-fed, bourgeois selves. In measuring out the possible future territory of autonomous Ukraine they
touched upon the Black Sea, Odessa, the Donetsk area, Katerinoslavsk, Kherson, and Kharkiv. Here, with one mind, with one imagination, they saw the Donetsk and Kherson coal fields, the iron ore in Katerinoslavsk theirs, the industry in Kharkiv will remain with them, they got excited, started waving their hands all about, forgot about their science, their high standards, and revealed their smooth, greedy Russian nationalism. No, they couldn't possibly acknowledge autonomy. Kyiv, Poltava, Podil, and even Volyn and Chernihiv could possibly be Ukrainian, but Odessa on the Black Sea, with its port, with its open path to the Dardanelles, to Europe? Kharkiv, Tauridia, Katerinoslav, Kherson? The population there is not even all Ukrainian. In a word, this is Russian land. The poor professors even spit in the face of their erudition, kicked their statistics, their certificates from the Academy of Science an annoying puppy.” (V. Vinnechenko, Rebirth of a Nation. Kyiv, 1990, part 1. pgs. 167, 168).

The local government of Tauridia also tried to take this tack. In July of 1917, The General Secretary of Internal Affairs of the Central Rada, V. Vinnechenko, sent an invitation Guberny Commissar to come to Kyiv on July 14 for a “preliminary regional meeting”. However, Simferopol decided not to send anyone to this gathering because “the Guberny Commissar has not received any instructions from the Temporary Government as to the inclusion of Tauridian Gubernies in the makeup of future Ukraine.” (cited by A. Zarubin, V. Zarubin. Without victors. From the History of the Civil War in Crimea. Simferopol, 1997, pg. 30).

Besides this, the Simferopol Government approved for themselves the decision that “the inclusion (into Ukraine, V. S.) of the Taurid- ian Guberny, diverse as to national makeup, with a minority of Ukrainian population, is not desirable. With a majority of Ukrainians in the northern areas, this question wouldn’t even come up if the decision had been taken in the negative.” (Zarubin, pg. 30).

This was the position of a pro-Empire local Government which consciously twisted facts, especially as to the supposed Ukrainian minority in the Tauridian Guberny.

By the way, regarding the question of uniting with Ukraine, much
depended on the Crimean Tartars. They formed a Temporary Crimean-Moslem Executive Committee in March, 1917 under the leadership of Mufti Numan Chelebi Dgukhan (Ch. Chelebi). This entity took upon itself the most difficult problems of the Crimean-Tartar people: religion, economy, education, and later politics and military matters. Based on the constant battle with Russian Centralism and the desire to express their native identity Ukraine and the Tartars had much in common. In June, 1917, with the support of the “Ukrainized” military units, similar units were formed by the Tartars. The Ukrainians supported the Tartar demands to remove the Guberny Commissar M. Bohdanov who was accused of involvement in the prevocational arrest of the Mufti of the Crimean Moslems. An eyewitness of these events, Crimean Bolshevik V. Elagin wrote: “Not one move is made by the Tartars without their (Ukrainians, V.S.) support, at least morally. (cited by: A. Ivanets, Crimean Political Direction of the Ukrainian Central Rada, pg. 145).

In July of 1917, their delegation visited the Central Rada, as reported by the “Southern News”, with a request to support their efforts in establishing an autonomy in Crimea. The Moslems expressed their desire that Crimea be considered part of the territory of Ukraine. (A. Zarubin, V. Zarubin, Crimean Tartar National Movement in 1917—1920, Simferopol, 1995, pg. 52).

In another publication these authors write: “There was no anonymous Moslem delegation to Kyiv in July proposing a deal: A separate Moslem army in Crimea in return for a territorial union with Ukraine. To the credit of the General Secretary (Ukraine), he felt that these discussions were not timely, and Musispolk (Moslem executive committee — GZ) declared: “There was no such delegation sent to the Ukrainian Rada”. (Zarubin, Without Victors..., pg. 30).

It must be underlined that the Ukrainian nationalist freedom movement, especially in Crimea, had a great influence on similar efforts of the Crimean Tartars. But these actions exclusively those of the Central Rada “with an open lack of ceremony” as these authors would have us believe. (ibid, pg. 30).

It is true that it is difficult to establish the exact series of events regarding the discussions in Kyiv with representatives of the Crimean
The first of these in describing the events of 1917 wrote in his memoirs: “Having learned that Ukraine has begun a structured movement towards nationalism and has formed a Central Rada, that Ukrainians are trying to establish national autonomy, and, lastly, that they have established a national government in the form of a General Secretariat, we came to the conclusion that we could never defend our country from the anarchy that was descending on us by working with the Russian authorities in Crimea and the Russian Government. (cited by B. Serhiychuk, Comments of Dgafer Seydamet as a source of information about Ukrainian-Crimean Tartar relations in 1917—1918. Scientific News of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine. 1999, 2nd edition, pg. 117).

Understanding that reaching an understanding with the Russians would not be possible, a fact that was particularly emphasized by Seydamet, he stated that it was very important to study the Ukrainian national movement. (ibid, pg. 117).

The Crimean Tartars wanted to know, as Seydamet noted, the exact plans of the Ukrainians, how they captured the attention of the masses, the relations of the executive apparatus with the people, and the state of their power. Recalling a conversation with Mikhailo Hrushevsky, he stated that the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee “shared our unease as regards the Russian revolution, which can lead to a disintegration of Russia, and therefore the consolidation of non-Russian people, creation of armed forces, something especially important for Ukraine. Notwithstanding the danger to Ukraine, it is necessary to fight against Russian centralization with all resources.” (ibid pg.118).

Evaluating his first visit to Kyiv, Seydamet stated that the heads of the Central Rada tried to understand the Crimean delegation and gave it the opportunity to voice their opinions. Seeing that if the Ukrainian movement could shake up the Russians, it could be use-
ful for the Moslems, but Moscow’s role in opposing Crimea forced the Crimean Tartars to have serious second thoughts. So, along with the decrease in general concern, the trip to Kyiv made it clear that there would be problems ahead. (ibid, pg. 118).

The friendly position of the Ukrainian Central Rada as to the right of the Crimean Tartars to autonomy encouraged the Moslem Executive Committee to accept an invitation to a gathering of the peoples of Russia in Kyiv in September. Reporting about the results of his work, the head of the Crimean delegation, Ch. Chelabi, noted: "After the ten day discussions at this meeting of different people, among other things, a resolution that Crimea should belong to the Crimeans was passed. I look at this as a tactical success, they greeted us saying: “You can run Crimea any way you want.” (Zarubin, … Without Victors… pg. 30).

The activities of the Ukrainian Military Committee of the Black Sea Fleet emphasized the processes of Ukrainian influence. The question arose in the fall of 1917 as to whether the warships should fly blue and yellow flags (Ukrainian). The impetus for this came from the orders from the Commander-in-Chief O. Kerensky to “Ukrainize” the cruiser “Svetlana” on the Baltic. The news that Ukraine’s national blue and yellow flag flew over the waves of the Baltic was received by the Ukrainians of the Black Sea fleet with great joy. In answer to this, all ships and ports were decorated with blue and yellow streamers and the signal flags proclaimed “Long live free Ukraine” (New Rada, 1917, October 14).

The news about the raising of blue and yellow flags on the Black Sea fleet flew around the entire Russian Empire. Congratulatory telegrams arrived at the Black Sea Fleet Rada (Centroflot) from everywhere.

The text from one of these telegrams:” The convention of instructors after the elections to the Founding Meeting, representatives of all fronts of the active army and your friends from the Baltic fleet greet the Black Sea fleet with this fact of historical significance: the raising of our flag is a foundation stone of the soon to be Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Hail free Ukraine!” (New Rada, October 15).
The raising of Ukrainian flags was planned for only one day. However, the crew of the mine-carrier “Zavidny” refused to lower the flag at days end, causing a great stir even among the members of “Centroflot”. Calling an emergency meeting they demanded an explanation from the “Zavidny”. The ship replied with the following declaration: “We, Ukrainians of the fleet mine-carrier “Zavidny” raised our national Ukrainian flag to make a statement. Despite age old repression, sons of our great mother-Ukraine, who is alive and strong, want to establish our rights. With this we showed that we, just like all democratic Russia, demand recognition by the Russian Federated Democratic Republic, and following this we demand autonomy for others as well as our dear mother-Ukraine.

In raising this flag we demonstrated our strength and we intend to use this strength to attain our dreams of gaining rights for downtrodden people.

To our naysayers and those who are not familiar with our complaints and accuse us of anarchy, separatism, and encouraging dissolution, we declare that we do not want to separate from Russia. We walk, hand in hand with all downtrodden peoples, not wanting a break up more than anyone, wanting to spread slogans of freedom, brotherhood so that they would not be like songs in the desert like it was to now. We want to remind the democracy that it has fallen asleep, that we are calling for it to join us in the war against the bourgeois and those trampling the rights of all downtrodden nations and for peace of all the world.

We, Ukrainians of the fleet mine-carrier “Zavidny”, call on all faithful sons of dear Ukraine, and the entire Russian democracy, to join us in our fight for higher ideals. We will not lower this flag while we still live and the mine-carrier “Zavidny” still floats.

Chairman of the judicial committee Kubko. Head of the group Kurilovich, secretary, sergeant Kislin. Members Semenenko, Dehtaryev, and Skakun” (Crimean News, 1917, October 20).

The Russian Naval Minister Verderevsky reacted to this declaration with a telegram to the Central Rada on October 17 in which he announced that the raising of Ukrainian flags on ships of the Black Sea fleet is an act of separatism. In his opinion The Black Sea fleet,
supported by funds from the Russian treasury should not raise any flag other than Russian. He insisted that the Central Rada convince the sailors to lower the Ukrainian flags and raise the Russian flags. (New Rada, 1917, October 18).

When this did not produce any results, Petrograd issued another telegram: “We categorically demand that the Ukrainian flag on the mine-carrier be lowered, we feel obliged to remind the commanders of the mine-carrier that the question of flags can be answered only by a meeting of the assembly. Any independent action of individual ships, going against the will of the fleet, reflects negatively on the battle readiness of the fleet. In a very sensitive time in the history of our country, this activity is regarded as a criminal act against the revolution. Representative of Centroflot Abramov”. (RDAMF: Fund 183, Description 1, file 32, pg. 19).

The Ukrainians saw their country first of all as Ukraine. And so the resolution of the Third Ukrainian Military Congress which opened in Kyiv on October 20, 1917. stated: “Insofar as the Black Sea fleet is composed of 80% Ukrainians and is situated in the territorial waters of Ukraine, this Congress declares that the Naval General Rada immediately begin the “Ukrainization” of the Black Sea fleet and employ the following methods:

1. When the autumn campaign of the Baltic fleet ends and the winter campaign begins, when the ships are not active, all the Ukrainians in the Baltic fleet will be transferred to the Black Sea fleet.

2. From this time on the Black Sea fleet should be filled only with Ukrainians. (New Rada, 1917, October 25).

The Black Sea Ukrainian Military Committee demanded respect for the various representative entities and to their rights, confirmed by a telegram October 25, 1917. This telegram demanded that the ministers of the army and navy immediately stop an investigation of the General Secretariat and dismiss all officers and commissars of the Temporary Government who were assigned to the fleet without the approval of the General Secretariat and the Black Sea Ukrainian Military Committee. If these demands, along with others, are not met, Ukrainians in the Black Sea fleet will not respond to any or-
ders from the (Russian — GZ) Temporary Government. (RDAVMF: Fund 183, Description 1, Matter 46, pg. 69).

In the light of these developments, the Commander of the fleet, Admiral Nemitz was forced to ask the Minister of the Navy on October 29th, 1917: “Because of the intensification of the Ukrainian question in the Black Sea fleet, I feel it important to assign a Ukrainian Commissar with specifically delineated authority, approved by Central Government”. (RDAVMF... pg. 70).

The widespread “Ukrainization” of the Black Sea fleet is seen during the meeting of the First All-Black Sea Congress on July 6th, 1917 when its delegates, greeted by the Central Rada all stood up and shouted: “Hail! Hail! Hail!”; a resolution to send a contingent of 600 armed sailors to Kyiv to protect the Central Rada was approved along with 17 delegates from the fleet.(RDAVMF, matter 38, pg. 3, 4).

The Naval Rada of the Ukrainian National Republic categorically forbade all Ukrainian sailors to take part in any punitive expeditions, one of which was being organized to the Don region. (RDAVMF... matter 22, pg. 51).
FRIENDLINESS OF THE CENTRAL RADA TOWARDS THE CRIMEAN TARTARS

A delegation from the Crimean Tartars came to Kyiv just as the Bolshevik revolt in Petrograd was developing. The purpose of this meeting was to confirm the news about the formation of Ukrainian armed forces and to enter into an agreement between Crimean authorities and the Kyiv government.

During this visit Seydamet “met with the founder of the Ukrainian army, National Defense Minister Petlyura”. (V. Serhiychuk, Memoirs of Dgafer Seydamet, pg. 118).

Seydamet described Petlyura as dressed in a simple army uniform, working in a small room, of average height, lean, pale, nervous, with a thoughtful expression. Officers and soldiers continually came in and out of the room, reminding one of a bee hive.

Petlyura openly announced his sympathies with the Crimean Tartars and supported his ideas of military cooperation. He promised assistance in moving Moslem divisions from the Romanian front to Crimea, furnish assistance to the Ukrainians in the Black Sea fleet, and would do all he could to obtain military supplies from Odessa.

Seydamet announced that he was very satisfied with his meeting with Petlyura. (V. Serhiychuk, 119).

In addition, the guest from Crimea had very encouraging discussions with Mikhailo Hrushevsky and General Secretary of the Central Rada in charge of international relations Oleksander Shulgin where it was promised that, in the Universal of the Central Rada, Crimea would stay outside of the boundaries of Ukraine.

As future events bear out, this promise made to the Crimean Tartars by the leaders of the Central Rada was kept.

In order to not exacerbate the situation, the Central Rada decided to announce its authority only in the undisputed areas. The fate of territories that were disputed, including Crimea, was left to later negotiations. The 3rd “Universal” announced: “The territory of the Ukrainian National Republic includes those areas with a Ukrainian majority: Kyiv, Podil, Volyn, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerinoslav, Kherson, and Tauridia (without Crimea).

The final determination of the borders of the Ukrainian National
Republic, as regards other areas with Ukrainian majorities, Kur-
shchin, Kholm, Voronizh, and other areas with Ukrainian majori-
ties, should be made with the organized will of those people.”

This approach by the Central Rada, as the legitimate government
in Ukraine raised no objections in Crimea. The 3rd “Universal” was
especially vigorously supported by the Crimean Tartars and local
Bolsheviks. At the United Congress of the Crimean Revolutionary
Council, which included citizens organizations, on November 25,
the Bolshevik Zh. Miller greeted “to the applause of both Crimeans
and Ukrainians, the Ukrainian people who resolved a national ques-
tion in the spirit of the revolutionary proletariat, and called on the
Moslems to follow this course and announce a Crimean republic”:
(A. Zarubin, V. Zarubin, Without Victors… pg. 48).

The opening of the Crimean Kurultai (highest Crimean legislative
authority — GZ) was attended by Ukrainian representatives headed
by Petro Bliznyuk. (V. Trembitsky, Black Sea Problems of Ukraine.
pg. 48).

November 12 (25) (calendar change in Russia at that time — GZ),
the Ukrainian Military Committee of the Black Sea fleet organized
the official celebration of the declaration of the 3rd “Universal” of the
Central Rada of the Ukrainian National Republic and marked this
event by raising Ukrainian blue and yellow flags on the ships.

A Crimean government was created by a parallel process. A Rada
of national representatives was called together in November 1917
which included a majority of anti Bolshevik forces including three
representatives from Ukraine. It was to this authority that the staff
of Crimean Armed Forces reported. It was this staff that com-
manded the army divisions on the peninsula, the nucleus of this
force consisted of Crimean Tartars, Ukrainian units, and a small
number of Russian officers. On the orders of the General Secretary
of Military Affairs of the Central Rada, S. Petlyura, a Moslem unit
(Polk) entered the peninsula on the 17th of October, and immedi-
ately reported to the staff.

This confirmed the support of the Central Rada of the anti-Bol-
shevik forces in Crimea, and also the recognition of the National-
tic movement of the Crimean Tartars.
It must be mentioned that the Tauridian Guberny authorities were inclined to be anti Ukrainian, even looking at the 3rd “Universal” negatively, calling it “untimely, undemocratic, and dangerous”. The Commissar of the Guberny even refused to receive letters that were written in Ukrainian. Having received a letter in Ukrainian from a representative of refugee Ukrainians he answered “why are you giving a piece of paper with some “khakhol” (a pejorative term for Ukrainians — GZ) writing on it, this is Russia and you must write in Russian”. (National Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea - DAARK; fund R — 1694, description 1, matter 70, pg. 58).

The Central Rada could count on the support of the Black Sea fleet which approved of its activities in this area and other regions. The sailors of the Black Sea fleet came out in support of the Central Rada, the legitimate government of Ukraine, when the Bolshevik government of Soviet Russia announced the sadly remembered Lenin ultimatum. The crew of the cruiser “Memory of Mercury” wired to Kyiv ”The ultimatum issued by Lenin-Trotsky is a coarse transgression of the rights of the Ukrainian National Republic. We ask you to decisively reject it. We protest against the declaration of an internal war. Let us know immediately what we are to do.” (The Free South, 1917, no. 13).

This support of the Black Sea sailors hastened the formation of the Ukrainian General Secretariat of Naval Affairs by the Central Rada on December 22, 1917. It was headed by Dmitro Antonovich, the son of a prominent historian. He, having traveled the circuit of ports starting in Tuapse and Novorosiysk, began convincing (after he was convinced by the sailors) the Central Rada that without Sevastopol the Ukrainian Black Sea fleet could not exist. (CDAVOVU: fund 3956, desc. 2, matter 28, pgs. 10—20).

And so the Central Rada corrected its mistake in the 3rd “Universal” — “Tauridia without Crimea”. As a condition of a peaceful agreement with Soviet Russia in Brest, it put the question of Crimean inclusion in the Ukrainian National Republic on the table. This position was explained by the law passed by the Central Rada January 14th, 1918, authorizing the transfer of the Black Sea fleet to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian National Republic. (CDAVOVU, fund 2592, desc. 1, matter 66, pg. 21).
This raised a new wave enthusiasm for “Ukrainization” among the Black Sea fleet sailors. The Bolsheviks in Sevastopol admitted that 10,000 soldiers who arrived in Feodosia from the Caucasus front “sent a telegram on January 18th, 1918 to the Central Rada in Kyiv requesting that they all be “Ukrainized”. (RDAVMF: fund 183, desc. 1, matter 22, pg. 235).

When Dgafer Seydamet came to Kyiv a third time, the city was already under fire. As Minister of Military and Foreign Affairs of Crimea, he informed Hrushevsky that he could no longer transfer a Moslem regiment to Kyiv and asked that he write a letter to the Turkish delegation in Brest asking for assistance. Hrushevsky showed Seydamet another telegram, where the Turks want to organize a conference dealing with the situation in the Caucasus, and advised him to go there. (V. Serhiychuk, Memoirs of Dgafer Seydamet…pg. 119).
CRIMEA — WITH UKRAINE

On the one hand, the “Ukrainization” of the Black Sea fleet caused the Bolsheviks to crush the Crimean Tartar autonomy in the beginning of 1918, but on the other it created a new political situation in the peninsula and forced the Central Rada to change its relationship with the peninsula.

On February 14, 1918, at a meeting of the Rada of the Ministers of the UNR, it was decided to agree to a peace with Soviet Russia with the understanding that “Crimea stays under the influence of Ukraine” and “the entire fleet (including commercial) on the Black Sea belongs to Ukraine alone.” (CDAVOVU: fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 5, pg. 25).

This, of course, had a great influence on the Tartar population of Crimea, which treated the Ukrainian Government with a certain amount of apprehension. However, when the Bolsheviks showed themselves in Crimea in the beginning of 1918, the Tartars changed their outlook on the possible inclusion in the makeup of Ukraine.

At that time the All-Russia Moslem Military Shuro wanted to reach an understanding with the Central Rada regarding the Crimean Tartar problem, asking not to disband the Moslem regiments that were on the territory of Ukraine, keeping them intact until they could return to Crimea, and then to Kazan as previously planned. (CDAVOVU, fund 2592, desc. 1, matter 37, pg. 23).

Forgetting the last agreement (perhaps because the Central Rada did not plan to discuss the Crimean situation with Russia, but only with the authorities of the Crimean Tartar people), the Radnarkom of the RRFSR, in their negotiations with Germany, insisted that the territories under discussion were only those named in the 3rd “Universal”. Replying to the note from NKZS RRFSR dated March 26, 1918, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a note on March 29, 1918 stating that: “The final delineation of the borders between Russia and Ukraine should be part of the Peace Agreement between Ukraine and Russia, agreed to by the Russian Government, to be signed immediately after executing the agreement with Germany and our Allies”. The German Imperial Government, principally agreeing with the 3rd “Universal” of the Ukrainian Central Rada,
feels that Ukraine should include the 9 Gubernies: Volyn, Podil, Kherson, Tauridia (without Crimea), Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Katerinoslavsk, and Kharkiv. Also parts of the Kholm Guberny which allied with Ukraine per an agreement between those parties”. (V. Butkevich, The Right to Crimea, Crimean is not only a vacation area. Lviv, 1993, pgs. 30, 31).

As we can see, this note — and this is not the Brest — Lithuanian agreement, mandates the final resolution of the problems between Ukraine and Russia. The Central Rada continued to insist on a final determination of territorial questions with Russia. Meanwhile Russia sent emissaries to Crimea with the goal of separating it from Ukraine. During March 2—5 1918, 20 delegates participated in a Guberny Conference in Simferopol. In the group of delegates was included Y. Gaven (a Latvian, sent to Simferopol after serving in the Minisinks Rada) Dz. Miller (who took part in the revolution in Riga in 1905), and others in the RSDRP (Bolshevik), people who were not very familiar with the circumstances in this area and who did not really understand what territories were included in the Tauridian Guberny. During March 7—10, 1918 these delegates called a meeting of the various Radas of the Tauridian Guberny during which the Tauridian CVK Rada was created.

Not having any cadres which would support them (Petrograd supported them financially, sending 49 million Karbovantsy), they attached themselves to the CVK Rada (Jhan Avgustovich Miller was the head of the CVK, and Y. Gaven his assistant), the party organizer of the factory at Obukhiv, member of the VCVK A. Slutsky, the head of the RNK.

On March 19, 1918 the Tauridian CVK Rada issued a decree proclaiming the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tauridia. This caused somewhat of a misunderstanding. The leaders announced their “republic” even in the territory of Ukraine. The authorities at RRFSR quickly issued a statement as to which lands really belonged to Tauridia. Within three days (March 22, 1918) the Tauridian CVK corrected their mistake and announced that the Dniprovsk, Melitopol, and Berdyansk Povits were not a part of the Tauridian Republic. In the census of 1897 the Dniprovsk Povit was 73% Ukrainian, Berdyansk 59%, and Melitopol 54%.
The Soviet Socialist Republic of Tauridia lasted a month and was dispersed on April 30th, 1918. Maybe the RNK RRFSR began to understand that separating the RSRT from Ukraine and proclaiming it a separate republic was a mistake. Without the support of the population, notes V. Butkevich, the authorities were doomed to failure. It would have been simpler to allow the people to voice their opinion. However, the powers in Moscow, the Committee of the RRFSR, knew perfectly well that the opinion of the people would not be what they wanted. At this point the authorities decided on a strange approach, they decided to call all their emissaries Ukrainians, so that the people would feel that they were ruled by representatives of their people. In a letter to S. Orgonikidze dated March 14, 1918 V.I. Lenin wrote that “a united front for defense from Crimea to the main part of Russia needs to be organized, incorporating the villagers, and the changing the nature of our divisions, that are located in Ukraine, to resemble the Ukrainian military — that is our goal now. Antonov must stop using the name Antonov-Ovsienko, he must use only Ovsienko (this is Ukrainian sounding). The same applies to Muravyov (if he remains at his post) and others.

...Tell tovarish Vasilchenko, Zhakov, and the others that however they were to connive to separate their Oblast from Ukraine, judging by the geography drawn up by Vinnechenko, it will be included in Ukraine and will be taken over by the Germans.” (V. Lenin, PZT. Tome 50, pg. 50). However, this did not help.

The head of the Austrian General Staff wrote to the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs: “The way to the East goes through Kyiv, Katerinoslav, and Sevastopol, and from there the connection to Batumi and Trapesond. In my opinion, to accomplish this goal, Germany wants to leave Crimea as its colony in one form or another. They will never let the valuable Crimean peninsula out of their grasp.” (V. Butkevich, The Right to Crimea, pg. 32).

A note from the German diplomatic representative in the RRFSR, Mirbach, to the NKZS dated May 3rd, 1918 stated: ”The Imperial Government recognizes the full right to self determination announced by the Russian Government, and expects the Crimean question (Crimea being part of the Tauridian Guberny until now) to
be resolved by an agreement between Russia and Ukraine. (V. Butkevich, pg. 519).

A delegation of Crimean Tartars came to Katerinoslav in April, 1918, when the Ukrainian army was there along with the German army. They stated that they were “ready to be a part of Ukraine provided that their national and cultural rights were guaranteed.”

Delegates from several Crimean cities came out to meet the Ukrainian army in Simferopol saying that “they were impatiently waiting for the Ukrainians, being tired of the Bolsheviks.” A delegation of 64 persons from Sevastopol confirmed: Sevastopol will surrender without resistance, but only to the Ukrainian army. Representatives from Kerch said that “we have large supplies of bread, fish, tobacco, and other things hidden from the Bolsheviks and are ready to turn them over to Ukraine if the Ukrainian army will take the city.” (V. Serhiychuk, Ethnic Boundaries and National Borders of Ukraine. Kyiv, 2000, pg. 161).

Ukrainian politicians of those days based the necessity of uniting the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine on the following: “The number of people and the extent of the Tartar National territory make it difficult for the Crimean Tartar Nation to organize an independent country and must rely on a larger, stronger country for support, one which will ensure national freedom and cultural development.

Only Ukraine could be this country, being territorially and geographically connected to Crimea. The Crimean Tartars, to whom Ukraine would not deny self determination, can be assured that Ukraine will help the Crimean territory form its own nation, closely allied with Ukraine in a federation.

This federation has both political and economic requirements. Ukraine is a fertile breadbasket with great commercial potential, the Crimean peninsula is a Riviera with a beautiful climate, fruit orchards and vineyards, but which cannot do without Ukrainian commercial goods. The national symbiosis between Crimean Tartars and Ukrainians is mandated by nature herself. We think that these very convincing resonances will be noted by Tartar politicians and will lead to a mutually productive understanding.” (Rebirth, 1918, April 23).
The Minister of Internal Affairs of the UNR, Yakim Khristich, was dispatched to Simferopol April 15th, 1918 with instructions to form an affiliate of the MVS UNR Bureau of Information which would inform the population of the peninsula about the politics of “Ukrainian Government, our laws, and work to bring Crimea closer to Ukraine”. (CDAVOVU fund 3766, description 1, matter 132, pg. 16).

A letter from the German ambassador Mum regarding the Black Sea fleet was discussed in a meeting of the Ministers of the UNR on April 19, 1918. The head of the Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were instructed to reply to baron Mum that according to a law passed by the Central Rada, the Black Sea fleet was declared a fleet of the Ukrainian National Republic, and the government of Ukraine is asking assistance in freeing the ships from the criminal Bolshevik elements who captured it and return control to the Ukrainian government. The Black Sea fleet, as such, is not engaging in any action against the German Armed Forces, so the Rada of Ministers proclaimed, as much as these ships are under control of criminal elements, are confronting “the German Armed Forces, they may be considered a prize of war”. (CDAVOVU, fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 4, pg. 111).

At this meeting it was decided to send a telegram to the Command of the Black Sea fleet “not to engage the German Armed Forces” (CDAVOVU, pg. 111).

At the same time, the All-Russian Shuro, consisting of representatives of Moslem organizations involved in freeing Crimea, with headquarters in Odessa, did not understand this. Under an illusion that an independent Crimean Republic was possible, they went against the orders of the Commander of Crimean Defenses Myachnikov, who was also the Commander of the fortress at Sevastopol and the Black Sea fleet, which were to raise the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag on the whole territory of the peninsula. The protest of this citizen’s organization, which included Moslem groups all over Russia, demanded that the Central Rada cease any attempts at curtailing “any efforts at forming a fully independent Crimean Republic” (CDAVOVU, fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 132, pg. 4).
So, when the Zaporozhian brigade led by Natiev moved on Melitopol on April 27th, Ukrainians on the peninsula proposed forming a commission which would try to explain the standing of Ukrainian nationals. Commander Natiev supported this idea, and appointed Khristich as temporary commissioner of Ukraine in Crimea. (CDAVOVU, pg.17).

During the advance of the German army on Simferopol, Khristich announced to the population that the Germans were coming to free Crimea from the Bolshevik anarchy and promote order and peace. “Under the protection of our arms, the production and trade of the land will continue, and political freedom will be insured.” (ibid. pg. 17).

When the delegates from citizen’s organizations in Simferopol asked about the forming of the future government on the peninsula, the German Commander replied that he would be satisfied with any form that it may take as long as it was done by responsible organizations. (ibid. pg. 17).

At this point a political vacuum developed on the peninsula; the previous parliament did not exist, as the Bolsheviks dispersed it, and most of the prominent leaders had fled across the border. The population itself had different views: the majority, especially merchants, workers, and city dwellers were on the side of Ukraine; the minority, mostly Moslem ecclesiastics, was leaning towards Turkey. However all circles of Crimean population, when it came to political determination, held a common view: it was necessary to call a meeting of Crimean citizenry for the purpose of forming some sort of government, until which time local self rule would continue.

As a result, Y. Khristich notified Kyiv on May 15th, 1918: “As a result of my discussions with the politicians here, my impression of the situation is that with our goodwill and a quick declaration of our intentions, when the Crimean Organizational Meeting is called, the area will want to be federalized with Ukraine.” (ibid. pg. 17)

Of course, this did not agree with the plans of Bolshevik Moscow. The director of the Crimean Bolsheviks, O. Slutsky, sent a telegram in the beginning of April 1918 to the RNK RRFSR requesting confirmation that “Crimea does not form a part of Ukraine”. A reply
telegraphed by Stalin read that Crimean union with Ukraine has no basis, that “according to a document from the German Government which we have, neither Germany nor Ukraine has intentions of taking over Crimea, only the mainland portion of the Tauridian Guberny “. (A. Zarubin, V. Zarubin, Without Victors, pg. 97).

Back in February of 1918, when the Bolsheviks took over Sevastopol and Crimea, they didn’t even want to hear that Ukraine would take over even a part of the Black Sea fleet. A well known official of Soviet Naval Information, Fedir Raskolnikov, gave the members of the Central Black fleet a directive from Moscow drafted by the Rada of National Commissars of Soviet Russia: “The Black Sea fleet is a part of the entire Federated Russian Republic, including Ukraine, and not one of the ships of the Black Sea fleet is permitted to fly a Ukrainian flag.” (RDAVMF, fund 183, desc. 1, matter 89, pg. 194).

But, the Commander of the Black Sea fleet Admiral Sablin, not paying attention to the Bolshevik government which appointed him Commander of the Naval Forces in the Black Sea with extraordinary powers, decided to first determine the attitude of the sailors regarding “Ukrainization”. The answer came back overwhelmingly in the affirmative. He then sent a telegram to Kyiv on April 29, 1918, announcing the transition of the Black Sea fleet to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian National Republic. That day, at 16:00, at a signal from the flagship “Georgiy Pobedonocets”, the ships of the Black Sea fleet raised the Ukrainian blue and yellow flags.

The Ukrainian government understood very well that Crimea is a bridge to the Near East, and the Crimean question will not be resolved without the participation of Turkey. Everything that happened in Crimea had repercussions in the Moslem communities and neighboring countries, especially Turkey. This was a matter not only of geographical proximity but also of Tartar emigration overseas. The Crimean Tartars who were forced to leave their ancestral lands never really assimilated with the Turks. Tartar literature and song became a great influence on Turkish culture. Tartar newspapers, both those published on the peninsula and those in Turkey had a great deal of authority.
Doubtless this was included in the plans of the leadership of the Central Rada when they signed the Brest Agreement on February 9th, 1918 with the Central nations. They then sent an ambassador, Mykola Levitsky, to Istanbul with instructions to determine the Ottoman's opinion regarding the Crimean question.

Crimea was of interest to Turkish politicians, especially when Ukrainian press secretary in Istanbul Khomenko, on February 26th, 1918, said in a local interview that the peninsula was really a part of Ukraine.

Levitsky informed Kyiv that “the local press seems to be pushing for the formation of an independent Crimean Republic for the Moslem population. Some newspapers favor uniting with Turkey, others dream of an independent Crimea under a protectorate”. (CDAVOVu, fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 1, pg. 21).

From the day the Ukrainian ambassador arrived in Istanbul the local press quizzed him about the attitude of the UNR as to Crimea, but not one newspaper printed the statement Levitsky made, that Ukraine considered Crimea a part of the Republic. (ibid. pg. 21).

When the Ukrainian ambassador received confidential information, based on notifications from Dgafer Seydamat, who escaped from the Bolsheviks to Turkey, that local army units are planning an expedition to the peninsula under the guise of assistance to the Moslem population and then plan to stay so that later they can help the Crimean Tartars with their self determination, he asked for an audience with the Great Vizer.

It must be said that before this a Bulgarian colleague of the ambassador told him that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ossman Porta (Ossman government — GZ) voiced his opinion regarding the question of Crimean independence as follows: “… The Crimean peninsula has a total population of 400,000, of which only 200,000 are Moslems; what kind of a country would that make? It’s not even worth considering.” (ibid. pg. 22).

In the meeting with the Great Vizer which took place April 24, 1918, Mykola Levitsky presented a detailed description of the Central Rada’s position on the Crimean question, specifically as it applied to the Moslem population: there was never an indication a
Report of the ambassador of Ukraine to Turkey about Turkish support of the inclusion of Crimea in the governmental structure of Ukraine.
complete Crimean independence was desired. The UNR looks at Crimea as a part of the Ukrainian nation, with full guarantees of national rights and liberties. (ibid. pg. 22).

In answer to the Vizer’s question “how are we to understand these guarantees, will this be a fully autonomous republic within a federation with the Ukrainian National Republic, or a separate province with broad powers of self rule”. The Ukrainian diplomat replied. “A federation would really be impossible, the Moslem population is not concentrated in any one area but is mixed with Ukrainians, and that they are in a minority everywhere but Yaltinsk (where they constitute about 68% of the population). Thus they cannot be treated as a geographic entity. And so, guarantee of national freedom is all that we can offer. The exact nature of these guarantees would have to be decided with the Crimean Assembly, which will meet as soon as Crimea is cleaned of the Bolsheviks.” (ibid, pg. 22).

Crimean autonomy was in the plans of the Turkish government, so the Great Vizer asked Levitsky “You will be giving the Moslems freedom?” Getting assurances from the Ukrainian ambassador once again he again repeated the Turkish position that they had no intention of having Crimea as a protectorate, “I assure you we have no such intentions whatsoever. When our Moslem brothers asked for military assistance against the Bolsheviks, we gave orders that one of our regiments on the Romanian front, along with Austrian units, start for Crimea. This assistance in no way represented any political ambitions on our part, we only wanted to make sure there would be no pressures on our Moslem brothers, if you guarantee national freedom, then there the matter ends.” (ibid, pg. 23)

Counting the “Ukrainization” of the Black Sea fleet, the desires of the Crimean Tartars, and the Crimean population in general, the loyalty of the Turkish government as demonstrated by the meeting of the ambassador in Istanbul, the government of Hetman Skoropadsky decided to seriously consider including the peninsula in the Ukrainian National Republic.

In the meeting of the Rada of Ministers on May 7, 1918 the question of national borders was discussed, especially the uniting Crimea with Ukraine. After hearing the text of a meeting between Pavlo Sko-
ropadsky and the German ambassador, and his statement, that he intended to send a formal letter to the ambassador in which he stressed the necessity of joining Crimea to Ukraine, this action was approved. (CDAVOVU, fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 6, pg. 6). Also, at this meeting, a resolution was voted to assign the task of substantiating the economic necessity of bringing Crimea under the Ukrainian National Republic umbrella to various ministers. (ibid matter 8, pg. 2).

In a letter to German ambassador Mum, the Ukrainian Government noted: “With the circumstances that developed in November of 1917, when the Russian Federated Republic intended to include a Crimean Republic and failed to do so, the Government of Ukraine must insist on including within its political boundaries the entire Crimean peninsula and not only the northern portion of the Tauridian Guberny. This is clearly motivated by strategic and economic necessities and it is also quite legal.

The government of Ukraine, with all due respect, would like to stress that this government has no untoward intentions regarding the population of the Crimean peninsula. The 1897 census carried out by the Russian Empire provides the following statistical data: in the 5 provinces of the Tauridian Guberny on the Crimean peninsula, the total population was 556,592 and only 186,081 indicated that Tartar or Turkish was their natal language. Included in this number were 5,609 Karaims and 3312 Jews. So the Tartar population, even including the Turks, comprised only 32% of the total population of the Crimean peninsula.

Even counting by individual province, the figure does not exceed 33%. So it is not reasonable to expect the balance of the population, which the Ukrainian government is obligated to govern and protect, with the acceptance of the Moslem Crimean Republic to bow to the wishes of a Moslem minority, an idea held as inconceivable by European diplomats.

It was not possible for the Ukrainian government to decide in favor of anything other than inclusion in the Ukrainian Republic. To do otherwise would be to ignore fundamental principles of justice and international law, and would not be equitable to the 2/3 majority of the population.
On the basis of the aforementioned, the Government of Ukraine has the honor of requesting that your Excellency, Mister Ambassador, forward these arguments to Your Government and ask them to issue the appropriate orders to the German army in the Tauridian Guberny, that Ukrainian authorities in that area, including the Crimean peninsula, are not hampered in the carrying out of their duties inasmuch as the Government of Ukraine, with the explanations given, cannot abrogate its rights to the entire Tauridian Guberny, including Crimea, which should be included in the Ukrainian Nation.

The Government of Ukraine would like to inform You about its intentions regarding the alternative organization of the Crimean peninsula which include a broad cooperation with the population as to political autonomy, a project to begin this is already underway.” (ibid fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 132, pgs. 12—15).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine called a special meeting to discuss this situation. Well known professors were invited to discuss the Crimean problem, including Bohayevsky, Kistyakivsky, Ehelman, Minister Vasilenko, ex-General Secretary of International Affairs Shulgin, Slivinsky, Halip, Surovtseva, Sukhoversky, Tka

After discussing the information from various sources (incidentally, a Ukrainian official, Yakim Khristin, forwarded a message from the German general Koch saying that he wanted to make a “second Nice” for himself), the assembly agreed on uniting Crimea with Ukraine. (ibid, pg. 16).

Professor Bohayevsky expressed the basis for this decision thus: “The Crimean question has repercussions for Ukraine that involve its future political and economic existence. Crimea allows domination of the northern coast of the Black Sea and affords protection for Ukrainian ports. The straits of Kerch play a role as the second Bosporus. Germany, which supports the creation of new countries from the ruins of old Russia as a buffer in the East should be careful to acquire independent and loyal allies. Without Crimea Ukraine will be shifted east and north into Moscow’s influence, and with every eventual misunderstanding will play the role that Italy has.
The country can exist without Besarabia and Kholm, but not without Crimea. Without it independence would be illusory. As to the various peoples that live in Crimea, the principle of self determination must have reasonable boundaries, it is impossible to artificially separate complex geo-economic entities. Annexation is out of the question, as Ukraine is forming as a nation, and Crimea with surrounding areas can substantially contribute to a Ukrainian nation.

As far as the peoples living in this territory, a particular autonomy or even federalization can be worked out. At this time federalization is not possible as this plan is now one-sided, an actual statement from Crimea is necessary.”

The Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Doroshenko, sent a special letter to the German ambassador Mum on May 30th, 1918, in which he argued the necessity of including Crimea within the Ukrainian National Republic:

“Crimea is intimately connected with Ukraine economically, politically, and ethnographically. Ukraine cannot develop normally without Crimea. It is true that the 3rd “Universal” of the Ukrainian National Republic stated that only the northern part of the Tauridian Guberny, without Crimea, belongs to Ukraine.

However, the “Universal” outlined the main areas of Ukraine’s territory with the intention of bringing in areas that did not have an absolute majority at a later time. Thus, the 3rd “Universal” did not mention Kholm, parts of Kursk, the Voronezh Guberny, the provinces of the Don army, or Besarabia; it was presumed these regions would join Ukraine, the same applying to Crimea. This approach to defining the boundaries is further explained by the fact that original plans were to have Ukraine part of Russia as a Federated Republic. The same is true of Crimea which was to also be attached to Russia as a Republic, and so the drafters of the 3rd “Universal” presumed that connection with Crimea, a very important strategic and economic partner, would not be lost. Today, when complete independence seems inevitable, Crimea, as a Federated Republic, could be lost. And so, now that Ukrainian armed forces, with the help of our German friends, have control of Crimea, the
prospect of integrating Crimea into the political structure of Ukraine becomes very important.

Standing by the principle of self determination, not violating the will of the population, and understanding the nuances of the various peoples that live in Crimea, the government of Ukraine feels that an autonomous relationship with Crimea is imminently feasible. The government of Ukraine will begin preparing a plan, and knowing the attitudes of the people and their past relationship with the Ukrainian government, we have no doubt that the people of Crimea will choose to join Ukraine.” (ibid, Matter 186, pg. 30).

The executive “Starosta” of the Perekop province, Petro Vilner, also voiced a desire to be part of the Ukrainian republic in his report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. “The desire to join Ukraine was seen in the manner that the local representatives greeted me as the representative of the Ukrainian nation which was considering the Crimean question. When the Perekop Commissar was asked to turn over matters to us he agreed, asking for 2 or 3 days time, and immediately left for Simferopol for instructions. (ibid, matter 132, pg. 27).

It was the same in Evpatoria. When the Commissar appointed by the Ukrainian government, Baydak, arrived, the city authorities “expressed their happiness, that at last a representative from the Ukrainian government came”. (ibid, pg. 26). Baydak’s report stated that “almost all the civil servants in the city and most of the intelligentsia were Ukrainian. There were a few Tartars, but they were not advocating independence”. (ibid, pg. 26). However, the next day, June 7th, a Commissar from the temporary government announced the orders of General Sulkevich: “Do not entertain any relationship with the Ukrainian government and in no way accede to their requests.” (ibid, pg. 26).

After receiving a copy of the orders Vilner and Baydak sent an encrypted telegram to Kyiv asking for concrete instructions, but local telegraph offices refused to send the telegram without permission from the German commandant. He, in turn, told them to go to General Koch and show him the following orders: “All officers on duty in Ukraine are to cease their activities immediately and return to Simferopol”. (ibid, pg. 26).
Both Ukrainian representatives came to Simferopol on June 8th, and attempted to meet with General Sulkevich. He would not see them, but Prince Horchakov, a friend of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the temporary government, advised them to return to Kyiv because, in his opinion, the Crimean question will not be resolved in Simferopol or Kyiv, but in Berlin.

Aside from this, Prince Horchakov said that the revolt in Crimea was orchestrated by the German Command without any participation of the local population, and was, evidently, already decided in Berlin. As proof of this he related an incident where Solomon of Crimea was asked to assume a leadership position in the Tauridian Guberny and when he wanted to send a telegram to Kyiv with a request to explain details regarding the territory involved, the German Commandant told him: “I can assure you that only the three northern provinces are involved, Ukraine has no ties to Crimea whatsoever.” (ibid, pg. 26).

It seems that the new outlook of the Germans was to not allow Crimea to be dependent on Ukraine at all, and never be included in the Ukrainian Republic. According to a report by Colonel Khimich, the German Minister of Colonies arrived in Crimea from Berlin in May, 1918, and heard a request from Germans living in Crimea that they want Emperor Wilhelm to take the peninsula as a protectorate. (Institute of hand-written documents in the National Library of Ukraine, named after V. Vernadsky, Fund XI, matter 3318, pg. 1).

A conference of the representatives of the Imperial Government and Chiefs of Command advised Kaiser Wilhelm II: ”Both Ukraine and Russia have designs on Crimea. Agreement is not really possible, nor is agreement as to the borders. Order should be maintained. The Bolshevik criminals there are still free. We cannot enforce things that have already passed by. The population cannot form a government. General Sulkevich is ready to run the government with our agreement.” (ibid, pg. 571).

This situation gives rise to various rumors: “1. Germany will annex Crimea as a colony, 2. German annexation of the southern strip only, giving the rest to Ukraine, and 3. Creating a Tartar nation with German rule and economic interests.” (ibid, pg. 2).
Aside from this, the report by Colonel Khimicha noted that “local authorities, elected under broad socialist principles are not able to deal with their assignments. Their activities follow the orders from the Bolsheviks and Germans.” (ibid, pg. 2).

This document also stated that “the Germans, cleaning Sevastopol of any Ukrainian element, slowly resettled them back to Ukraine”. (ibid, pg. 3).

At the beginning of June, 1918 the German Command decided to turn over the rule of Crimea to the Russian general Sulkevich, who issued orders that local authorities not have any relations with the Ukrainian government whatsoever.” (CDAOVU, fund 3766, matter 132, pg. 27).

Hetman Skoropadsky tried to influence the situation in Crimea through the Germans, especially since a convention of farmers and landowners of the Guberny in June 12, 1918, having acquainted themselves with the position of the Ukrainian government supported joining Ukraine. The chairman of the convention sent the following telegram to Kyiv: “We warmly welcome this step on the part of government.” (ibid, matter 186, pg. 738).

The Kurultai, popular with the people, also spoke in favor in joining Ukraine on an autonomous basis. (Ekaterinoslavsk News, 1918, June 7).

Nevertheless, the local Crimean government headed by General Suleiman Sulkevich, who was extremely pro Russian, in the words of D. Doroshenko “began to fight against the “Ukrainian propaganda” and persecute Ukrainian newspapers, then refused to accept any correspondence written in Ukrainian. Ukraine replied with an economic blockade of the peninsula. I insisted in a meeting of the Rada of ministers regarding a “customs war” with Crimea; all commercial activity and sea going traffic was halted, with the exception of that required by the German divisions stationed in Crimea. The vegetable harvest, in a very bountiful year, was approaching. The fruit growers needed wooden slats for their boxes, wood for dryers, shavings and sawdust for packing; all these were imported from Ukraine, but now they stopped. They also needed sugar for conserving the fruits and berries, which was no longer available. Last but not least,
the population needed bread. In a couple of weeks prices for all produce grew tremendously. The harvest could not be packed into conserves without sugar and rotted; the situation of the fruit growers became catastrophic. The Germans had already purchased a quantity of vegetables, both fresh and dried, and they were decaying. Transporting out of Crimea by Sea was impossible because the produce could not tolerate such an extended journey and subsequent loading onto railroad freight cars. The Germans turned to us with a note requesting the ending of the blockade. We replied that we could not do this. They turned to us again, citing the hardships on the Crimean people.

We replied that the Ukrainian government was obliged to insure the delivery of produce to Germany, but there was no such obligation to Crimea. We are ready to cooperate but this depends entirely on Crimean government, which heretofore refused to reach an understanding with us. The Germans no longer contacted us. The government of General Sulkevich had to capitulate: a telegram was received from him stating that he was ready to discuss the details of Crimean unification with Ukraine.” (D. Doroshenko, My Remembrance of the Recent Past, pg. 301, 302).

Supporting D. Doroshenko, the Rada of Ministers, in its resolution of July 27, instructed the finance minister “to pay very close attention to any freight going to Crimea and make sure that no provisions are exported to Crimea”. To help him he was given the widest latitude of authority regarding customs inspection of outgoing ships.” (CDAVOVU. fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 6, pg. 135).

Very detailed analyses of Crimean economy conducted by local specialists verified that Crimea cannot function without close ties with Ukraine. According to conclusions reached by one of these specialists, M. Benenson, the grain harvest in 1918, both feed for livestock, affecting the working cattle, and commercial grain for public consumption would fall far short of requirements. In 1916 the grain harvest totaled 13,888 thousand pood (each pood being 40 lbs.), in 1917 the total was 14,252 thousand, but in 1918 the harvest was only 10,199 pood. (M. Benenson, Economic Description of Crimea, Simferopol. 1919, pg. 26).
This situation was often repeated on the peninsula, its northern parts and the mainland parts of the Tauridian Guberny often seeing strong easterly winds which had a negative effect on farming. They are known for their very dry, hot winds which cause droughts in the spring and summer, and great snowdrifts in the winter. These winds also cause storms that raise large amounts of sand and dust into the air, contributing to destruction of the harvest.

One of these storms, in 1892, was still remembered in Crimea; the sandstorm, with a peculiar red color like a sunset, was seen as far away as St. Petersburg. (Land Office Center and the south of European Russia. (SPB, 1911, pg. 12).

Natural circumstances prevented the peninsula from developing a strong farming culture. Other than raising sheep, Crimea could raise cattle, which also impacted farming development as there were not enough cattle left to help with the plowing. Two and a half thousand horses had to be brought in each year to help plow the available land. (M. Benenson, ibid, pg. 28).

Just before World War I, 25,000 head of cattle were brought in to supply meat for the population. The main suppliers of cattle before the war were Kuban, Katerinoslavsk, and the northern provinces of the Tauridian Guberny. Later the cattle came mainly from neighbors of the peninsula, Berdyansk, Dniprovsk, and Melitopol provinces. (ibid, pg. 28).

Raising hogs was also not very successful; three quarters of the pork consumed came from the Melitopol province. (ibid, pg. 28).

After Crimea was taken over by Russia, the sheep herds declined, despite all means the government used. In 1897 there were 1,483,000 sheep in Crimea, in 1917 this number dropped dramatically to only 350,000, a four-fold drop. A paradox developed; while the locals continually decreased their herds, large numbers of sheep (averaging 10,000 to 120,000 head) were driven from adjoining provinces to graze on the land. At first they came from the Dniprovsk province, then even from Besarabia through Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Kakhovka, and Perekop. The locals benefited by letting these sheep graze on their land, receiving all new born sheep, dairy products, and a portion of the wool. Inventories showed that almost half of
the sheep brought in to graze were slaughtered for meat by the local population. (ibid, pgs. 31—32).

Because the peninsula never developed widespread sheep herding, there was no commercial wool processing industry. Two small factories, one in Johnko and one in Feodosia, each having a few employees, were not even included in an analysis of Crimean economy. (ibid, pg. 58).

Tobacco products also were not commercially developed, even though there seemed to be every opportunity to do so. The 8 new companies that appeared after 1913, in the words of M. Benenson, “are not contenders for a laurel wreath in the tobacco industry. In past times Crimea was known for a couple of excellent tobacco products with recognized trade names. What we have today is a pouch of tobacco without indication of variety, name, aging, and most importantly, without proper sorting and grading, a basic requirement in the tobacco trade. If the labels were removed and changed from one product to another, the buyer would never know the difference. (ibid, pg. 58).

Another category that should have prospered was the conserving of fruits (canning), but this required sugar imported from Ukraine; 623 thousand pood were brought in annually. Not only was sugar necessary by itself, but it also enabled the canning industry and wine making. In 1918, during the Ukrainian blockade, all the canning factories that specialized in fruit jams and jellies, syrups, and candies were forced to change over to vegetables and meat products.

In spite of great local potential, Crimean markets were full of dried fruit from Greece and Turkey because they were not able to maintain continuous production. (ibid, pgs. 60, 61, and 73).

Due to the lack of flour milling facilities, a lot of flour had to be imported, even during plentiful harvests. In 1913 4,948 thousand pood of flour were brought into Crimea, and also 1,277 thousand pood of bran. (ibid, pg. 68).

Ukrainian farmers helped develop Crimean grain trade; grain (mostly wheat) was exported through Feodosia, Sevastopol, and Evpatoria. The port in Feodosia alone annually exported nearly 25 million pood of grain, most of which came from the northern
provinces of the Tauridian, Katerinoslavsk, Poltava, and Kharkiv Gubernies. This had a pronounced effect on the economy of the peninsula. (ibid, pg. 69).

Essentially all the products needed in Crimea, that were not able to be produced internally, were provided by Ukraine. 90,500 pood of dairy products, 45,000 pood of eggs, 27,000 pood of foul, 18,000 pood of vegetable oil, 1,204,000 pood of potatoes, and 721,200 pood of hay were shipped annually. (ibid, pgs. 73, 74).

Aside from this, local farmers relied on other necessities from Ukraine: coal (2,395,000 pood imported from the Donbas region annually), wood (1,406,000 pood from the Chernihiv region), and metal from the factories in Pridnieprovy, using ore from Krivorih. (ibid, pg. 75).

To completely satisfy the requirements of Crimean economy in 1913, 40,127,900 karbovantsy had to be spent on imports. (ibid, pg. 77).

The report of the Mayor of Simferopol clearly illustrated the position that Crimea found itself in. If, before the blockade was announced, the residents of the peninsula did not really care whether it became “Tartar, German, Ukrainian, or was divided into 5 independent republics, as long as their lives were peaceful, now that they began to feel hunger, they scurried for a solution. The non-Tartar population, even though they were not completely aware of the situation in Ukraine, and independent of their political views regarding one or another combination of countries, listening to the demands of their stomachs, looked for a way to express their desire to join with Ukraine, realizing that this would open the borders. (CDAVOVU, fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 14, pg. 4).

As this document shows, the authorities in the Guberny began to have a clear picture of what happen if Crimea continued to be isolated. The land office and commerce department wrote to General Sulkevich and the German General Koch, that, even in the relatively good harvest of 1917, over 553,341 pood of grain had to be imported. The harvest on the peninsula was poor in 1918. In the Perekop province the gathered grain was enough to only feed the livestock. The reasonably plentiful harvest in the Evpatoria area was
taken by the Germans. It was hoped that some grain was available from the fields of Feodosia and Simferopol. (ibid, pg. 4).

During my stay in Simferopol, wrote the Mayor, “the last reserves of bread were doled out to the public (one pound for two days). The authorities then were totally out of any reserves. Residents who were accustomed to buy any amount of bread they wanted now had to stand in line with their ration cards, starting in the evening. Butter and fat of any kind is virtually not available in the markets. Prices are rising daily.” (ibid, pg. 5).

The catastrophic economic situation in Crimea was caused not only by the lack of Ukrainian wheat. The peninsula also depended on rail connections with Ukraine, so that they could export their products to Ukraine, an important market. The head of the Simferopol fruit and wine exchange, A. Pastak, noted in a letter, that in order to take advantage of a good harvest of fruit, they needed 30 rail cars per day for the export of the summer harvest, and at least 60 per day for the winter harvest. However, to ship these quantities nearly 1,000 rail cars of packing materials were needed. (ibid, fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 133, pg. 13).

The situation was also difficult for the grape and vegetable growers in Crimea. The authorities in Feodosia turned to Kyiv for permission to bring in 500 pood of Copper oxide from Kharkiv, 300 of Sulfer oxide, 20 of Iron oxide, 40 of Barium chlorate, and 3 of Parisian green, otherwise the grape, fruit, and vegetable growers will be in danger of losing their crop. (ibid, pg. 18).

Not to be forgotten were the problems with forage for animals. This situation, in the words of the minister of farming, Rappa, was worse than that with grain. The harvest of oats, barley, and hay in the peninsula was generally poor and the import of these from the northern provinces was very difficult because of the customs war declared by the Ukrainian government. (The Southern Morning (Simferopol) 1918, August 27).

In Yalta, the annual requirements for hay were 400,000 pood, grain for livestock feed 500,000 pood, and also 500,000 pood of bran. Simferopol required these three items in quantities of 840,000, 800,000, and 600,000 pood. Simferopol needed these in approxi-
mately the same quantities. (The Free South (Sevastopol), 1918, July 16th).

At the end of August, 1918, the lack of sugar reached crisis levels. Even though the German government bought 300 rail cars of sugar in Ukraine, the customs war prevented their delivery to the peninsula. (The Southern Morning, 1918, August 27th).

Of course, given the conditions in 1918, this deficit was felt 100 times worse. Only then did the people of Crimea understand their dependence on Ukraine, and the economic ties that were forged over several centuries, without which the population of the peninsula faced a real catastrophe.

In August, 1918 the head of the Tauridian flour millers association, H. Kahansky, announced that “the economic union of Crimea with Ukraine is imperative”. (The Southern Morning, 1918, August 25th).

This newspaper wrote that Ukraine and Crimea had many things in common with nothing to separate them. Even in the actions of the “two governments, ignoring the lack of proper relations between them, there is much in common. Both consciously try to promote peaceful, creative progress, call for national growth, wage war on the remains of the Bolsheviks, and work to rebuild the law and order that was lost with the extremism of the revolution. This should be enough to reach out to one another and join together for a common goal.

We have already been notified by telegram about the new law regarding elections which was prepared for the local committees by the Ukrainian government. It essentially mirrors that proposed by the Crimean government. (ibid, August 28th).

A convention of orchard owners, meeting September 5th, 1918 in Simferopol, approved a petition to the Crimean and Ukrainian governments to stop the customs war “which badly affects the economy of the peninsula. Professor Dekker was appointed to begin discussions with the Ukrainian government.” (Rebirth, 1918, number 131).

A convention of commercial trading organizations, exchange commissions, cooperatives, banks, authorities regulating commerce,
local authorities, and land office bureaucrats selected a delegation to Ukraine. It was composed of the Simferopol exchange committee led by Kharchenko, the Guberny commerce authority led by Steven, the ex-commissioner of the Guberny Bohdanov, the representative of the exchange in Feodosia Cvibak, and wood products businessman Khalitov. The delegation had instructions to try to get agreement to a common customs arrangement with Ukraine, and to have the right to have their own representative in negotiations with other countries regarding economic issues. (The Near-Azov Lands, 1918, September 25th).

The Crimean government, even in the midst of these circumstances, still tried to appeal to German authorities and then encouraged the people to believe that Berlin would help them become independent of Ukraine. In the first part of September, 1918, Crimean newspapers published a notification that “we received news from a representative of the government in Berlin that Crimea’s independence from Ukraine is established.

Count Tatushchev has entered into discussions with representatives of the Ukrainian government asking for immediate cessation of the economic war with Crimea and creating a plan that would permit reasonable relations between Ukraine and Crimea”. (ibid, September 4th).

However, the first part of this announcement confused what is desired, and what is actually real. When the delegation from Crimea arrived in the German Capital, the assistant to the Minister of Germany, Shtumm, told Baron Steingel, the ambassador from the Ukrainian government, that “these gentleman will not be officially received, as talk about Crimea will be between Ukraine and Germany” and so the Ukrainian ambassador commented “in that case the issue is decided, Crimea is ours”. (CDAVOVu, fund 3766, desc. 3, matter 1, pg. 46).

The head of the Rada of the ministers of Ukraine, Fedir Lizohub told correspondents “In the question of Crimea, Germany has recognized our rights to fully rule the Crimean peninsula. The issue of negotiations with the Crimean government did not come up, but they can begin with the initiative of the Crimean government, to be
held in Kyiv.” (The Near-Azov Lands (Rostov), 1918, September 12).

Some of the local ministers began to have doubts as to the longevity of the Crimean government, and spoke out in favor of Crimea joining Ukraine. (CDAVOVU, fund 106, desc. 1, matter 14, pg. 5).

Of course, this was well understood in Berlin; the German government sent a telegram to Simferopol on September 10 in which they advised to begin discussions with Ukraine, offering to be a moderator. (Rebirth, 1918, pg. 134).

At a conference called together on September 15, 1918, held in the main hall of the Crimean government, present were also representatives of the German government, Vidfeld, a secret adviser to the Emperor, and a group from the armed forces, Major Von Devitz, Captain Prince Reys, Major Zidmund, and Lieutenant Kumrov.

After the meeting was opened, Prince Reys asked General Sulkevich to outline the points that apply to economic problems and must be discussed in Kyiv. The head of the Crimean government said that the most important single problem at that time was the export of fruits. If a large quantity of this harvest cannot be exported soon, then the orchards will be ruined and may have to be plowed under. (A short report on the activities of the delegation from the Crimean government in Kyiv from September 28th to October 16th, 1918, Simferopol, pg. 62).

The representative from the Ministry of Finances, Nikiforov, informed the assembly of the difficulties that arose from the cessation of the flow of funds between Ukraine and Crimea. The villagers, who had to settle all their accounts, whether buying or selling, through the commercial bank, had no money. Dombrovo, the representative of the Ministry of Farming emphasized the need for importing food and feed reserves, as well as coal.

Having listened to all these arguments, General Sulkevich concluded that since the Crimean government already tried to negotiate with Kyiv twice and was rebuffed each time, there was no point in trying a third time unless he had the support of the German government.
The secret adviser Vidfeld counseled that any proposition to the German Command regarding the Ukrainian government should be done carefully, in such a way as to insure that they would not be waiting for another denial. (ibid, pg. 64).

Summing up the results of the conference, General Sulkevich stated that “the Crimean representatives will have full and broad plenary powers to negotiate and form agreements using their judgment, and not be required to get approvals from the Rada of ministers in Simferopol”. (ibid, pg. 64).

The next day the commander of German forces in Ukraine, General Koch, notified Simferopol that Berlin has decided “to unite Crimea and Ukraine based on autonomous local rule. The details are to be worked out with representatives of the Ukrainian government.” (ibid, pg. 67).

General Koch continued his statement saying that “the Crimean government is not a national government, but only local, without their own minister of foreign affairs. Crimea should not have any political relations with other countries”. (ibid, pg. 67).

As demanded by the Germans, on September 17, 1918, the members of the Crimean government gave their reply. They insisted that “the joining of Crimea with Ukraine did not necessarily mean that Crimea could not be involved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have a representation in embassies and consulates.” (ibid, pg. 68).

After thoroughly analyzing the situation, General Sulkevich and his people were forced to negotiate with Kyiv. This step was taken not only due to pressure from the Germans, but also from the orchard owners who turned to both Kyiv and Simferopol asking them to come to an agreement. (Rebirth, 1918, pg. 131).

Inasmuch as the negotiations in Kyiv did not begin on September 20, as was planned at the meeting of the Crimean government, the Chief German Command asked the Simferopol government that a delegation should leave for Kyiv, emphasizing that was very desirable. (A short report ..., pg. 66).
Crimean political circles also leaned toward negotiating with the Ukrainian government regarding unification. A local activist, Prince V. Obolensky, recalled that their thoughts turned to Kyiv, albeit unwillingly, due to circumstances. In the first part of October, 1918, he stated that “these thoughts, held by those close to the government of the Guberny, had already matured. It became quite clear to us that if we joined larger Ukraine we would have a better chance of joining Russia later, but if remained a small independent country and the Austro-Hungarian forces triumphed, we would be completely pushed away.” (V. Obolensky, Crimea Under Germany — Crimean archive, 1996, no. 2, pg. 24).

The government of the Guberny called together a meeting of local Crimean authorities at which various possibilities proposed by Prince Obolensky, concerning the unification with Ukraine, were discussed. Despite the varying political views of the attendants, he wrote “as to the central topic brought up for discussion, there were no disagreements.” (ibid, pg. 24).

After learning of the Crimean government’s decision to enter into discussions with the Ukrainian government concerning joining Ukraine, and taking into account the difficult situation the Crimean population found itself in, not being able sell their fruit and grape harvest, Hetman Skoropadsky’s Rada of the Ministers of Ukraine declared on September 18th, 1918:

“1. Temporarily stop the customs war on the condition that Crimean representatives with appropriate plenary powers are immediately sent to begin discussions in Kyiv.

2. Request that the Ministry of Finance lift the requirement of customs inspection of goods going from Kyiv to Crimea.

3. The negotiations are to be conducted by the ministers directly involved, and not turn over plenary powers to others.

4. Information about the temporary lifting of the customs war will be sent by telegraph.” (CDAVOVU, fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 11, pg. 62).

When pro tem head of the Rada of the Ministers of the Ukrain-
ian government, M. Vasilenko, announced at its meeting September 23rd, 1918 that a telegram was received from the head of the Rada of Ministers of Crimea announcing that the delegation was leaving, it was decided: “To send General Sulkevich a telegram that specified the delegates should have plenary powers to decide not only economic, but also political questions.” (ibid, pg. 5).

General Sulkevich replied on September 26th, 1918 with a telegram to the Hetman which confirmed that the delegation has full authority to “conduct negotiations with your Highness on all economic and financial matters that impact Crimea and Ukraine, unification of Crimea with Ukraine, and all factors involved in the unification.

Senator Akhmatovich, along with the other members, is empowered to sign any agreements and applicable documents that are drawn up by Crimean and Ukrainian representatives in the name of the Crimean government.” (ibid, fund 3696, desc. 2k, matter 6, pg. 1).

The cessation of the customs war enabled the export of fruits from Crimea. Over 2 million pood was expected to be exported. (Rebirth, 1918, October 9th).

From its side, Ukraine promised to ship 900,000 pood of wheat flour. (ibid, October 3rd).

The announcement that the talks have begun gave the Ukrainians living in Crimea a chance to assert themselves. In the beginning of October the Ukrainian community in Simferopol began to organize a network of Ukrainian cooperatives, consumer and farm produce organizations. The Ukrainian club started a school in Sevastopol. (ibid, October 11th).

The activities of Ukrainian organizations before this markedly influenced these actions. When Crimea found itself in a bad situation, they called their first meeting on August 28th and 29th, 1918 in the premises of the Simferopol Community Association, located on Lazarevska street, number 8. The meeting was called by the steering committee of the Simferopol Community Organization with the approval of Crimean government and the German commandant of Simferopol.
The gathering was attended by: Petro Bliznyuk, head of the Simferopol Community Rada, Dennis Matzko, representing the Simferopol Community Cooperative; from Yalta, head of the Community Rada, Pavlo Horyansky and associate Natalia Yaro-shevska; representing Sevastopol was a member of the audit com-
mittee of the Ukrainian club, Maksim Mulenko and the head of the cooperative (and also treasurer), Ivan Likhonos; from Evpatoria, sent by the Community Rada, Pavlo Cherevchenko; the delegate from Alupki, member of the Ukrainian Community Organization, Yosip Shevchenko; representing various towns in the Tauridian Gu-
berny was Mitrofan Maltsiv, member of the executive committee of all organizations in the Guberny.

The latter opened the conference, Ivan Likhonos was elected head, associate head was Yosip Shevchenko, and Petro Bliznyuk secretary.

With the presidium in place, the order of the day was determined and approved unanimously:
1. Reports from the attendees.
2. Organization of the central group of communities.
3. Forming of cooperatives.
4. Cultural and educational matters.
5. Preparation of a statute for Ukrainian cultural and educational community organizations. (CDAVOMU, fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 132, pg. 43).

After reports from attendees and a detailed discussion of the planned topics, the conference approved the following resolutions:

I

Publishing the Ukrainian newspaper in Russian.

The convention felt it was very important to publish such a newspaper in Crimea, approved the use of any means necessary to accomplish this.

II

Support of the Ukrainian newspaper “Nash Step” (Our Steppe).

Understanding the impoverished condition of this newspaper, the convention asked the Ukrainian community in Crimea to support it financially, and help with some of the writing.
III
Create a national choir. Form a choir attached to each community organization, led by a competent choirmaster. On occasion, all the choirs in a city should join together for public performances. If necessary, hire professional singers.

IV
The convention, feeling that it is very important to spread national erudition, approved the organization of Ukrainian lessons, schools, kindergartens, and Ukrainian holidays by Ukrainian organizations and the authorities in Crimea. The local Rada in Crimea should be available to help the Ukrainian community organizations with these endeavors.

V
Preschool education.
Organize preschool education as soon as possible so the children of our citizens will be prepared to enter the first grade in a school where the lessons are taught in Ukrainian.
The next school year, 1918—1919, should see each community group organizing lessons in Ukrainian language, writing, history, culture, and geography for young students and adults.

VI
Libraries and reading rooms.
It is seen as necessary to assist local community groups in the acquisition of books and periodicals, and ask the local Rada to help this effort by notifying the public about book bazaars, new publications, ordering books and seeing to their delivery at organizational expense, and, finally, setting up a book collection center in the towns central areas.

VII
Recognizing that Ukrainian theater was and still is at the apex of Ukrainian cultural life, it must be encouraged so that it will spread Ukrainian culture among its own people and to others; theatrical productions must be supported as much as possible.

VIII
Children’s preschools.
Ask the Ukrainian organizations to pay special attention to
preschools, giving the children as much Ukrainian education as possible, organize songs, games, and, if possible, start their own preschools.

IX
Kozak affairs.

Ukrainian organizations, with agendas primarily involved with culture and education, could not contribute in economic matters, so therefore the convention decided: propose to all Ukrainian organizations in Crimea that they form their own national cooperatives and join them to the Crimean association of cooperatives using as an example the statute of the Simferopol Ukrainian Community.

The Rada of the Cooperative Association must include representation from the Ukrainian Rada of Crimea.

X

The convention voted unanimously to recommend that all Ukrainian organizations forming in Crimea use the statute drafted by the community in Simferopol as an example.

XI

Organization of central community groups.

Create a regional Ukrainian Organization in Crimea based in Simferopol, including in its makeup five members and one candidate, and call it “Regional Ukrainian Rada in Crimea”. This organization is to bring to fruition the various decisions of this convention.

XII

The Regional Ukrainian Rada should be opened and commence its functioning August 30th at three PM.” (ibid, pgs. 43, 44).

The first meeting of both delegations, sent to discuss unification, took place October 5th, 1918, chaired by the head of the Rada of Ministers of Ukraine, F. Lizohub and attended by the representative of the German Command, Prince Reys.

Besides F. Lizohub, other members of the cabinet of ministers were present: minister of the armed forces, Rohoza, minister of foreign affairs Doroshenko, minister of finance Rzhepetsky, minister of trade and commerce Hutnik, minister of internal affairs Kistyakivsky, associate minister of foreign affairs Paltov, and a representative of the minister of the navy, Chernelivsky-Sokil.
The Crimean Regional Government was represented by the minister of justice Akhmatovich, minister of education Charikov, minister of roads and transportation Freeman, and minister of freight delivery Dombrovo.

After reading a sincere welcome in the name of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, who expressed his belief that the negotiations will reach a speedy and successful conclusion, Lizohub asked for a word from the leader of the Crimean delegation. Senator Akhmatovich, after thanking everyone for the greeting, presented his credentials with the plenary powers granted by General Sulkevich and asked that the Ukrainian delegates present theirs. Not satisfied with verbal assurances from Lizohub, Akhmatovich insisted on seeing a written document from Hetman Skoropadsky. (A short report on the activities of the delegation from the Crimean government in Kyiv from September 28th to October 16th 1918. Simferopol, 1918, pg. 10).

After explaining that “due to technical reasons it would be impossible to present a copy of the journal entry of the Rada of Ministers of Ukraine at that moment” Lizohub invited the delegates to share their ideas relative to the order and subject matter of the negotiations. (ibid, pg. 11).

As to the request by Akhmatovich regarding written credentials confirming the Ukrainian delegate’s plenary powers, the Hetman’s representatives assured everyone that they were empowered to approve all decisions reached at the negotiations.

The head of the Rada of Ministers of Ukraine assured everyone present that “the interests of both Crimea and Ukraine are equally important to the representatives of the Ukrainian government. If, in the course of negotiations, it becomes clear that Ukraine should yield a little, it is prepared to do so. However, the first item of business is the unification of Crimea and Ukraine, and the opinion of the Ukrainian government is that without agreement on this issue, solving economic problems will be impossible.” (ibid, pg. 15).

There continued the following exchange of ideas:

“Akhmatovich. Thank you for your neighborly good wishes, but we would like to move the meeting to next Monday, when your documents can be presented Until then I would inquire what the opin-
ion of the Ukrainian government is relative to the political fate of Crimea, as the initiative to begin these negotiations was theirs.

Lizohub. We assure you that the copy of the journal entry of the Rada of ministers will be presented to the representatives of Crimea on Monday.

Paltov. The initiative for these negotiations came from the Crimean side. Count Tatishchev made the first statement on this topic, as recorded in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Akhmatovich. I don’t know about the political activities of Count Tatishchev, but his plenary powers extended only to questions of economics. A. M. Akhmatovich feels that the basis for these negotiations is the telegram sent to General Sulkevich from the Ukrainian government.

Lizohub. I did not feel that it was necessary to examine the credentials of Count Tatishchev, but if the Count came to Germany as a minister of the Crimean government, I presumed he was an official representative. Count Tatishchev talked about the possibilities of uniting Crimea with Ukraine in an autonomous relationship, such as Finland and Russia.

Akhmatovich. I don’t doubt the words, but I see this as an example of why we should exchange credentials. I can only act according to my instructions and ask that the Ukrainian government delineate the form which the union of Crimea and Ukraine will take at the next meeting. (ibid, pgs. 15, 16).

As an addition to its resolution on September 18th, the Rada of Ministers of the Ukrainian government confirmed on October 8th, 1918 “the plenary powers, regarding negotiation with Crimea and the unification with Ukraine, of the head of the Rada of Ministers Fedir Lizohub, minister of foreign affairs Dmytro Doroshenko, minister of internal affairs Ihor Kistyakivsky, minister of finance Anton Rzhepetsky, minister of trade and commerce Sergiy Hutnik, and armed forces minister Alexander Rohoz, giving them the power to sign any documents or agreements regarding political, financial, economic, or administrative issues.” (CDAVOVU, fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 7, pg. 10). At the second meeting the Ukrainian side gave the Crimean delegation time to acquaint themselves with the prof-
ferred credentials, and after this announced the plan drafted by the Ukrainian government defining the unification of Crimea with Ukraine. The agreement was proposed in 19 points:

1. Crimea is united with Ukraine as an autonomy under the exclusive rule of His Excellency the Hetman.

2. All subjects of Ukraine living within the boundaries of Crimea and the Crimean region within the borders of Ukraine have the same equal rights.

3. All international rights, the power to execute international agreements, command of the armed forces and fleet lie with the Hetman and the Ukrainian government. The Crimean army is to be formed as a territorial entity, remaining within Crimean borders in peacetime.

4. The Crimean region will have a regional government, regional popular elections, and the right to pass local laws.

5. All local laws voted by regional elections will be personally approved by the Hetman before taking force. He also will approve all higher elected officials of the regional government.

6. As regards national education, religion, nationalism, trade and commerce, farming, and village industry, the Crimean region is completely independent and will not be subject to the laws of the Ukrainian government.

7. All means of transport, with the exception of rail lines, and all natural resources are at the disposal of the regional government.

8. The Crimean government will levy and collect all forms of taxes, except income tax, and will enforce collection of its local levies.

9. The Crimean government will control criminal and civil courts and also any investigatory functions. A central court will be located in Simferopol. The ultimate court of appeals and its administration will be the Ukrainian National Senate.

10. The regional government maintains its own budget.

11. Territorial customs duties and regulations will be common with Ukraine.

The Crimean region will have a common currency with Ukraine, share the National Bank with Ukraine, pass tax laws that are similar
to those in Ukraine, common laws regulating the commercial fleet, and common use of rail lines, postal system, and telegraph.

12. All criminal and civil laws of Ukraine will remain in effect in Crimea. Exceptions that may arise due to local circumstances will be ruled on by local national elections, and then approved personally by the Hetman.

13. All military and commercial ports will be under the direct control of the Ukrainian government, who will maintain them at government expense.

14. The regional government has the right to institute an official language, and all local self-rule will be under its direction.

15. The regional government will direct all aspects of public medicine and organization of labor.

16. All government property in Crimea, with the exception of property specifically deeded to government entities and property that is specifically deeded to certain organizations, is the property of the regional government. Property deeded to government entities will be owned and managed by those entities in Ukraine, and similarly the organizations in Ukraine with property in Crimea will continue to manage them.

17. The Ukrainian government will be financially responsible for the maintenance of the army, fleet, military and commercial ports, rail lines, postal and telegraph offices, and all offices of a general rather than local nature.

18. The ministries of foreign affairs, armed forces, and finances will have special departments dealing with Crimean affairs.

19. His Excellency the Hetman will have a state secretary for Crimean affairs with an appropriate staff. This secretary will have the right to vote in meetings of the Rada of Ministers on all topics having to do with Crimea.

This state secretary is appointed by His Excellency the Hetman from the three candidates proposed by the regional government.”

(A short report... pg. 71—73).

Having received their instructions from General Sulkevich as to the negotiations, the Crimean delegation began to argue about expanding the rights of the peninsula with unification. In order to
pursue this line of negotiation they issued the following counter-proposition, already prepared in advance:

“1. Crimea, based on its declaration of the 12th of June (25th according to the newer adopted calendar — GZ) 1918, proposes the status of Crimea as a federated state with Ukraine.

2. The mutual relations between the two members of this federation involving political, economic, financial, judicial, and administrative matters will be governed by separate agreements. These should be based on the fraternal relations demonstrated in their external politics, and each, having their own government, shall fully exercise complete independence within the bounds of agreements.

3. Current circumstances make it difficult to judge what other party may be a member of this federation. Undoubtedly Kyiv will be capital of this union, and only life will tell which of the parts of the Russian Empire that have proclaimed themselves, and in what order, will join the union.

4. In any case, a future international congress will determine the status and eventual fate not only of Crimea. The representatives from members of this union should support the common interests of the union using all available political and economic resources as well as their own individual resources.

5. To promote expediency in matters involving His Excellency the Hetman, a state secretary dealing with Crimean affairs, with an appropriate staff, will be appointed by the Crimean government, and will be expected to be in constant contact with the Ukrainian government.

6. Yesterday’s proposition from the representatives of the Ukrainian government, and today’s counter-proposition from the Crimean side must be considered by the Crimean government.

Taking into account the fact that Ukraine and Crimea, regardless of the exact form of their union, have a great deal of common interests, this delegation proposes that such topics not be put off but rather discussed in specialized sub-committees.

The subcommittees should clarify the following issues of general interest to the people of Ukraine and Crimea:

1. The regional court in Simferopol should assign cases to the
courts of Melitopol, Dniprovsk, and Berdyansk to be adjudicated in the regional courts of Katerinislavsk and Kherson. The outline defining specific rules, which should be mutually agreed upon, is included in this proposal.

2. The lighthouses, channel markers, the hydro-meteorological services, and the Kerch-Enikal canal should be discussed. A short note about this is included.

3. A more precise definition of borders between Crimea and Ukraine.

In connection with this issue there arises another, that of including the land of the Tauridian Guberny in Melitopol, Dniprovsk, and Berdyansk.

4. Lastly, regarding import-export questions that affect both Crimea and Ukraine, because they are of a specific character, we should have a commission which would examine these issues.” (ibid, pgs. 73, 74).

The Crimean delegation, in answer to the nationalism of the Ukrainian side, “Rebirth” wrote, had a definite tendency toward “indivisibility” (of the Russian Empire — GZ) as seen in their third point “Current circumstances make it difficult to judge what other party may be a member of this federation…” (Rebirth, 1918, pg. 158).

This statement was explained by the representatives of the Tartars and Germans-colonists: “Inasmuch as we do not feel empowered to accept or not one or another of the provisions of the third item proposed, the representatives of the Crimean Tartars and German population reject the inclusion of this point in the counter-proposal. (ibid).

This divergence of opinions between the Crimean representatives and the actual residents of Crimea, who saw the union with Ukraine as a benefit, was very characteristic. That is why authorities in Kyiv had no doubt that “in the spirit of unification, a local parliament, composed of actual permanent residents of Crimea, will express itself.

The attempt to decide the issue of unification in the way that was presented was no less sabotage. These people (the Crimean delegates —
GZ) clearly expect something, anticipate something, first of all that someone will come and build another federated Russia for them, one which they can, with combined efforts, make “indivisible”, unified.” (ibid).

At the meeting on October 9th, 1918, the delegates heard the reading of the Ukrainian declaration, where the principles of a Crimean regional constitution were outlined. It envisioned that the plenary powers of both sides would include: the heads of state, the army, monetary system and finances, rail transport, postal system, national senate, and foreign representation. (Rebirth, 1918, October 11).

At the meeting on October 10th the Crimean delegation did not accept the aforementioned principles of the regional constitution. Senator Akhmatov, addressing himself to the head of the Ukrainian delegation, said that “the project of unification proposed by you — is a proposed enslavement.” (CDAVOVU, fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 132, pg. 50).

Answering him, Lizohub said that “the existing Crimean government is not empowered to finalize any agreements. The Ukrainian government would always welcome properly empowered representatives of a legitimately empowered Crimean government.”(ibid, pgs. 50, 51).

At last, at the meeting held on October 12th, the Crimean delegation agreed to examine in detail the proposed plan the Hetman’s government offered, but asked for a month so that the Kurultai (Assembly — GZ) of the peninsula can study it.

“We agreed to this”, reminisced D. Doroshenko, “because certain favorable matters were being decided (several delegates from various nationalities that were in Kyiv told us secretly). Meanwhile, the Germans agreed to turn over the Black Sea fleet along with Sevastopol, and the Ukrainian colors waved for the first time on several torpedo cruisers, and ships armed with cannon. This gave us de facto rule over Crimea.”(D. Doroshenko, Memories About the Recent Past, pg. 303).

It must be added that the association of (flour) millers of Tauridia, in a conference which opened October 16th, 1918, vigorously debated the prospect of joining Crimea to Ukraine. They sharply expressed their unhappiness with the actions of their government at the negotiations in Kyiv.
Protocol regarding the discussions about the inclusion of Crimea in the governmental structure of Ukraine in October 1918.
Local businessmen then began a project to open a branch of the Ukrainian Bank in Crimea. (Rebirth, 1918, pg. 162).

On October 18th, 1918, a labor congress in Simferopol approved a resolution to join Crimea with Ukraine. Three days later a gathering of the Ukrainian community in Sevastopol echoed a similar resolution. (ibid, pgs. 164, 165).

This grassroots movement pointed out that, first, the economic situation in Crimea was very difficult, and second, that the reserves of foodstuffs for the winter were very low. The 100,000 pood of potatoes that were purchased for the population were not delivered for a long time. And very little wheat was left. On October 23rd the ration of bread was reduced to three quarters of a pound. (ibid, pgs. 168).

Receiving new instructions, the Crimean delegation took steps to renew the negotiations. However, it was said in political circles of the Ukrainian government that a renewal of negotiations would happen only if the Crimean delegation substantially changed their position. (ibid, no. 162).

On October 30th, 1918 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian government Paltov met with two new members of the Crimean delegation, General Izveykov and senator Nikiforov, who continued discussions about the relations between Crimea and Ukraine.

That same day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw two representatives from the Russian association of steamship owners, Rabinovich and Burshteyn, who wanted to discuss the regulation of trade between Crimea and Ukraine. They were promised the resolution of this problem in the coming days, when the customs war would be stopped. (ibid, pgs. 173).

Not only the production and financial organizations of Crimea raised questions about the unification of Crimea and Ukraine. On October 10th, 1918 the professional associations of Crimea turned to the “Ucentroprof” (Central association of professionals — GZ): planning the formation of production oriented unions and associations, “Crimeaprof”, considering the close economic relations between Crimea and Ukraine, the absence of economic centers in
Crimea, and the weakness of Crimean professional associations, considers the best solution to be joining the Ukrainian centers.”

An impetus for the development of these events was clearly the November 6th, 1918 announcement by the German command that all responsibility for the Black Sea fleet will be transferred to the representative of the Naval Ministry of Ukraine, Admiral Klochkovsky, (Crimea (Simferopol), 1918, November 9th).

This, of course, gave a lift to the Ukrainians. On November 11th, 1918 a meeting of Ukrainians in Crimea was held in Yalta, forming the Ukrainian Regional Rada, its statute to include:

“The goal of the Rada:

1. The education and elevation of the culture and well-being of Ukrainians and the defense of rights of the Ukrainian population of Crimea. The territory is to include the entire peninsula.

2. In order to accomplish these goals the Rada recommends the following methods: publication of books and other publications and distributing them to the community, arranging various public lessons, lectures, expositions, concerts, and theatrical plays; oral education on various topics for the public, setting national holidays, and displays; hosting conventions and congresses on various topics, forming and stocking libraries, museums, and reading rooms; founding schools and organizing instructional courses; founding religion based schools, children’s kindergartens, vacation establishments, and other goodwill institutions; organizing institutions to loan money to and aid small businesses, institutions that support financially scholars, writers, artists, and students.

3. The regional Ukrainian Rada in Crimea is a legal entity that can buy and build moveable and immovable property (real estate), can make loans and various agreements, and protect its interests, through persons approved by the Rada, in whatever institutions may be necessary.

Seal

4. The Rada has its own seal, “Regional Ukrainian Rada in Crimea”.

Organization of the Rada and setting the agenda

5. The Regional Ukrainian Rada is composed of representatives of
existing Ukrainian organizations in Crimea. They elect, from among themselves, a small Rada consisting of five members and two alternates.

The small Rada directs all matters before the Regional Rada.

Note: members of the small Rada and Audit Commission may be members of organizations that are not members of the Regional Rada.

6. General elections are called by the small Rada when necessary, but in any event not less than twice a year. The general elections select the head from members of the Regional Rada.

7. The members of the small Rada select from among themselves a head, assistant, treasurer, and secretary, other tasks divided by mutual agreement. The members of the small Rada are elected for a term of six months.

8. Meetings of the small Rada can be called by the head, or, in writing, by no less than three members.

9. All matters before the small Rada are decided by a majority vote. In case of a tie, the head casts the deciding vote.

10. A meeting may be held with at least three members present, including the head or assistant head.

11. Accounting of the finances will be carried out by one member, the treasurer, but the general responsibility for the finances and property will be held by the entire Rada.

12. The treasurer receives, keeps, and distributes monies according to the dictates of the Rada.

All monies collected will be deposited in a bank account controlled by the Rada, and will keep on hand enough to cover monthly expenses.

Note: the treasurer makes use of monies from the bank account using checks that are signed by the head or the person temporarily replacing him, and a second member of the small Rada.

Funding of the Rada

13. Funds of the Rada consist of: a) annual or one-time contributions from Ukrainian organizations; b) contributions from individuals and institutions; c) admission fees for lectures, literary
evenings, expositions, and fairs arranged by the Rada; d) income from investments and properties.

Changes in the statutes and dissolution of the Rada.

14. Changes and additions to the statutes can be made only by a convention of the Regional Rada.

15. The Regional Rada may be dissolved by a resolution of the convention which must consist of at least two thirds of the membership of the Regional Rada.

16. When the Rada is dissolved and ceases to function, after satisfying all obligations, all remaining monies and assets are transferred, by a resolution of the liquidation meeting, to another organization with similar goals.” (CDAVOVu, fund 3696, desc. 3, matter 50, pgs. 5, 6).

At that time, taking advantage of declining fortunes of the Germans and a distinct possibility of their leaving the peninsula, supporters of “one indivisible Russia”, in opposition to the agreements made in Kyiv, took a different, secret, route: the head of the Guberny government, V. Obolensky, called a meeting of its members at which he writes “the (Guberny) government took upon itself a unique responsibility — asking General Denikin to occupy Crimea with his army as soon as the Germans leave.” (V. Obolensky, Crimea under Germany, pg. 25).

On November 17th, 1918, the Hetman of Ukraine received the following telegram from Simferopol: “Today a new government has taken over rule in Crimea which has as its mandate the rebirth of a undivided great Russia”. (CDAVOVu, fund 3766, desc. 1, matter 132, pg. 52).

With this, all efforts of Hetman Skoropadsky to unify Crimea with Ukraine were brought to naught. But his government did not stop watching the fate of the peninsula. When, on December 2nd, 1918, the head of the Rada of Ministers, C. Herbel, announced at a meeting of his cabinet that Denikin appointed Admiral Kanin as commander of the Black Sea fleet, the representative of the volunteer (General Denikin’s — GZ) army in Kyiv, General Lomnovsky was told “The Ukrainian government, which carried the responsibility of financing then Black Sea fleet and has expended large sums, feels that in the future the operational command should be run by a commander appointed by the joint armed forces fighting the Bolsheviks,
but in any event should be under the control of the Naval Ministry of Ukraine.” (CDAVOVU, fund 1064, desc. 1, matter 11, pg. 101).

As to the position of Bolshevik Moscow during the period of Crimean-Ukrainian negotiations, it again took the communists in Crimea under the wing of the CKKP(B)U (Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine — GZ). On September 8th, 1918, at a plenum of the CKKP(B)U in Orel, a pronouncement was made by the communists of Crimea regarding support. It was ordered that “the regional committee in Odessa travel throughout Crimea and help organize a Crimean conference, giving assistance, including financial, to our Crimean tovarishy (friends). Do not distribute any money without verifying the person. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 9, pg. 13).

In the 2nd convention of the KP(B)U (Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine — GZ) in October 1918, the delegate from Crimea, Morshin, announced in his presentation “We received 3,000 rubles from the Odessa regional committee, and a quantity of literature. This helped us considerably”. (ibid, matter 5, pg. 20).

At the plenum of the CKKP(B)U on October 23, 1918, when the Crimean communists announced that they “wanted to work under the direction of the CKKP(B)U “, it was voted to agree to this. It was also announced that “Crimea, in an organizational relationship, will be an independent region”. (ibid, matter 13, pg. 2).

It was decided then that further work in the Dniprovsk, Berdyansk, and Tauridian districts will be discussed at the next meeting with the Odessa regional committee. 50,000 karbovantsy were allotted to the Crimean Bolsheviks for organizational expenses. (ibid, pg. 2).

By this means, after the 2nd convention of the KP(B)U, the Crimean party organization was included in the regional organizations in Ukraine. (ibid, fund 1, desc. 53, matter 5132, pg. 34).
VRANGEL’S UKRAINIAN PLANS

The entry of troops of the Entente, who supported Denikin and his desire to renew “the one indivisible”, into Crimea put off for an indefinite time the possibility of a Ukrainian nationality here. However, the Ukrainian population continued to fight against the regional occupation.

At beginning of December 1918, a group of villagers in the Pidhorodno-Petrovsk region, led by Rusanovich, staged an active protest against the “volunteer army. According to its reconnaissance, “the protestors were convincing villagers that the regional government and the volunteer army in Crimea will soon be overturned by the forces of Petlyura and Makhno, and urged them not to obey the current government nor pay taxes.” (Red Archive, 1928, volume 28, pg. 146).

The villagers in the Simferopol region supported this position within a month. Very active agitation against the “volunteer army” led by Kostyantin and Pilip Shevchenko was seen in the villages of Sabli, Kurka, Zuya, Mazanka, and Mamak. (ibid, pg. 163).

In April, 1919 Soviet rule was reinstated in Crimea, with the exception of the Kerch peninsula. In order to prevent any attempts by the Ukrainian National Republic to incorporate Crimea within its territory, the Politbureau of the CKRKP(B) voted to create a Crimean Soviet Republic within the RCFRR on April 23rd, 1919. This was not the will of the people of Crimea nor was it a legal document which could form the basis of any rights Russia had toward Crimea.

Why did the Politbureau of the RKP(B) hurry like this? This is easy to explain. Memories still lingered about the spontaneous convention of Radas, revolutionary committees, and local village committees of the Tauridian Guberny held from the 7th to the 10th of March 1918. Beside personnel, material, and other forms of support, the delegates decided to turn to the government of the RCFRR with the statement “Soviet rule should encompass the entire territory of Ukraine as voiced by the working classes, and we, together with our brothers of the proletariat, will support this rule with all our resources. We recognize no other rule.” (V. Butkevich, The Right to Crimea, pg. 34).
The RKP(B) reviewed the organization of the new government of the Crimean Republic on April 28th, and then on April 28th and 29th, 1919, a regional Crimean party conference was called together, at which a few tens of communists, according to the directions of the Politbureau of the RKP(B), approved the resolution creating the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic within the RCFR. The conference prepared a declaration for the temporary government in which was announced: “With the will of the revolutionary workers and villagers of Crimea, and the famous achievements of the heroic Red Army, the bourgeois regional government of Crimea is toppled and Crimea is now a Socialist Soviet Republic.” (ibid, pg. 34).

Once again misstatements could not be avoided, emphasizes this scholar. The declaration was from the workers of Crimea, but there really were no workers there. The text was copied from previous Russian declarations without taking into account any local circumstances. The higher authority of the temporary worker-villager government was formed so quickly, with such a mistrust of all local people, that it was necessary to bring in people that at least knew Crimea from vacationing there. (Lenin’s brother D. Ulyanov, Dubenka, Polonsky, and others). The makeup of the government was analogous to the RNK RCFR, and so a minister of foreign affairs was appointed. This alerted the Radnarkom of the RCFR. And so, on May 28th, 1919, a resolution of the CK RKP(B) about the status of the Crimean government “dotted all the i’s“: the official directive is that the government will act as a regional committee under the VCVK and appropriate civil committees, and the regional party committee is joined to the CK RKP(B).” (ibid, pg. 34).

In general, V. Butkevich quite correctly feels that the history of the Crimean party organization shows how the Bolsheviks felt about an independent Crimea. In October 1917, not agreeing with the politics of the temporary government, and at the same time wanting to get the support of Ukraine in future activities, RCDRP(B) agreed that Crimea belonged to Ukraine, and thus any Bolshevik organizations that may be formed should be led from Kyiv. In a letter from the CK RSDRP(B) to the Mikolaev committee of the RSDRP(B) dated September 18, 1917, Y. Sverdlov gave this explanation: “The
question of region has a great significance. We think you should join the southern region (for now) with Kyiv as center.

This region will include, besides Kyiv, Odessa, Nikolayev, Kerson, Crimea with Sevastopol, Elisavetgrad, and others. Eventually this region can be divided in two: 1. Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Mohiliv, and others. 2. Odessa, Nikolayev, Crimea, and others.” (Y. Sverdlov, Selected works, Kyiv, 1961, volume 2, pg. 40). In a letter from the CK RSDRP(B) to the regional committee of the RSDRP(B) in the southeastern area dated October 15th, 1917, he repeats again: “It seems to us that it would be better to include in your region the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Volyn, and Podil Gubernies. This would make a Southwestern region. The Gubernies of Kherson, Taurida, with Kishiniv included, would constitute the Southern region.” (ibid, pg. 61).

After October 1917 the leaders of the RSDRP(B) stopped taking Ukrainian communists in account when deciding Crimean issues. As was pointed out by V. Butkevich, they subordinated the activities of the Crimean communists (read this- their own activists sent to Crimea) directly.

After Diniken conquered Crimea, the CK RKP(B) once again moved him aside and turned over the Crimean Bolshevik organizations to the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. The CK KP(B) of Ukraine formed a group (including S.V. Kosiur, H. I. Petrovsky, and D. Z. Manuilsky) to lead the underground operations in Crimea. In order to promote the work of the Crimean communist committee, the CK KP(B) of Ukraine provided 250,000 karbovantsy for printing, 500,000 for general expenses. (V. Butkevich, The Right to Crimea, pg. 35).

It must be emphasized that the CK KP(B) was definitely against separate Crimean communists trying to act apart from the Ukrainian communist party organization. When F. Artem (Sergeev) reported on February 1, 1919, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CK as to the position of Crimeans now residing in Kharkov, who wanted to form their own party and government it was decided: “Taking into account that at previous party meetings it was decided that the Crimean party should merge with the KPU (Communist Party of
Ukraine — GZ), and that Crimea has its own regional Revkom (revolutionary committee — GZ), the separation of the workers in Kharkiv is unthinkable.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 27, pg. 2).

The Crimean question was examined again by the Presidium of the CK KP(B) on February 7th, 1919. A resolution was approved to “send a person with money and the power to organize a regional Communist committee”. (ibid, pg. 7). On February 12th, the Presidium of the CK KP(B)U decided to “send tovarish Chornousov to Crimea. However, since he was brought before the Tribunal court, the charges had to be first examined.” With this it is noted to all Soviet organizations that “no workers be admitted without first registering with the Secretariat of the CK”. (ibid, pg. 12).

Chornousov was asked to go to Crimea on February 13th, 1919 as a representative of the CK KP(B)U. (ibid, pg. 13).

Simferopol professor M. Dementiev announces that, in the first years of Soviet rule the CK RKP(B) often directed the CK KP(B)U to provide assistance to the Crimean Communist Party for staging various party campaigns. The experience that made the Ukrainian party organs superior to the Crimean party structures lay, to a great extent, was using locals in the party organizations rather than bringing in people from the outside, a principle transferred to Crimea. (N. Dementiev, About the Politics of Tartarization in Crimea, News of the Crimean Republican Regional Museum, 1993, no. 2, pg. 31).

Meanwhile, during the Denikin occupation, individual life of the Ukrainians did not begin to die. In August, 1919, another convention of Ukrainians was called in Sevastopol, announcing:

“We, the undersigned representatives of Ukrainian organizations in Crimea, having convened in Sevastopol on August 11th, 1919, resolve as follows: “That the Regional Ukrainian Rada in Crimea be allowed to defend the rights of the Ukrainian population before the Crimean government and conduct broad organizational, educational, and economic activities among the Ukrainians in Crimea. The convention resolved to give the Executive Committee of the Regional Rada, also called the small Rada, the rights of a Ukrainian Consulate, and the head of the small Rada, Pavlo Erofeich Horyan-
sky, the title of Consul of the Ukrainian National Republic in Crimea. The Consulate is to be located in Yalta.” (CDAOVU, fund 3696, desc. 3, matter 50, pg. 3).

Wanting to establish contact with the Ukrainian government as quickly as possible, the head of the Crimean Regional Rada, Pavlo Horyansky, tried to do this through the UNR embassy in the Caucasus. He turned to them with these words: “From the name of the Regional Ukrainian Rada in Crimea I respectfully ask You to forward a report about the Regional Rada, a request for Ukrainian representation in Crimea, and other papers for the government of the National Republic, adding to our request your favorable resolution.

In order to save the Ukrainian cause in Crimea the Regional Rada recognizes the necessity of opening an official representation by the government of Ukraine and assigning certain costs for its operation. We ask You to provide a cost estimate for this representation in Crimea and its cultural and economic work.

I leave the return of our national efforts in Crimea onto a better path in your kind hands,

I have the honor of remaining Your servant”. (ibid, pg. 7).

Horyansky sent a similar letter to the MFA UNR, in which he described various events in Ukrainian life in Crimea: “In accordance with the resolution of the convention of Ukrainian Organizations in Crimea held on August 11 of this year, the Regional Rada in Crimea turns to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a humble request to give the small Rada the rights of a Consulate or open an official representation in Crimea.

This representation is essential to the elevation of Ukrainian National matters in Crimea, which are degrading with time. Without funds and leadership the Ukrainian population in Crimea is helpless against the various attempts at Russification by the Russian government, and will lose their national identity. It is also necessary to increase awareness of Ukrainian culture among the villagers in Crimea, heretofore ignored by the Regional Rada. The means for achieving this end are outlined in point 2 of the statutes of the small Rada.

Beside this, after an official meeting of a delegation from the Re-
regional Rada with representatives of the Tartar Directorate (with the
director of foreign affairs) and the Kurultai (Tartar Parliament —
GZ), it became clear that the leadership of the Tartar people con-
siders a representation of the Ukrainian people in Crimea desirable
and necessary for the defense of the rights of both peoples.

We ask the Ministry to calculate an annual estimate, by staff, that
would include expenses for creating cultural institutions (schools,
courses), maintaining the representatives and their travel expenses,
and other expenses it would deem necessary.

As far as the Regional Rada knows, the head of the Ukrainian
Diplomatic Mission in the Caucasus, Ivan Ihnatovich Kraskovsky
diligently follows the support of Ukrainian nationalist movements in
colonies and is especially active in the Eastern politics of Ukraine.
The Regional Rada feels that he would be an authoritative adviser on
the subject of opening a Ukrainian representation in Crimea.

The Regional Rada asks him to be an intermediary and to for-
ward this request along with a report, statutes, and other papers to
the Ministry.

We ask that the reply of the Ministry be through the diplomatic
mission in the Caucasus.” (ibid, pg. 4).

Beginning in spring of 1920 Baron Vrangel, who was more flex-
ible in his relationship to Ukrainians, was in charge of Crimea.

It is interesting to note that there were many Ukrainians in
Vrangel’s army, actually forming a Ukrainian organization at his staff
headquarters in Sevastopol. It began with the “Group of Ukrainian
officers” which became publicly known on August 17th, 1920. The
goal of this organization, outlined in its statutes, was uniting the
Ukrainians in the Kuban area with those in Crimea. Members of
this group felt that “there are 5 or 6 commissars in each district, and
in order to defeat the Bolsheviks in Kuban, an exclusively Ukrainian
army is necessary, under a Ukrainian flag, led by a Ukrainian com-
mander, because Ukrainians will not obey a draft declared by Russ-
ian authorities; the Ukrainian people do not believe the Russian
government led by General Vrangel, nor Russian officers, nor the
Russian bureaucracy in general. This is borne out by the fact that
even though Russian armed forces were on Ukrainian soil (Meli-
Врата в Україну

У першій половині червня 1920 року Гітлер
успішно проник у Кронштадт. На південь від його
піднімання пішли швейцарські війська:"A Vendredi,
et voici genereux soldats. A Vendredi, je vous
salue". Проте у жовтні 1920 року відбулася
усна переговорна революція. У минулі часи
Гітлеру відома сила та вплив, який він здобув.
Це приводить до високого рівня ризику.

Україна була під владою Гітлера. Вони вступили в 1920
року. Україна була під владою Гітлера. Вони вступили в 1920
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topol district), no one reported when the draft was announced.” (Central Army Archive in Warsaw, CAV, fund 380, desc. 3, matter 103, pg. 69).

After acquainting himself with this document, Vrangel agreed to this proposition and asked for the Ukrainians who would be believed by both the Ukrainian people and himself. The group suggested General Kirei, who was accepted by Vrangel, and asked to form a temporary Ukrainian Authority, the Ukrainian National Block. (ibid, pg. 69).

In those days, it would seem that Vrangel really appreciated the role of Ukrainians, addressing them in a special speech with these words: “Sons of Ukraine! Downtrodden under the red heel, you rise to defend your Orthodox faith, your dear Ukraine, and all that is yours.

Like you, the Russian army is fighting for happiness, freedom, and the greatness of our motherland. Commanding the Russian army, I turn to you, brothers! Let us close the ranks against the enemy that tramples underfoot everything we have achieved with the blood and sweat of our fathers and grandfathers. The Russian army, with sword in hand and a cross at our heart, fights against violence and lies. We do not fight to return the old ways but to give the people a chance to be masters in their own land. The will of the people will promote order across the land. I have agreements with the Kozaks in the Don area, in Kuban, Terek, and Astrakhan, and we, as family, reach out our hands to you. In our union — is our deliverance.” (Vremya (Simferopol), 1920, August 19th).


From then on it was understood that a temporary Ukrainian authority is serving with General Vrangel. The General immediately proceeded to form affiliates in all towns, expressing a negative attitude
towards existing Ukrainian groups who had a democratic tendency and supported the legal Ukrainian government headed by Simon Petlyura. (CAV in Warsaw, fund 380, desc,3, matter 103, pg. 69).

General Kirei announced to the press on September 11th: “The Commander-in-Chief has concluded an agreement with the Kozaks in the Don area, Kuban, Terek, and Astrakhan and on these terms extends his hand to the sons of Ukraine, believing that in union is our deliverance.

Many Ukrainian insurgents wanted to have their own native language, and the Commander-in-Chief agreed to a wide extent.

As to the internal political system in Ukraine, this will have to be decided by the people after the war has ended, but for now the higher administrative positions in Ukraine were chosen by Vrangel from the ranks of native Ukrainians, and the lower echelons will be elected by the people.

The question of formation of Ukrainian divisions will be resolved positively. Revolts in Ukraine occur everywhere. There are entire districts that have thrown off the Bolsheviks, killed the commissars and communists. A delegation from the army of Pavlenko arrived, wanting to obtain information relative to developing terms for a possible agreement. Because this delegation did not have any real powers to form the actual agreements, the session was limited to cordial greetings, information gathering, and expressions of hope that both armies will be able to join together to fight a common enemy.

The Commander-in-Chief fully supported this agreement. We all want the same thing — order and peace, but shadowy forces are trying to set us one on the other.

A federation of fraternal peoples of the Russian nation is inconvenient to someone.

I expect that this is understood here and, having become acquainted with our hopes, we can come to an understanding.” (Vremya (Simferopol), 1920, September 12th).

At this time, several local Russian newspapers ran a story that a Ukrainian mission is coming to Crimea to close an agreement with Vrangel. Who headed it, with what powers, and from whom this delegation came to talk with Vrangel was not known by the Officers.
Group, not to mention the general public. The Ukrainian community assumed a waiting posture.

When this group arrived in Crimea in three or four days, it was revealed that the head of this group was the odious Morkotun, known for his anti-Ukrainian propaganda, especially for his slanderous attacks on the Head of the Directorate and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the UNR. (CAV in Warsaw, fund 380, desc. 3, matter 103, pg. 69).

Morkotun himself told a correspondent of a Simferopol newspaper: “We believe in the necessity of a Russian federation. We feel that both Russia and Ukraine are equally interested in the rebirth of Russia as a large and mighty power.

A federated type of government, in our opinion, means a strong, indivisible Russia, with internal self-rule, both administrative and judicial, with local government and Seym (assembly, GZ). We believe the rebirth of Ukraine should begin with wide agrarian reforms, forming a strong class of small owners. This will insure that Ukraine will be saved from the Bolsheviks. That is why we hope the SouthRussian government will bring this to fruition.” (Vremya, 1920, September 13).

After hearing the pronouncement by Morkotun, the Ukrainian Educational Organizations in Crimea turned to the Guberny Rada with the question, “who are these representatives of the Ukrainian people, Morkotun and his entourage?”

Simferopol replied that there are many different self-styled governments being formed, pointing, incidentally, to the Sevastopol national bloc, and proposed the following tactic: all educational radas should choose one veteran member and send him, for informational purposes, to join affiliates of Kirei’s organization. Besides this, the Simferopol Ukrainian Rada sent a letter to the temporary Sevastopol Ukrainian government: “Call for a convention of Ukrainians in Crimea and the lands of Ukraine occupied by Vrangel no later than October 1st. If this convention is not called together, the Guberny Simferopol National Rada will call such a convention together independently on October 15th.” (CAV in Warsaw, fund 380, desc. 3, matter 103, pgs. 69, 70).

A convention of Ukrainians took place in Sevastopol in the second
half of September, 1920, to which were invited, with the power to cast a vote, representatives of various local educational radas. Even though it was not the convention of villagers demanded by the Crimean educational radas, when representatives from the mainland area received voting privileges, then “villagers, townspeople, and insurgents all recognized the government of Ukraine to be only the UNR and the Commander-in-Chief Simon Petlyura. Various speakers, for example the representative from the Oleksandrivsk and Katerinoslav districts, said that finding themselves under Bolshevik rule, the Ukrainian population is waiting for their deliverer, Petlyura. Even the anarchist Makhno told villagers at a meeting that they should follow Petlyura and save Ukraine from the enemies.” (ibid, pg. 70).

After the speeches of representatives from the areas not located on the peninsula, the leaders of the Sevastopol bloc understood that the people did not select adherents to the idea of “one and undivided”, but rather independent individualists, followers of Petlyura. And so, the organizers from among the numbers of Kirei followers stopped individual speeches and returned to the planned agenda.

In answer to the question, why are there no representatives of the UNR and the Chief, nor of any insurgents, raised by one of the members of the Simferopol Educational Rada, Bezradetsky, the head replied that it seems that the latter were already here but were tired and will attend the meeting tomorrow, and the representatives of the UNR government just passed through Dgankoy and will doubtless also be at the convention tomorrow.

Continuing, Bezradetsky said that Petlyura was a traitor, giving Ukraine to Poland, and so it would be best to organize the government of the Ukrainian Vrangel according to the model of the Kuban Regional Rada. Bezradetsky was supported in this by the representative of the Russian bloc (Ukrainian) Perlikh, Sakhno-Ustimovich, Lizohub, and a few others. They tried to show that only fighting the Bolsheviks was important, otherwise they would lose Crimea.

After hearing the statements about the alleged treason of Petlyura, the convention demanded concrete proof of this treason. A disturbance erupted in the hall and the meeting was interrupted for some time. (ibid, pg. 70).
An attendee of the convention, Luka Bakun recorded the events as follows: “Members of the association of radas, Shulha, the younger Leontovich, Ovsyanko-Bilchevsky, Kolomiyets, Lashchenko, Shoporchuk-Odinets, father Dashkovsky, and others, arguing that the government in Ukraine can only be Petlyura’s and that of the UNR. If Petlyura and the government of the UNR was forced to sign an agreement with Poland that was not advantageous to Ukraine, it was only because the circumstances they found themselves in, with Denikin beginning a war with Ukraine, required it. What did Denikin end up doing? He lost the war, abandoned the Russian cause, and fled to the British and the villa that had been prepared beforehand for him. Petlyura did not abandon his people, and when he left the territory of Ukraine it was at the head of his army.

“Look at the Russian generals, they sold Russia and are living off these monies abroad”; Shulha and Bilchevsky argued the necessity of organizing under the command of Ukrainian officers. “The draft of men from the villages for the army should permit whoever wants to join the Russian army be free to do so, and who wants to join the Ukrainian brigades can do so, the Ukrainians saying that if they have to die in battle with the enemy, they will do so only under their own national flag. All authority in Crimea and the territories of Ukraine should be in the hands of Ukrainians, from the governor to the lowest official.

The Russian aristocracy, especially the officers, are all bandits, with the exception of Vrangel. We trust Vrangel. Everyone is taking whatever they can carry, like from a fire, and running across the border. One can wonder about nothing. What does Crimea and Ukraine mean to them — nothing. When the Ukrainian government takes over they will bring an end to this, they will not steal from themselves. Ask Krivoshein, where is the grain gathered from Crimea and parts of Ukraine, where was it shipped across the border, who received the pounds, liras, and franks for it. It is not difficult to guess. The bloc representatives must open Vrangels eyes to this, show him we are surrounded by robbers and thieves. The representatives of the Russian bloc averred that not everyone is a thief, there are honest people. Shulha stated that he could demonstrate the honesty of
the Russian aristocracy with various facts, beginning with Denikin, Shkura, and ending with Krivosheiv and Tatishchev. I ask the convention to elect representatives of the Ukrainian national bloc who would protect the rights of the people of Ukraine and Crimea, help Vrangel beat the Bolsheviks, and hang the robbers.” (ibid pgs. 70,71).

After protracted arguments, the Ukrainian convention in Sevastopol elected six members and two alternates to the National bloc. Also approved was the following:

“1. Organize a Ukrainian army under the national flag and command of Ukrainian officers, and the authority of Vrangel, to fight the Bolsheviks;
2. Ukrainian officers must be vetted by the local educational radas;
3. The representative in military matters with Vrangel, will be Prisovsky, and in civil matters, Leontovich;
4. Local rule must be in the hands of Ukrainians, also vetted by the local Radas;
5. Rule in Ukraine should be in the hands of Petlyura;
6. It is necessary to have an agreement between Vrangel and Petlyura, our bloc must send two representatives, along with representatives from Vrangel, to meet with Petlyura”. (ibid, pg. 71).

On October 1st, 1920, Vrangel accepted the resolution of the convention, and noted on the document, with his own hand, “Accept and put into effect”. (ibid, pg. 71).

But this acceptance of the resolution by Vrangel did not mean he was really interested in a just resolution of the Ukrainian problem. He and his associates paid attention to the Ukrainians only because they valued their role in fighting the Bolsheviks.

In the “Project of necessary actions for deciding the Ukrainian question” an adviser to Baron Vrangel, General Slashchov-Krimsky, who even allowed Ukrainian regiments to fly the blue and yellow flag with a red corner, noted “ All the itemized actions should be taken immediately for the establishment of a democratic Ukraine on general Russian federated principles, counterbalancing on the one hand total independence, and on the other the far right…” (Y. Slashchev-Krimsky; White Crimea, 1920, Moscow, 1990, pg. 192).
Poland’s involvement in heretofore Russian matters and the actions of General Vrangel ruined the Bolshevik’s plans. The timeline for their “liberation” of Crimea was moved up. The Crimean regional party organization was once again given over to the communists in Ukraine. From July 1920 on, the CK KP(B) yet again (how many times now?!) received the homeless Bolsheviks of Crimea. A Crimean division was created within the CK KP(B) of Ukraine headed by Y. Gaven. In order to strengthen their position in Crimean organizations, 9,000 party workers were sent there, required funding being provided. After the liberation of Crimea, the regional party organization was once again placed under RCDRP(B).

One of the leaders of the USRR, Hrihoriy Petrovsky, spoke eloquently about Crimea as the base for extending Bolshevik Russian aggression to the South at the 5th All-Ukrainian conference of the KP(B)U in October 1920: “after finally freeing and protecting Crimea, and cleaning it of our civilized barbarians, we can continue on our path to spread communism to the shores of Asia minor and Major.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 42, pg. 1).

“Crimea has a special significance for the RCFSR,” said B. Monatov, representative of the Narkomnats of Bolshevik Russia at the 1st All-Crimean convention of Radas in November, 1921.

“Our Crimean republic is a window through which many peoples of the near east, southern Europe, and northern Africa look at Soviet Russia. Even though Crimea does not have a large territory, it has great political import. It is a demonstrative example for our friends and enemies as to what sort of politics we will conduct here in Crimea.” (quotation of V. Broshevan and A. Formanchuk, Crimean Republic, 1921, Simferopol, 1992, pg. 24).

This was how the Bolsheviks decided the issue of “self-determination”. The population of Crimea had the same opportunity for “self-determination”. The Radnarkom of the RSRFR, as V. Butkevich stated, knew the procedure to promote self-determination quite well, and accepted the responsibility to hold to it before other nations.

This is how they promised to promote self-determination of the peoples in the territory of the former Russian empire:
“1. Political and economic talks.
2. The theme of any talks and the main principle: “Without annexations and contributions”.
3. The idea of annexation:
   a) Annexation cannot be carried out after a declaration of a state of war. (The acquisition of lands after a declaration of war cannot be called annexation);
   b) Annexation is declared when the people of a territory are dissatisfied with their being taken over by some country or their status within the country they are in over a period of decades (from the second half of the 19th century). This dissatisfaction can be expressed in literature, in the decisions of assemblies or municipalities, meetings, in national and diplomatic documents. This is expressed by means of a national movement in these territories, national arguments, clashes, disturbances, etc.

   1) People, who are part of a warring country, have the right of self-determination up to and including forming an independent nation;
   2) The right of self-determination is effected by a referendum of the population of the region involved;
   3) The geographic boundaries must be determined by democratically elected representatives, including neighboring regions;
   4) The conditions which guarantee the right to self-determination:
      a. Armies that are on the territory seeking self-determination must leave;
      b. Repatriation of all refugees to the region as well as everyone who was expelled at the start of the war;
      c. Creating a temporary government of democratically elected representatives of the people who have a right to item “b” above;
      d. Creating, within the temporary government, commissions who will then agree among themselves as to control of the government;
      e. The funds required to implement items “b” and “c” will be taken from a special fund provided by the occupying country”. (quote from V. Butkevich, The Right to Crimea, pgs. 36, 37).

Unfortunately, these many constructive points were not adhered
to in the former Russian Empire. Upon the formation of the previously mentioned Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic, the guidelines used were not nationalistic but geographic. This was explained officially by saying that there were many nationalities living in Crimea and it was difficult to determine their will.

The point was that the desire of the Crimean population was already well known. There were far less Russians living there than any other nationality. According to the 1897 census, Ukrainians alone in the Tauridian Guberny numbered 42.2%. Add to this 13% Crimean Tartars, 3.8% Jews, 2.8% Bulgarians, 5.4% Germans, and others, and it is easy to see the outcome of a referendum. (ibid, pg. 37).

This is why they began the conniving with demographic statistics. The actual numbers of the different nationalities disappeared and were replaced by the indicator “numbers of Russians and Ukrainians”. Of course, together they outnumber the other peoples in Crimea. In order to further confuse the issue, they started using the indicator “Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians”. Even though the population of Belorussians in Crimea was less than 1%, this approach emphasized the three fraternal nations, and cleverly concealed the Ukrainian majority. When the various massive deportations and resettlements were finally completed and the population of Russians began to exceed that of Ukrainians, statistics were used to clearly define each people’s place and rights. The official language of the peninsula had already been declared as Russian (Tartar for the Crimean Tartars). Clearly, when forbidden their own language, the Ukrainians began using Russian and not Tartar. Already, beginning in 1917, there were questionnaires given to the population as to which language they would want their children to learn. Of course, not many Ukrainians would want their children to learn the Tartar language. And so, gradually, the statistical indicator changed from “Russian” to “Russian speaking” and this category swamped all the others.

The central leadership, however, knew full well what this meant and how many Russians there really were in Crimea. (ibid, pg. 37).

In April, 1921 it was decided to take a census in Crimea. As early as May 1921, the first results started coming out, and the picture did
not look very good (for the Russian leadership — GZ). Anticipating a problem, the leadership called together, in May 1921, a plenum of the CK RKP(B), which passed a resolution to create the Crimean ARSR as a part of the RSRFR. Once again the leadership did not factor in the opinion of the population of Crimea. The Crimean autonomy was organized along territorial and not ethnic lines. In any case, the legal documents relative to this question were never executed. There still remained hopes that the final figures would be more or less acceptable. But the hopes came to naught, and no matter what efforts the leadership exerted, the census figures were not what they wanted. The instructions to Crimea from the leadership at that time resembled military orders.

To be entirely truthful, even at the beginning of the census instructions from the leadership closely resembled orders from the NKVS (future KGB — GZ). For example, on March 24, 1921, Crimea received a “Decree from the head of the RNK, V.I. Lenin, and the Central Statistical Administration, to the Crimean Revolutionary Committee ordering it to speed up the professional-demographic, agrarian census, and the tabulation of commercial concerns in Crimea.” The decree emphasized “It is recommended that you use all available means to speed up this census. This census is required by the village workers administration. The facts gathered will be used by the Soviet building construction planners. Remove, in revolutionary order, all obstacles. Every lost day is of great national importance. Crimea must be examined and done so within the time frame required by our plan. I remind you that the village workers administration will hold you responsible for your lack of energy and accuracy in completing this census. Inform the Central Statistical Administration daily, beginning the 1st of April, of your progress so that they can report to me.” (ibid, pg. 38).

The decree was addressed to, among others, the Crimean RevKom (Revolutionary committee — GZ), Crimean ChK, Special division, and other “specialists” connected with the census.

Even these decrees failed to help. The number of Russians in Crimea remained at the previous level. Once again the old, approved, method had to be used.
The official results showed the composition of Crimea was as follows: Russians and Ukrainians 51.5% (other data showed similar figures but for Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians together), Tartars 25.9%, Jews 6.87%, Germans 5.88%, Greeks 3.31%, Armenians 1.67%, Bulgarians 1.57%, Poles, Karaims, Estonians and others 3.31%.

Using these data, the Head of the Rada of National Commissars, V. I. Lenin, and the Head of the VCVK, M.I. Kalinin, signed a resolution on October 18, 1921 authorizing the formation of the Crimean ARSR within the RSFR. This ended the Crimean “self-determination”. From the day of formation, Crimea’s status remained identical to any region in the USSR until June 30th 1945. (ibid, pg. 39).

It must be noted that one of the initiators of the Bolshevik autonomy of Crimea was Stalin.

It was he, as national commissar of the RSFRR in matters of nationalities, submitted a proposal at the meeting of the RNK on May 10, 1921 outlining the formation of an autonomous region in Crimea. “Recognize as necessary the formation of an Autonomous Crimean Republic and ask the NKN to work out a project resulting in a decree joining it with the RNK. Ask the Presidium of the VCVK to send a person to Crimea with the plenary powers to resolve any conflict on site”. (Decrees of the Soviet Government, Moscow 1949, volume XV, pg. 277). The resolution forming the Autonomous Crimean Republic was approved at the meeting of the Politbureau of the CK RKP(B) on May 24. (ibid, pg. 277).

By the way, the Kerch district committee of the Bolshevik party still insisted on combining Crimea with the Ukrainian Republic, “taking into account geographic location and economic ties”. (V. Broshevan, A. Formanchuk, The Crimean Republic: 1921 — 1992, pg. 8).
CRIMEA AS UKRAINE’S FULCRUM ON THE BLACK SEA

Evaluating this turn of events, Ukrainian political forces, most of whom were in exile, noted: from the end of the 18th century, when Russia conquered Crimea, there is an ongoing “great effort to reclaim peacefully, with plows, territory lost by the Ukrainian people to the nomadic hordes pressing in from Asia.” (CAV, in Warsaw, fund 380, desc.2, matter 95, pg. 13).

This process, although continuing, cannot be considered complete. At the same time as the process of retaking lost land, no less important is the process of ethnic reunification, extending geographically to the entire south-eastern territory of Ukraine. Inasmuch as the chief opponent to these plans is Russia, the Black Sea, as a fulcrum for Ukrainian hopes and plans, is the difference between victory or defeat, life or death.

Only by securing itself on the Black Sea can Ukraine hope to be an active member of the international community. Only a Ukraine which controls the coast of the Black Sea will be able to have access to international assistance and not be alone in its fight with Russia. The alternative is to be a helpless pawn in the petty games of petty international intrigues. Without any doubt whatsoever, the role of Crimea in this is paramount.

The statement “Tauridia without Crimea” that was written in the 3rd “Universal” of the Central Rada, which delineated the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic, can only be explained by the extreme immaturity of Ukrainian political thought of the time. This phrase, inserted by the Ukrainian revolutionary parliament, the Central Rada, caused great problems already in the months that followed. Taking advantage of this phrase in the talks at Brest, the Turks treated Crimea as belonging to no one, and declared their intentions to take over Crimea. Only the lack of a definite understanding of East-European matters by the European countries, and Germany’s desire to gain as much as possible, kept the Turks from occupying Crimea. However, when Ukraine tried to take over the peninsula by force after the Bolsheviks, the Germans drove Natiev’s divisions out of Crimea and formed a makeshift republic under the leadership of General Sulkevich.
The ejection of Ukrainian forces from Crimea by the Germans deprived Ukraine of the opportunity to liberate Kuban from the Bolsheviks and establish political relations with the people there. This in turn led to the loss of the northern Caucasus territories to ideologies inimical to Ukraine, those of Denikin and Vrangel.

Having lost Crimea, Ukraine also lost the Black Sea fleet because the defeat of the central European countries in World War I, and the exit of Germany from Ukraine, automatically allowed the coastal areas to be captured by the Red and White Russian armies, cutting Ukraine off from contact with Europe. From that time Ukraine lost its significance in international affairs and became caught in the war between Russia and the countries formed on its former western borders, Poland and Romania.

The Bolsheviks, having finally taken over the main territories of Ukraine, understood the importance of Crimea and the coastal areas. Separating Ukraine, both ethnically and politically, from the Black Sea was the main reason for the Bolsheviks forming the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the northern Caucasus region which, even with a Ukrainian majority, were brought in to the RSFRR (Russian republic - GZ) rather than the USRR (Ukrainian republic — GZ). To this end, other small administrative entities were planned in the Black Sea coastal area, a Moldovan autonomy and a Jewish autonomy. In the RSFRR, Ukrainians had minimal cultural and personal rights. This was a continuation of the efforts to wring from Ukraine one of the bases necessary for its existence — the Black Sea. (ibid, pg. 14).

The Crimean Tartars did not take an active role in the fight for the Black Sea between Russia and Ukraine, but rather brought in certain complications. The Tartars acted as a sort of screen, behind which hid the various authors of the conflict. As already mentioned, in 1918, the Turks claimed Crimea based on the historic fact that the Crimean Khanate belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and on the request of various political groups among the Crimean Tartars. Russia, not recognizing any rights on the part of the Tartars when dealing with demands made by Ukraine, used their favorite argument, that Russia freed the peninsula not from the Ukrainians, but from
the Tartars. Ukrainians started to be a slowly decreasing minority on the peninsula, so the Crimean issue was left to the Russians and Tartars, with the Ukrainians having no part in it. The Russians, who never respected the rights of any minorities, now took the role of defending the Tartars from Ukrainian imperialism.

It was not only Turkey and Russia who wanted take Crimea; there were also other countries who wanted to join the parceling out of Ukrainian territories. From time to time the possibility of Crimea as an independent country was proposed; from time to time unknown factors would create a situation calculated to complicate Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea.

The Tartars themselves did not maintain a consistent line in this political game. In 1917, in the fight against the Russian Temporary Government, the Tartars stood side by side with the Ukrainians. When Ukraine rejected the union with Crimea, and then let it be taken over by the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1917—1918, the Tartars turned to Turkey, of one religious faith with them, and at that time victorious.

The period of Sulkevich and Denikin saw an agreement between the top layers of bourgeois Tartar society with the Russians. In that time of Bolshevik paradise, the Tartar population remained quiet, enjoyed life, and …slowly died. With the exile of the Crimean Kurultai, someone who never actually held a leadership position on the peninsula and never tried to hold one, Seydamet was perhaps the only person exiled from Crimea who tried various ways to raise the issue of Crimea to an international level. One time he asked Poland to take Crimea as a protectorate, another he turned to the Ukrainian government, promising to represent Ukraine in the Moslem world…

Actually, Seydamet had an understanding with the Turkish government as to the incorporation of the peninsula with Turkey, meanwhile preparing world opinion about Crimea, that it could be taken over by a stronger country, hoping it to be Turkey.

Demands by various political forces that the Ukrainian government treat Crimea as separate from Ukraine, as an independent political entity, to recognize the right of the Tartars to speak for all
Crimea, were pressed in order to weaken Ukraine’s moral position in the Crimean issue. This would serve to reinforce the statement about Ukraine “without Crimea”. Ukrainian politics tried to explain this fatal phrase, written in the 3rd “Universal”, that it was made at the time that Ukraine had not yet declared itself separating from Russia, and saw itself as a federated part of the Russian republic, presuming Crimea would join Ukraine and become an autonomous part with certain rights. This is why that phrase does not impose any obligations on Ukraine as an independent country.

If the Ukrainian government recognized Crimea, as a separate entity, then it would validate that phrase absolutely. Attempts to express the phrase “recognize the independence of Crimea” were made exclusively to the Ukrainian government, which was already recognized by the world as a country that would occupy the northern coastal area of the Black Sea and would drive out Russian influence.

Expecting Russia to recognize Crimean separateness was unrealistic not only from the point of view of their mentality, but also because Ukraine really had the first word on this issue. Because of this, interested parties used the difficult straights Ukraine found herself in to exact various long term declarations from exiled Ukrainian authorities. If the UNR government in exile, as the rightful representative of the Ukrainian people, were to acknowledge Crimean independence, mentioning this to the Crimean Tartars, their Kurultai or Seydamat, then a fifth power would be added to those four already vying for Ukraine, Turkey.

In addition, this would greatly complicate the international position of the UNR government. When a Ukrainian resurgence came, it would cause serious international conflicts, leaving Seydamet’s representation of Ukrainian interests in Turkey problematical.

It must be remembered that Crimea has a great strategic significance for Ukraine. The Black Sea coastal region is of major importance to Ukraine, the ports being kept open as a window on Europe needed a fleet capable of defending them.

The role of Crimea in Ukraine’s defense is determined by its geographic location. The peninsula is situated in the middle of the Black Sea, guarding access to the coastal regions of the Sea of Azov
and the relatively defenseless Odessa, Mikolaev, and Kherson. In addition, there is the Sevastopol bay, the only harbor on the Black Sea capable of holding a large fleet that can sail in any direction. Neither the bay at Novorosiysk, with its north-eastern winds, nor those at Odessa, Mikolaev, and Kherson which have a narrow channel, are suitable for a large fleet. It is because of this, without control of Crimea, Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea near the mouths of the Dnieper and Dnister rivers is tenuous. Even more tenuous, due to these same circumstances, is Ukraine’s hold on Kuban. The connection of Ukraine with the northern Caucasus below the Don is convenient in case of an enemy attack from Tsaritsin-Kamish. The battles Denikin waged with the Bolsheviks were a shining example of the far-reaching advantage this gives an opponent from this direction. With the wide front seen in the Ukraine-Russian war, from the Dnieper to the Volga, Crimea was important for both protection of their rear guard as well as communications with the northern Caucasus.

Based on these ideas, the authorities of the UNR should have reached the following conclusions for the future:

1. The abrogation of Crimea in the 3rd “Universal” of the Central Rada of Ukraine must be viewed as a fatal mistake, one which must be eradicated, as much as possible, from the political memory of the world.

2. Explain this mistake by citing conditions that were in place at that time - the status of Ukraine’s federated attachment to Russia, and showing that it has no obligatory status in an independent Ukraine.

3. Any documents which try to show Crimea’s independent status relative to Ukraine must be viewed as extremely damaging, and unthinkable for the government of the UNR.

4. The government of the UNR must not enter into any explanations or agreements regarding the issue of Crimea, because these would take on an international rather than a locally Ukrainian character.

5. The Crimean Tartars, being an extraterritorial minority, may not act as agent in matters relating to all Crimea. The Tartar Kurul-
tai has no authority other than cultural, and that only over the Tartars, inasmuch as it never had any authority over the non-Tartar population which comprised over 3/4 of the inhabitants of the peninsula, and never had any administrative functions whatever.

6. Seydamat, as a representative of the Tartar Kurultai, with an outdated mandate, cannot have the right to represent all Crimea. When Seydamat appears in any political context claiming to represent Crimea, he is really playing a game as a self-styled politician, denigrating himself and all who are with him. Such behavior does not obligate Seydamat, as a non-responsible person, to anything, yet the words of the responsible party he talks to are taken as politically significant.

7. The government of the UNR can carry on talks and sign agreements only regarding internal, not international, matters with the representatives of the Crimean Tartars, and then only matters dealing with the cultural lives of the Tartars within the borders of Ukraine. Any attempts, by anyone, to promote the separation of Crimea from Ukraine, hiding behind the Tartars, must be immediately and resolutely derailed.

8. The government of the UNR must not permit any misunderstandings regarding the Crimean issue in the international arena, and must engender complete faith on the part of the Ukrainian population, both in Ukraine and abroad.

9. Understanding that, at the moment of the renewal of Ukraine as a country, there may be attempts to separate Crimea from Ukraine, the government of the UNR must be ready to answer both diplomatically as well as militarily.

10. Ukraine must react to the anti-Ukrainian politics promoted by Moscow by preparing a plan to resettle Crimea with Ukrainians.

11. The importance of Crimea as a resort and healing center requires the organization of people who can begin to prepare the infrastructure necessary for common people to be able to take advantage of Crimea for healing tuberculosis, asthma, and other respiratory problems. The Bolshevik occupation ruined what little was there, leaving as consequences increasing tuberculosis, hunger, and venereal diseases.
Opinion of Ukrainian émigrés regarding the future of Ukrainian-Tatar relations.
12. Any plans for building a Ukrainian naval force are predicated on Ukrainian settlement of the area.

13. The joining of Crimea to Ukraine forms a basis for joining Kuban and the northern Caucasus to Ukraine.

14. Any argument over Crimea can only be between Ukraine and Russia, and this argument must be resolved militarily, because any discussion with Russia is useless. (ibid, pgs. 18,19).

This is one way Ukrainian authorities in exile continued to address the Crimean issue.
MOSCOW’S PLANS:
UKRAINIANS TO SIBERIA, JEWS TO CRIMEA

The new, better life the Bolsheviks promised in Crimea, as in other parts of the former Russian Empire, was simply forgotten. Announcing Crimea an autonomous republic in 1921, Lenin’s comrades, in their usual style, from pulpits, meetings, and press, touted the Soviet government’s care about the poor people, beaten down by the Czarist regime, promising the people of southern Crimea the steppes that were bereft of people due to war and hunger.

But the project of Tartar resettlement remained on paper as the Soviet Executive Committee, in 1923, approved a resolution to resettle a large number of Jews from Belorussian and Ukrainian cities, none of whom had done any farming.

During the next 10 years 50,400 Jewish families were to be resettled to Crimea from Ukraine. In 1925—1926 1,500 families were to be resettled, in 1926—27 4,200, 1927—28 4,200, 1928—29 4,500, 1929—30 5,000, 1930—31 6,000, 1931—32 6,250, 1932—33 6,250, 1933—34 6,250, 1934—35 6,250. Beginning in 1925, the southern part of Ukraine was to be settled by 5,400 Jewish families within three years. Others were to be resettled as follows: “Northern Crimea — 7,300 families, Salsky district — 1,700, and later, in the dried swamps near the Sea of Azov (150,000 decyatina) (one decyatina is about 2.5 acres — GZ) which bordered Ukraine and Crimea — 23,500, and the other side of the Urals — 12,480”. (CDAVOVu, fund 3, desc. 1, matter 4853, pg. 14).

This plan, finally approved by the Presidium of the VCVK of the SSR on July 15th, 1926, called for an expenditure of 124 million karbovantsy, including 67 million from foreign sources. (ibid, pg. 14).

Everything relating to this plan was executed by the Bolshevik government. And so, during 1924-25, the government of the USRR allotted 43,000 desyatina in the southern part of the republic from the Ukrainian colonization fund, and 50,000 the next year. (ibid, matter 4706, pg. 2).

As for the farmers of Ukraine, there was no land for them in Crimea. The Ukrainian villager was to get untamed lands on the
steppes in the trans-Ural region, in Siberia, and the Far East, including the island Sakhalin and the Kamchatka peninsula. According to the resolution of the VCVK of the SRSR of July 26, 1926, almost 2 million people from Ukraine were to be resettled in the East, including 4,680 Germans, 3,640 Poles, and 2,600 Bulgarians. 707,900 were to be resettled in Siberia, 353,500 in the Far East, 296,000 in Kazakhstan and Bashkir, 281,000 in Central Asia, 225,000 in the Volga region, 52,000 in the northern Caucasus, and 45,000 in the Urals. (ibid, fund 413, desc.1, matter 199, pg. 17).

In a protest against the massive provocative resettlement to the south of people from Belorussia and Ukraine by the Bolshevik government, the head of the Directorate of the UNR, Simon Petlyura (living in exile in France — GZ), said “this careless and far-reaching step hurts the interests of Ukrainians and their relations with the Jewish people”. (S. Petlyura, Articles, Letters, and Documents, New York, 1979, volume II, pg. 428).

Resettling “the Jews on those lands that Ukrainian villagers owned going back to their great grandfathers, only stolen from them by the recent occupiers, is lighting a powder keg, and is nothing short of a tremendous provocation”, continued Petlyura. (ibid, pg. 429).

This provocation, writes Petlyura, “has two sides. As it provokes the Ukrainian population, it also provokes the Jewish people, who are not sure about this resettlement, and almost guarantees future problems. Leaders of Jewish organizations (primarily Bolshevik agents — GZ), who are raising money for this resettlement and working to convince the Jews to resettle, hide from them the difficulties and dangers involved.”(ibid, pgs. 430, 431).

These opinions were shared by the Jewish activist Arnold Margolin. He writes, in the publication The New Palestine in December 1926, “The fact that the hungry Jewish population in the cities is escaping to the villages does not even need proof. But the risk and danger in the Jewish colonization planned by the Soviet regime depends on something else. There are many unanswered questions in this plan. Is Ukraine, Crimea, and the shores of the Sea of Azov really the best territory for Jewish colonization? What can be said
about the resettlement of Jews from Greater Russia, and White Russia to these areas…“.

The events that transpired after the revolution in Russia confirm that the populations of Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Crimea were very negative towards Russian government, whatever form it took, “soviet or monarchy”. (Trizub, 1927, no. 14, pgs. 13, 14).

Taking into account that “many Ukrainians live along the coast of the Sea of Azov, in the northern Caucasus, in Kuban…in northern Crimea”, areas outside of Ukraine. Also taking into account that the residents of Crimea, led by the Tartars, in 1918, expressed their desire “to be joined in a federation with Ukraine based on territorial autonomy which would guarantee that the Tartars could pursue their own language and customs”, and that “all Ukrainians felt that Crimea was a part of a future Ukraine”; A. Margolin warned Jews about the danger of settling on lands that the Bolsheviks would not give to either Ukrainian or Tartars villagers. (ibid, pg.14).

The reason for any danger to Jews in this region was seen by A. Margolin because “they are now, and always will be seen as foreigners there, they do not speak the local language and do not follow any local customs, etc. Even Jews that lived in Ukraine before the revolution for several generations did not need to speak Ukrainian or Tartar, because most of them lived in cities where Russian was the official language of government, institutions, organizations, etc. Thus Jews of the current generation living in Ukraine, Crimea, Caucasus, and White Russia, besides speaking Jewish, spoke only Russian, being Russified from an early age. And so, resettlement of a certain number of Jews from Ukraine or White Russia to Greater Russia, Siberia, or Turkestan did not present as great a problem as resettling Russian or Belorussian Jews to Ukraine, Crimea, the coast of the Sea of Azov, or the Caucasus. “. (ibid, pg. 14).

These considerations led Margolin to the following conclusion: “Those Jews who wish to leave larger cities must be assisted in finding places to live in areas reasonably close to where they have lived for a long time, and the population is similar to what they were used to. All other resettlements, to Ukraine, Crimea, coast of the Sea of Azov, or the Caucasus must be stopped. On the other hand the re-
settlement of Jews from Ukraine and White Russia to Greater Russia, Siberia, and Turkestan, with their large areas and unlimited potential, should be encouraged.” (ibid, pgs. 14, 15).

Similar warnings were issued by Volodymir Zhabotinsky in his well known article Crimean Colonization. Analyzing all the information issued by the SRSR, he came to the following conclusion: even supporters of the Soviet regime who came to the West all felt that “the Jewish colonization is very unpopular with the Ukrainian villagers; we who have lived here know what this means”. (V. Zhabotinsky, Selected Articles of National Interest, Kyiv, 1991, pg. 116).

Further, Zhabotinsky quoted one such Bolshevik: “The Ukrainian villagers view this as a wild attack, not only insulting their concept of land ownership, but also every detail of this procedure seeming a stab in the heart. Imagine the mental state of a villager in Kherson who cannot farm the plot of land that he has been working since Nicholas II because he cannot fix his broken plough, and has no oxen to pull it, suddenly seeing a freight train pull into the station, a pair of new ploughs unloaded, with healthy oxen poking their heads out and he asks himself, who is this for? He hears the answer, “for the Jewish colonists the government wants to settle on our land”. I have never seen anything as capable if inciting pure hatred as this. This delivery of equipment and livestock had a greater effect than that of Petlyura and his band during those terrible years of bloodshed, because Petlyura (the editor of the collection of V. Zhabotinsky’s writings, I. Klayner, explains that the use of the term “Petlyura’s band” was simply an expression the Jews were used to hearing and did not reflect on Petlyura personally”— V. S.) reminded the villager of past conflicts, but today’s manifestations called out a new hatred”. (ibid, pg. 116, 117).

V. Zhabotinsky continued, a colonization was underway in Palestine without asking the permission of the current residents, who “never wanted to forget this fact and its future ramifications. But they had to deal with only 700,000 Arabs and with England, the strongest country in Europe, and even in those circumstances it was said the situation was dangerous, and special efforts were necessary
to insure safety. In Ukraine we must deal with 25 million villagers, and on “our” side stood a government which represents, and wants to represent, only a small part of the population.

I don’t doubt that the people who support this colonization have the best of intentions, but, speaking objectively, the world has never seen such gross collective carelessness, distressing 25 million villagers in a country where every stone is a memory of a bloody tragedy, playing a game with the deepest, most fanatical religion of the Ukrainian villager, and all this relying on a regime that, even according to its representatives, is an experiment”. (ibid, pg. 117).

Obviously, the Bolshevik leadership in Ukraine understood the unforeseen consequences of Moscow’s policy of the resettlement of Jews onto lands taken away from long time inhabitants.

The resettlement movement soon began to slow down, citing lack of free lands as the reason.

But Moscow made all final decisions: on May 19th, 1926 the Pre-sidium of the VCVK confirmed the methods of resettling working Jews. It was noted: “Because of the lack of land in Ukraine, it is not feasible to provide settlement opportunities for all Jews who want to engage in farming. The issue of providing land for Jews, who want to engage in independent farming, in the northern Caucasus, northern Crimea, Siberia and other lands in the national fund will be taken up by the Soviet Central Executive Committee”. (CDAVOVO fund 3, desc. 1, matter 4706, pg. 3).

The VCVK brought to the attention of the Moscow government on August 7, 1926 the necessity of “setting aside a fund to cover the land for the settlement of Jews in the northern Caucasus region, Siberia, Crimea or other regions, land that will be suitable on natural, historic, and cultural grounds for the Jewish resettlement”. (ibid, pg. 2).

At last, Moscow had to face the situation in Ukraine relative to the resettlement issue, and so the Secretariate of the VCVK SRSR, on the 26th of October, 1926, recognized “the resettlement of working Jews as planned is not possible in principle because of the lack of land within the boundaries of the URSR, so land will have to be set aside in other republics.” (ibid, pg. 5). “Special funds” were found
for the Jewish resettlement in the following years, as verified by archival documents. And so, in reviewing the five year plan of resettlement from Ukraine, the Presidium of the VCVK, on March 20th, 1929, stated “the resettlement to the south of Ukraine is essentially complete and Jewish resettlement will be charged to special funds.” (ibid, matter 4853, pg. 140).

Petlyura, Margolin, and Zhabotinsky were all right when they warned of the anti-Semitism that was inflamed by resettling city dwelling Jews onto lands that were farmed for hundreds of years by Ukrainian and Tartar farmers.

The slogan of the Bolshevik government “Land for the Jews—a blow against anti-Semitism” did not reflect reality. The opposite was true, a fact underscored by leaders in Crimea. For example, at the beginning of 1926, one of the leaders, Veli Ibraimov, was quoted in the Turkish press in an article called “Crimea or Palestine”, “It is not right to give land to the Jews when the Tartars don’t have it. They are taking land from us for 8,000 Jewish families resettled in Crimea, and the Tartars already don’t have enough for their needs.” (Red Crimea, 1932, February 20).

A Crimean newspaper published a statement by the secretary of the Committee of the VKP(B), Petropavlovsky, that “the issue of resettlement of Tartar villagers living in the hills and foothills to the strip of steppe is very important for us.” (Red Kerch, 1926, April 29).

This was actually so, because with the resolution of national issues in the East, the economic conditions of each nation must be taken into account, and appropriate local rule instituted. A well known Crimean Tartar activist, A. Ozenbashli warned: “If the Soviet form of government in Central Russia is based on historical fact, using the same for the Moslem masses…totally fails to reflect reality”. (DAARK, fund 150, desc. 1, matter 112, pg. 181).

Actually, various separated Tartar villages did not really understand what Soviet government represents. The bulletin of the ChK “(special division of the KGB — GZ) in 1921 often informs that “There are many places in Crimea that has no Soviet rule at all, places that never saw a party or political worker. The Tartar population in many villages and regions has no idea whatever what Soviet
rule is. Other than tax collectors, the Tartar population never saw a representative of Soviet government.” (ibid, pg. 30).

This is why the head of the CVK and RNK RRFSR commission Ibraimov, in the summer of 1921, stated: “In general the politics of the local government in Crimea rest on the ChK and the Red Army, which are used to terrorize the workers and the Tartar population.” (ibid, pg. 85).

The actions of the Bolshevik government at the beginning of 1927 in the continued colonization of Crimea by Jews caused intense dissatisfaction among the local residents and markedly raised the level of anti-Semitism.

After some time this issue had to be discussed in the bureau of the local Party Committee.

However, putting out the fire of anti-Semitism at that point was not simple. Ever new group of Jewish settlers was met with intense hostility. The Evpatoria newspaper openly stated “Whoever took it into his head to transform Evpatoria into a dump” (Red Crimea, 1931, March 30).

The Radhosp “Tohaili” actually stated “Here come the Jews to work here, lets beat them”. (ibid, April 3).
After the creation of the Crimean ASRR, the authorities in Simferopol required the addition of 10 districts, totaling 475,000 desyatiny, to the territory of the peninsula. The Crimean republic, as was noted in a meeting of one of the sections of the Derzhplan of the SRSR on the 3rd of August, 1923, “intends to change its northern border by adding parts of the Henichesk and Dniprovsk districts of the Katerinoslavsk Guberny. The reasons are as follows: 1. The mainland part of the Tauridian Guberny, in pre-revolutionary days, gave Crimea 4 million pood of wheat…” (DAARK, fund R-1932, desc. 1, matter 103, pg. 2).

At that time the growing areas in Crimea itself were diminished. In 1924, for example, the areas sowed with grain were half that of 1917. (S. Usov, Historical and Economical Features of Crimea, Simferopol, 1925, pg. 263).

The productivity of the fields in Crimea, compared to the average in the years 1905—1914, declined dramatically. For example, at the beginning of the century one desyatina (2.5 acres — GZ) yielded 45.1 pood, while in 1922 only 23.6, in 1923 the yield was 27.4, in 1924 it was only 19.7. Winter wheat yielded respectively 53.2, 33.0, 34.6, and 27.6. Barley 47.2, 32.4, 21.0, and 19.6. Oats 44.6, 33.0, 22.0, and 13.8. (ibid, pg. 265).

Official documents in Moscow confirmed:

“1. The farming sector in Crimea was shaken so badly that, according to information in the report of the Radnarkom of Crimea to the second Crimean Conference of Radas, the deficit of grain (according to the calculations of the Crimean Farming Authority) totaled 7,249,421 pood (one pood equals 40 pounds — GZ). Consequently, grain had to be imported into Crimea, as directed by the NKZ RRFSR.

2. Fruit orchards in Crimea decreased by 28% compared to 1916. The productivity fell very badly due to the fact that, over the last 8 years, no efforts were used to combat various pests. In fact, it was so bad (27.9 pood per desyatina less than the norm) that taxes on fruit growers had to be suspended in Crimea.

3. The land dedicated to vineyards declined by 23.7% compared
to that in 1916. Because of this the tax on wine was dropped 50% and CrimeaEKOSO loaned small wineries money to buy grapes.

4. Tobacco growers dropped the acreage used by 89% compared to that in 1916. To support the tobacconists, significant loans were issued by Crimearadnarhosp, Derzhbank, and Silshospbank.

5. Livestock in 1922, compared to 1916, decreased as follows: horses by 60%, cows by 31%, oxen by 60%, camels by 71%, sheep by 45%, hogs by 88%. These figures show that Crimea is depleted of its essential resources.” (DAARK, fund R-137, desc. 1, matter 26, pg. 6).

The situation in Crimea on January 30, 1924 was that only 49,642 head of cattle were available to work 198,400 decyatina of land. There was only enough seed to plant 107,600 decyatina. (ibid, matter 4, pg. 73).

If such a state of affairs could be explained in 1921 as the result of war, then in 1924 this was just not believable. So, in local circles, it had to be admitted that joining Crimea with Russia did not have the effect on agrarian development that was seen in the northern Gubernies and Ukraine. (All of Crimea, Simferopol, 1926, pg. 57).

It became obvious rather quickly that the Russian Republic cannot satisfy the food requirements of the peninsula. The Crimean government then turned to the National Conference of Turkey, notifying them that “the Tartar population living on the flowering coast of Crimea, the villagers on the steppe, and large numbers of city residents, are all dying of hunger. Hundreds of people, men, older people, and children, the hope of the Crimean Republic, are being buried every day in every populated part of Crimea. The people have eaten everything they could find in the Crimean flora.” (The second session of the Crimean Central executive committee of the Soviet of workers, villagers, Red army, and naval deputies. Stenographic report — March 4, 1922 — Simferopol, 1922, pg. 21).

“Let the fraternal hand of revolutionary Turkey extend to their brothers who are dying of hunger”, they asked from Crimea. However, Turkey could not render assistance. Crimean authorities could not even trade tobacco for bread in Turkish markets. Also, when earlier a pood of tobacco could be traded for 5 pood of flour, now it was traded at an even pood for pood. (ibid, pgs. 44, 45).
Under these circumstances only Ukraine could help, as in times past. Moscow obligated Ukraine to ship 480,000 pood of grain in 1922, even though there were food shortages there due to a poor harvest. (ibid, pg. 60).

It is true that whenever Ukraine had a poor harvest it was immediately reflected in Crimea. And so dispatches flew from the peninsula to the capital of the USSR regarding “The Radnarkom of the Crimean ARSR considers it imperative that you draw attention to the hazardous conditions due to the preparation of shipments of food products to Crimea”. (DAARK, fund 652, desc. 1, matter 1534, pg. 3).

There were instances when Ukraine, under orders from Moscow, had to ship food products, to Crimea even though they were needed badly locally. And so, on the 3rd of March 1922, when the southern part of Ukraine was on the verge of famine, Moysey Frumkin, member of the Narkomprodu of the RRF SR, was sent by Lenin to force the obedient Politbureau of the CK KP(B)U to “consider it imperative to send two shipments of wheat”, which were “ordered by Katerinoslav, charged to local funds, and brought to Katerinoslav from Podil”. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 6, matter 29, pg. 43).

The young Crimean republic, wrote the head of Crimea CVK Gaven to the VUCVK, “not having recovered from the bloody battles with the White Guard, began a battle with hunger. Not having the resources to combat hunger, called for help from its brother republics.

Ukraine, which also lived through difficult times with the White Guard, and also suffers from hunger, ignoring her problems, quickly reacted to the call from Red Crimea and is sending 10,000 children’s portions of food for the children of Crimea.

This aid brings out very brotherly emotions in the Crimean proletariat, because Ukraine has helped for the last several years. For example, last year Kreminchuk Guberny donated 34,000 pood of produce to the hungry.

Taking all these conscious, unbreakable, friendly, and brotherly relations of the Ukrainian Republic with the Crimean, and so the Crimea CVK and the CK Naslidholu of Crimea send their proletar-
ian “Thank you” to all working Ukrainians for the great help you extended to Crimea.” (News of VUCVK, 1923, March 7).

As a matter of fact, a special representation of Crimea was created in Kharkiv, then the capital of Ukraine, that directed preparation of food products that were shipped to the peninsula. In good times, trading of wines for wheat had been proposed, as many entries in Crimean archives testified.

There was one instance where this agency shipped 1,000 pood of kerosene from Ukraine in exchange for foodstuffs from Crimea. (DAARK, fund R-137, desc. 1, matter 1, pg. 91).

The Ekonomrada of the Crimean ASRR was forced to turn to the RSRFR and USRR on December 17th, 1921, for assistance in supplying seed for produce, because “the spread of vegetable cultivation, in the wake of decreased grain production and livestock, has become a very important issue.” (ibid, pg. 26). Obviously, this request was necessary because the Economrada resolved on November 23rd to buy seed from Ukraine, but this was never carried out. (ibid, pg. 8).

As it turns out, Crimea needed imports of meat as well. So therefore Ukraine and northern Caucasus had to ship 120,000 sheep to Crimea. (ibid, matter 64, pg. 178).

Amazingly, while there are many documents in the archives which show that Crimea could not support itself with even minimum food necessities, documents were found that claimed that Crimea exported wheat. The question arises, where did Crimea get wheat for export?

The answer is easy. In the export plans of the government concerning the harvest of 1923, it was seen that the peninsula was to ship 600,000 pood of wheat, and 750,000 pood from…northern Tauridia, a part of Ukraine. (ibid, matter 36, pg. 98).

Similar plans covered other grains. And so, while Crimean fields were to produce 200,000 pood of wheat, and 100,000 barley, southern Ukraine was to add 1,800,000 and 450,000 pood respectively to the Crimean harvest. (ibid, pg. 98).

The Crimean purveyors, who were informed of these plans, were required by the Special Plenary Commission on the renewal and de-
velopment of the wheat trade, adjunct to the Rada of Labor and De-
fense of the SRSR, “with the goal of proper and complete direction
and regulation of wheat cultivation within the borders of the
USRR… to present a report and data according to the example pro-
vided by the USRR.” (ibid, pg. 11).

However, the National Trade Council of Crimea was not the only
organization to deal in Ukrainian wheat. There was also the Crimean
office of the regional division of the Russian Centrospilka. Accord-
ing to its representative M. Poletaev, 226 railcars of wheat, 396 of
rye, and 106 of barley were purchased in the Melitopol and Khorliv
district of Ukraine. (ibid, pg. 102).

Getting ready for the next season, the leaders in the regional office
of the Derzhbank of Russia announced that “they could not leave
alone the issue for which they spent a lot of time preparing reports.
That is, the issues regarding northern Tauridia, the three regions of
the Tauridian Guberny, Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Dniprovsk.”( ibid,
pg. 95).

In addition to these, yet another group has its sights set on trad-
ing wheat, the Crimean office of the Publicly Traded Company Khli-
boproduct. The directors of a local bank asked that they be allowed
to handle all operations connected with grain trade in the above
mentioned regions, which were a part of Ukraine. (ibid, pg. 95).

A similar tendency, when Crimean purveyors worked outside the
borders of Crimea, arose in Moscow. There, evaluating the situation in Crimea as absolutely incapable of producing any exports, all export trade had to be from the neighbor to the north (Ukraine — GZ). Export from Crimea, even if it were feasible, would lead to the destruction of essential capital, and destroy the basis for any rebirth of local agriculture. (ibid, matter 26, pg. 6).

Because of this, the representative of the Narkomat of Foreign
Trade of the RSRFR in Crimea, Dolzhenko, asked that he work in
Ukraine, emphasizing in his letter to the Narkomat dated January
2nd, 1923, “in order not to decrease the level of export, 80% of it
must be brought from outside Crimea.”(ibid, pg. 6).

The leadership in Moscow clearly understood that the founda-
tion of economic prosperity in Crimea is the full exploitation of the
great ports along its coast. This can be effectively accomplished only by close relations with eastern Ukraine...very rich areas of Ukraine are located just north of Crimea, areas that were great producers before the war (1909—1913), and began a renewal of agricultural production before other regions.

The tempo of renewal was so great, that during the period of October to December 1922, this region was the first and only of the regions of NKZT to show positive trade figures (Ukraine was considered only one region in the documents of that time — V. S.) (According to the report of the Ukrzovnishtorhu for October — December 1922). (ibid, pg. 7).

As a result of this report, the authorities in Moscow came to the following conclusion: “It is necessary to connect the rich, productive, areas of Ukraine with the underutilized ports of Crimea, if an export trade is to be maintained.” (ibid, pg. 7).

This, of course, would require the various purveyors to organize themselves into an active association. Moscow was ready for this step, to merge the Crimean apparatus of the NKZT of the RSRFR with the Ukrainian. This reorganization would have several advantages:

“1. Expediency — Crimea, which borders on several areas that are good producers of agricultural products, will have what it lacks — trade goods for export, and Ukraine will have access to ports enabling it to export its products.

2. Regulatory convenience — arrange port activities so as to increase export of goods from Ukraine.

3. Simplify the structure of the NKZT”. (ibid, pg. 7).

As further events showed, there was no other way to renew Crimea, that the authorities in Moscow could see, other than using Ukraine’s productivity. The attempts to increase exports of Crimean products failed miserably. And so, on March 2nd, 1924, the leadership of the local affiliate of the Russian import-export office, “Derzhtorh”, had to admit that “efforts at exporting Crimean products such as wine, fruits, and tobacco leaf did not yield satisfactory results.”

The best price that the traders of the Crimeaderzhtorh could get on the international market for the older harvest was 12 karbovantsy
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Document regarding Ukraine supplying grain to Crimea.
per pood, whereas the price for the current harvest paid to the growers was 22 karbovantsy per pood…

As to wines and fruits, Crimeaderzhtorh is studying the international market. The overhead expenses, such as freight, import and export customs duties, etc. greatly impact the production of wines and fruits…” (ibid, desc. 4, matter 2a, pg. 40).

It must be mentioned that another idea of the authorities in Simferopol, that of not only being independent of Ukraine for various provisions, but also to compete with Ukraine in the production of sugar beets, also failed. (ibid, desc. 6, matter 3, pg. 18).

Again, it was obvious that Crimea could not survive on its own resources. The way out of the current crisis could only be with the help of Ukraine.

Crimean authorities not only wanted to grab some of Ukraine’s fertile land, but also wanted the salt producing area of Henichesk, which produced salt at a very competitive level, even on the internal market. (ibid, fund R-137, desc.1, matter 4, pg. 21, 21 back, 80).

The USSR did not allow these territories to be taken away, (obviously, because the Tahanroz and Shakhtinsk districts were taken away at this time), and so Russian Crimea continued to be economically dependent on Ukraine. Already starting with the second half of March 1927, the peninsula existed solely on imported wheat. That is why, on May 6th, orders came down from Moscow, by telegram, to hurry the shipment of grain. However, after one month the Crimean authorities asked Moscow to arrange for shipment of 100 rail cars of wheat beyond the 385 that had been ordered for June. In July they asked for an additional 500 rail cars. (ibid, fund R-652, desc. 1, matter 1322, pg. 1—6).

On January 13th, 1928 the Politbureau of the CK KP(B)U was forced to admit that it was imperative to ship “100,000 pood of barley to Crimea to satisfy the requirements of the NKT SRSR” (CDA-HOU, fund 1, desc.20, matter 2791, pg. 3).

At the same time it was decided to “inform the CK VKP(B) that the shipment of the additional 100,000 pood of barley came from the stock reserved for sowing the next crop, and that this would mean a decreased acreage of barley in Ukraine.” (ibid, pg. 3).
In order to prevent this, the Ukrainian government raised the price of wheat, which permitted sowing greater quantities of barley, in addition also allowing the shipment of 300,000 tons to Crimea. (ibid, pg. 4).

The low prices for grain determined by the government, due to the chronic problems of the Crimean budget in 1928, did not permit the government of the peninsula to even buy grain from their own producers. In order to compensate for the low prices for grain in Crimea, the local villagers shipped almost 3,000 wagon loads of grain to Ukraine, where they got a better price. In the beginning of August 1928, when this process already could not be stopped, the Crimean authorities had to ask Moscow for larger shipments of wheat, at least 450,000 pood every month, calculating that almost a million pood of wheat will pass out of Crimea. (ibid, pg. 29).

Dependence of Crimea on Ukraine, especially for foodstuffs, was seen continually, especially in the post WW II era.

However, Crimea did not depend on Ukraine only for its food. Any industrial production in Crimea depended on Ukrainian coal. In the years 1923—1925 an average of 50,000 tons of coal was shipped. (Report on the export of hard mineral fuel, iron ore, phosphates, salt, cast iron, and scrap metal from the southern Hornozavodsky district. Kharkov, 1926, pg. 471).

This dependence was acute in the case of the Kerch steel factory; it functioned strictly on coal from Donetsk. (N. Den, Crimea, pg. 68).

Ukraine’s selflessness was shown again, when an earthquake in the late 1920’s caused great damage in Crimea. On October 5th, 1927, the Presidium of the VUCVK (Ukraine — GZ) allotted 50,000 karbovantsy for aid to the victims. (CDAOVU, fund 3, desc. 1, matter 5090, pg. 5).

A special commission led by the head of the VUCVK Hrihoriy Petrovsky coordinated the relief efforts of several organizations that were set up to deliver assistance to the Crimean people.
THE GAME OF UKRAINIZATION

The politics of Crimean Bolsheviks, after they seized power in 1920, was not very different, with respect to Ukrainians, than that of Czarist politics. It can be said, without exaggerating, that the Bolsheviks completely disregarded Ukrainians. The Bolshevik regime itself admitted that even “the statistical authorities in Crimea, publishing the results of the 1921 census in 1922, did not consider Ukrainians a separate nation, but included them with the Russians. In S. A. Usov’s work, “Historical and economic features of Crimea”, published in 1925 in Simferopol, comparing the census results of 1897 and 1921, did not recognize a nationality such as “Ukrainian”. (DAARK, fund R-137, desc. 6, matter 42, pg. 1). And so Ukrainian life, as such, on the peninsula all but died; there was not even one Ukrainian school.

Even the one school in Sevastopol, organized at the beginning of 1918 with private funds, keeping 6 grades until 1921, was taken from the Ukrainians by the Bolsheviks and given over for military use. In the winter of 1921—22 it was turned into a Russian school, supposedly due to the wishes of the parents. (ibid, fund R-663, desc.1, matter 1194, pg. 2).

Even though, starting with 1923, the SRSR began a program of “returning to our roots”, no Ukrainian cultural activity in the Ukrainian language was seen in Crimea up to this day (1928 — V. S.), neither by the Narkomosvita, nor by professional associations. The subject simply never came up, even at the level of preliminary discussions. (ibid, pg. 2).

In the school year 1925—1926, it was planned to have 359 Tartar schools, 289 Russian, 131 German, 11 Greek, 10 Armenian, 3 Jewish, 3 Bulgarian, 2 Karaim, but not even one Ukrainian school. (ibid, desc. 1, matter 202, pg. 96).

Archives and newspapers of that time show that the Crimean authorities regularly called together representatives of various minorities to discuss any cultural or nationalistic problems.

For example, in 1926 the Presidium of the Crimean Central Executive Committee approved 6 proposals of the Crimeanarkomosvita in connection with the 1st conference of non-party Arme-
nians. These included that the division of school districts for the next budget years should include the Armenian population as widely as possible, both in villages and in cities; invitations to experienced teachers and procurement of books and other learning materials such as publications and newspapers in Armenian; conversion of some Armenian schools of the first level (Kerch and Simferopol) to 7 year schools without requiring them to support themselves. (National Archive of Sevastopol, fund R-79, desc. 1, matter 213, pg. 1a).

The education Rada of Crimea even corresponded with the Narkomat of education of the USRR, but only regarding calling the first Crimean Conference of Labor…Jews, publishing Bulgarian literature, sending educational programs, etc. (CDCAOVU, fund R-166, desc.6, matter 1222, pg. 20).

There were no similar efforts regarding any Ukrainian schools.

In the beginning of December of 1926, Crimean authorities, working on the issue of national organization, listed Russians, Tartars, Germans, Jews, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and others, which included Karaims (5,000), Poles (3,000), Estonians (3,000), Czechs (2,000), Gypsies (1,500), and Italians (650), but there was no mention of Ukrainians. (ibid, fund 663, desc.1, matter 991, pgs. 2, 3).

The basis for doubt as to the actual number of Ukrainians can be seen in the official materials of the 1926 census. The number of Ukrainians listed in Crimea was 77,123 of whom 43,214 were listed as transient. (All-Soviet Census of 1926, Moscow, 1930, volume 39, pg. 19). But these same documents show 72,289 Ukrainian immigrants in Crimea. (ibid, pgs. 34, 35).

14,358 were from the Melitopol precinct, 7,694 from Kherson, 4,026 from Odessa, 3,548 from Kharkiv, 4,024 from Dnipropetrovsk, 2,920 from Kyiv, 2,496 from Zaporizhia, 2,767 from Kremenchuk, 2,383 from Mariopol, 2,609 from Poltava, 1,960 from Nikolaev, 2,186 from Romensk, 2,244 from Shevchenkovsk, 1,753 from Prilutsk, 584 from Vinnetsa, 1,582 from Lubensk, 1,428 from Zinoviv, 1,703 from Kamyanetsk, 1,174 from Konotop, 572 from Stalinsk, 1,151 from Chernihiv, 1,074 from Bilatserkva, 781 from Krivorihi, 997 from Hlukhiv, 922 from Uman, 589 from Tahanroz (transferred to Russia just before the census), 571 from Sumi, 447
from Luhansk, 621 from Volyn, 468 from the Moldavian ARSR, 386 from Pervomaysk, 498 from Mohiliv, 443 from Berdichiv, 445 from Nizhin, 299 from Tulchinsk, 351 from Proskuriv, 285 from Shepetivka. (ibid, pgs. 34, 35).

Of the immigrants from Kuban, Slobozhanshchina, Don, who came to the peninsula in droves, is it possible that none of them had Ukrainian blood flowing in their veins?

For example, the number of Ukrainians in the Kuban district was listed as 915,450 (ibid, pg. 146), almost twice the number of Russians. However, the number of Ukrainian immigrants on the peninsula from Kuban was listed as only 1,147 in the census. (ibid, pg. 34).

From other regions of the RSRFR that were heavily populated with Ukrainians, the 1926 census listed 6,736 Ukrainian immigrants from Kursk, 4,237 from Bryansk, 605 from Chornomorya area, 1,154 from the Don area, 1,660 from Voronezh, 1,690 from Saratov. (ibid, pgs. 34, 35).

Documents that show Ukrainians actively striving to keep their cultural identity intact can be found in Melitopol, an area constantly supplying people to the Crimean peninsula. For example, in 1925 there were 4,571 marriages registered in Melitopol, of these 4,179 were of Ukrainians. In addition, Ukrainian men married 305 Russian women, 14 Polish, 9 Bulgarian, 5 Jewish, 11 German, and 1 Armenian woman. (Statistical materials of the Melitopol district for 1925. Melitopol, 1926, pg. 7).

Here we see a real basis for doubting the actual composition of the population of Crimea in the 1920’s. Moreover, the official numbers of Ukrainians given immediately after the census of 1926 were refuted by the Ukrainians themselves.

In their inquiry before the Presidium of the Crimean Central Executive Committee, it was noted:

“The census numbers are decreased due to improper recording on the part of the census takers, who, as it was witnessed in Simferopol, argued with people as to their nationality, and took advantage of the people’s ambivalence as to the census forms. Actually, the Ukrainian population comprises about 15% or 16% of the total, if
the statistical figures from before the war are examined, and the fact
that few Ukrainians were seen to leave Crimea and many more com-
ing into Crimea from Ukraine beginning with 1923, are taken into
account. (DAARK, fund R-663, desc. 1, matter1194, pg. 2).

A newspaper publication appeared in Kharkiv which said that
“the Crimean CSU absolutely ignored the issue of counting Ukraini-
ans as a nationality.” (ibid, fund R-137, desc.1, matter 300, pg. 15).

Regardless of the facts, Ukrainians continued to be ignored in
Crimea. In the book by P. Nikolsky, The Population of Crimea, pub-
lished in 1929, Ukrainians are completely excluded as an ethnos in
the materials of the 1926 census. They are mentioned as a Russian
group, together with Greater Russians, and Belorussians. (P. Nikol-

The 1926 census listed the Ukrainian village population in Crimea
as 51,436. These figures placed the Ukrainian village population
third, behind the Tartars who numbered 146,717, and Russians
numbering 131,802. Other nationalities included Germans at
40,160, Bulgarians at 10,916, and Greeks at 9,103. The least number
of Ukrainians were in the southern part, long settled by the Tartars.
In a primarily Tartar region like Sudak, there were only 505 Ukraini-
ans, in Bakhchisarai there were 674, in Karasubazarsk 895, ( here
were areas where Ukrainians were in the majority, Dgemrek, Sul-
tan-Sarai, Musabie, and Urus-Khodgi); in Sevastopol, a region heav-
ily populated by Tartars, there were 1015 Ukrainians, and 1,698 in
Yalta.

Ukrainians lived primarily in the steppe areas of Crimea. There
were 12,294 living in the Kerch region, almost as many as Russians,
who numbered 12,822. Ukrainians constituted a majority in 69 pop-
ulation areas. Areas that were primarily Ukrainian included Baksi,
Dgarzhava, Katerlis, Meskechi, Novomikolaevka, Stariy Karantin,
Ostaban, Pasha-Salin, and many others.

The second region most populated by Ukrainians was Dgankoy,
where 11,433 Ukrainians were listed. The Ukrainian spirit was also
kept alive in Armyansk, Biyut-Kiyat, Vorontsovka, Ishun,
Novoivanivka, Tarkha, Kula, and almost 100 other villages.

Populated areas with a Ukrainian majority were also found in the
К. А. С. С. Р.
Украинцам и Украинским
ОБЩИЙ ОТДЕЛ
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ДЕЛАМИ

ДЕЛО

по вопросу о культурно-просветительной
деятельности в Крыму

началось
закончилось
192 г.
192 г.

в дозе

Cover for a collection of cultural and educational activities of Ukrainians in Crimea in the 1920's.
Evpatoria and Simferopol district with 10,601, and 10,076 Ukrainian residents respectively. Ukrainians lived in separate groups in the Feodosia district, totaling 2,245.

Ukrainian village families typically had many children. For example, the association for communal farming in the village of Barab in the Simferopol district, in a report in 1925, recorded their members, by family, as follows: Honcharenko Levko Ivanovich — 6, Honcharenko Panas Fedorovich — 5, Honcharenko Anton Fedorovich — 4, Honcharenko Kasyan Leontiyovich — 7, Honcharenko Ivan Kharitonovich — 9, Honcharenko Kostyantin Kharitonovich — 4, Honcharenko Fedir Mikolayovich — 8, Shcherbina Hrihoriy Kharitonovich — 6, Shcherbina Oleksy Trokhimovich — 5, Shcherbina Dmytro Romanovich — 9, Chuprina Vasil Ivanovich — 1… (DAARK, fund R-663, desc. 1, matter 375, pgs. 192—194).

Ukrainians in this village did not get any additional land because a collective, “The Red ploughman” was formed, manned by discharged soldiers of the Red army. (ibid, pg.191).

Not seeing any activity on the part of the authorities, Ukrainians themselves began to organize in various Crimean cities and towns in order to openly declare their presence and insist on their rights. However, this did not yield any noticeable results. Instead of any assistance, they saw new roadblocks and disappointments. For example, an organization called the “Red Corner”, formed in 1926 in Yalta with 150 Ukrainian members, tried unsuccessfully to get a meeting place and minimal support for over one and a half years, and were finally forced to disband.

With great difficulty, Ukrainians in Simferopol were able to get approval for a Ukrainian club. However, they were not able to get a meeting place, despite trying for three years, and met evenings in small rooms in various schools. The 50 karbovantsy per month they got in 1927 as support was not enough for any sort of library or organizational work. (ibid, fund R-663, desc. 1, matter 1194, pg. 2).

A Ukrainian school, opened in 1927 at the request of the parents, also survived difficult times. It was given 2 small rooms in another larger school. An area of 53 square meters contained the school, library, club, choir, music and drama groups, and a reading room. In
addition to this it shared space with the organization “Self Help”. (ibid, pg. 2).

The Ukrainians in Sevastopol found themselves in a similar situation, even though there were quite a few of them there; the army was 75% Ukrainians. The Ukrainian theater, which was popular with the Russians as well as the Ukrainians, was closed in 1925. At the beginning of 1927 the Ukrainians were not permitted their own club, when minorities such as the Armenians, Georgians, and others had their own cultural centers. (News — Kharkiv, 1927, February 1).

As far as any cultural activity in the villages, there was none. There were no reading rooms, no books, no newspapers or other publications. In most Ukrainian villages the teachers were Russian, any Ukrainian teachers were assigned to non Ukrainian areas. (ibid, pg. 3).

Attempts at opening Ukrainian schools in villages were rebuffed by the Narkomat of Education of the Crimean ARSR, saying that the villagers had no interest in learning anything Ukrainian. The leaders of Ukrainian organizations in Crimea asked the authorities; “Did the Narkom of Education do anything about researching the advisability of Ukrainian education in schools? No. If the Ukrainians living in the cities offered the possibility of having Ukrainian schools to the villagers, the Ukrainians there not only would not refuse, but rather be very grateful. This must be approached seriously, thoughtfully, and without any prejudice.” (ibid, pg. 3).

The bitterness of the Ukrainian people was increased by the fact that these matters of cultural identity were often brought up for discussion in the Crimean Rada when issues regarding minority culture came up, but nothing was ever done for the Ukrainians. Thus, in 1928, it had to be announced “we must say that it would be criminal for us to continue encouraging the people, with no results, and not inform the higher authorities of the Crimean government.” (ibid, pg. 3).

The leaders of the Simferopol Ukrainian club and the Simferopol Ukrainian association “Vzaymodopomoha” (Self assistance — GZ) went before the Presidium of the Crimean Executive Committee with a written request ( with copies to the Obkom of the VKP(B)
and the Crimean Rada of professional associations) that demanded:

“a) discuss the importance of cultural and political issues that are important to the Ukrainian community in Crimea;

b) Propose to the Narkomprosu of Crimea the creation of a competent advisory group who would study the question of carrying on cultural education in the Ukrainian community in Ukrainian, and studying the practical aspects involved (transfer of teachers, Ukrainian education courses, education about cultural matters, etc.); allow cultural workers from the Ukrainian club and school to be a part of this advisory group;

c) Due to the complexity of the problem, and its importance, and the lack of necessary cultural workers, in order to direct efforts in the immediate future, propose that the Narkom of Education organize a department that would work with the Ukrainian population. In order to facilitate this, the Ukrainian Community club be given the status of “The Building of Ukrainian Socialist Culture” (Building of Cultural Education) which would serve over all the territory of Crimea, which would provide the means for developing the direction and leadership that would be able to educate the Ukrainian people both in school and out of school culturally, and politically;

d) Ask the OMH of the city of Simferopol to provide premises for the use of Ukrainian organizations (club, school, and the group “Vzaymodopomoha”), if possible near the center of the city because the Ukrainian community is so spread out;

e) Keeping in mind that no funds for any Ukrainian cultural endeavors were ever expended, and the local Simferopol Rada is not able to provide any funds, we ask the Crimean CVK to assign 6,500 karbovantsy to pay for a library, Ukrainian theater, and Ukrainian clubs in Sevastopol and Yalta (3,500 karbovantsy for the theater, applied to the budget of the Narkomovita (education committee — GZ)” (ibid, pg. 3).

What resources were actually used during the half year after this request was submitted can be judged by the notes written on the request itself by someone, dated January 16, 1929: “Problems with premises for school and club (the number of students increased from 44 to 109, but only two small classrooms were added, and a
Report about the progress of Ukrainization in Crimea. 1928.
class teaching reading and writing, which met evenings. Along with this, a school for homeless children, meeting from 2PM to 6 PM, was added to the usual class of 2nd year students that met until 7 PM. The conclusion is that there is no room for the library, club, and group meetings…The villages received 10 libraries (in Ukrainian) that were moved from village to village…” (ibid, pg. 3).

It is entirely possible that the situation regarding Ukrainians in Crimea finally attracted the attention of the local Bolshevik leadership, inasmuch as there was much rhetoric in the Kremlin about the successful program of cultural awareness among the minorities, and the leadership of the USSR complained about the treatment of Ukrainians on the peninsula. Therefore, in response to this, a decision was announced by the Presidium of the Crimean Central Executive Committee on April 12, 1929, with a number of preparatory actions taken by May 1 in Simferopol, which planned to introduce Ukrainian in schools and political education groups in areas where the Ukrainian population was concentrated.

It was also determined that “the Ukrainian population of Crimea, in all essential characteristics, including language, was not different from that of southern Ukraine.

Russian culture had only a minimal influence in the village areas populated by Ukrainians. It had a greater influence on the more educated people in the cities, who spoke with a Russian-Ukrainian jargon when speaking with Russians and generally to people in the cities. The language in the villages was almost exclusively Ukrainian. In areas that were located at some distance from the cities, and some recently settled areas such as Chistenka, Besharan, Mikolaevka, Ivanivka, and Kontuhan (Simferopol district) and all the populated areas of the Dgankoy and Evpatoria district the language spoken was exclusively Ukrainian.” (ibid, desc.2, matter 141, pg. 1).

It was especially interesting to hear the responses of students who were asked various questions about the introduction of the Ukrainian language in Russian. Typical reactions were “complete silence, with rare one or two word answers, devoid of emotion, given by a couple of the students, using many of the Russian words used by the person conducting the interview, or an emotional outburst in Ukrainian.
Plan outlining the means of speeding up the process of Ukrainization in Crimea. 1929.
nian (in Katerlis), or just disinterested attendance at the “lecture-discussion” with no emotional response whatever (in Baksi).” (ibid, pg.1, 2).

This led to the conclusion that “the teacher or cultural worker, who is a semi-foreigner, who is often seen in areas populated by Ukrainians, not speaking their native language well, is in a world of his own, basically ignored by those around him. Not using the native tongue limits a person, diminishes his activity and general development.” (ibid, pg. 2).

That is why the report of the representative of the Ukrainian pedagogues collective, Zhorovsky, succinctly stated: “The resolution about the possibility, necessity, and expediency of using the native language in institutions of education, must first determine the competence of the persons conducting this campaign.” (ibid, pg. 2).

Additional reports showed that in population centers such as Baksi, Bulhanak, and Katerlis, where the instructors were exclusively from the ranks of the Narkomat, the local residents chose to change the language in which classes were conducted to Ukrainian. In villages where there was no effort at preparation, Nova-Mikolaevka and Dgardgava, comments were “even though the people all speak Ukrainian, they do not wish changes at this time.” (ibid, pg.2).

In the Dgankoy district, the questioning of the populace was conducted by the heads of the Russian schools, so it was no surprise that the following conclusions were reached: “According to the Administration of Statistics — the village Novo-Pavlivka is 90% Ukrainian, but according to the head of the school, Honcharova, none. The population did not agree.

According to statistics, the village Biyuk-Kiyat was 98% Ukrainian, but according to Lyashkova “the children did not know any Ukrainian, so the people do not want to change the language (in school — V. S.) to Ukrainian.

According to statistics, the village Kart-Kozak is 98% Ukrainian, but according to Miryashina, “the children were born in Crimea and speak mostly Russian, and so the residents categorically reject changing the school to Ukrainian.” And further, as regards nationality, “all groups of children were — malorosi (pejorative Russian name for Ukrainians — GZ)“.
Statistics list the village of Mahazinka as 54% Ukrainian. “The school committee feels that Ukrainian can be introduced as a subject, although the children, as well as the adults, speak Russian.”

The village Koz. Shagin — introduce as a subject in school”.

The Seredi. Sarai Voronts. — 92%, but (the teacher) Sablaeva said “The population feels that the Ukrainian language is unnecessary, and asks that the school continue teaching in Russian, as it has been to date.”

In Vorontsovka, 80%. Morozov said “Because the residents of the village of Vorontsovka were born in Crimea and have nothing to do with Ukraine, they do not wish the introduction of Ukrainian”.

In Kerch, district 4, Demyanova said “Ukrainian introduced as a required course of study”. The village Tarkhi, 96% Ukrainian, Vetvitska said “The children speak absolutely differently than in Ukraine, and so the majority wishes to continue teaching in Russian”.

In the village Tyubey, Pol said “The residents want to switch to Ukrainian as the language used in school”. In the villages Bulatkodga and Zhanzhora, Shkarupo said “The residents did not agree to a change”. There was no report included regarding any discussion.

The village Mahazinka reports, “It is not expedient to change the school to Ukrainian. The children have a double system, they learn Russian and Ukrainian separately”.

In the village Mahit, the village committee voted to have Ukrainian as a course of study”. (ibid, pg. 3).

After studying the documents of the so-called study that was done regarding the introduction of Ukrainian as a language of instruction in schools, it is obvious, as can be seen in Simferopol in 1929, that those carrying on this work had no definite instructions from the Narkomat of Education of the KASRR. For most of them “Ukrainian Socialist culture, and the preparation of this study based on Ukrainian was totally foreign and unpleasant.” The results bear this out — the people who conducted this survey did so very subjectively, they did not know the language, and were basically prejudiced against the subject of the survey.” (ibid, pg. 3).

Even though the data indicated that many villages, such as in the Tyubey Dgankoy district, wanted to change the language used in the
schools to Ukrainian in 1928, this did not happen until the school year 1930—31, because here and in other Ukrainian villages were people who spoke Armenian and other languages and did not speak the language of the village (Ukrainian).” (ibid, pg. 3).

The local authorities in the Evpatoria region distinguished themselves by being extremely complacent about the change of language in Ukrainian villages. It came to the point that ridiculous reports would come from Ukrainian villages saying that there were no Ukrainians there at all. Amazingly enough, this was happening at the time (1922, 1923, and 1924) when entire Ukrainian villages were resettled from the Podil and Kyiv Gubernies (the very center of Ukraine — GZ). (ibid, pg. 3).

In the Simferopol district, the survey was done only in the village of Mikolaevka and in the city itself, where there already were Ukrainian schools. There were plans to open schools in Ivanivka and Kontuhaniv. These could have been authorized by the member of the Presidium of the Ukrainian regional pedagogical collective, Moldavsky, the head of the school in Mikolaevka. (ibid, pg. 4).

The process of introducing Ukrainian presence to Crimea continued with great difficulty. At the Crimean Conference of minorities in 1930, it was noted that 17 independent Ukrainian schools were organized on the peninsula, one of which was only to the 7th grade. (ibid, matter 626, pgs. 69, 70).

Also, it was planned, in the near term, to open 1 reading room, 2 “red corners” (information board — GZ), 1 club, and 1 library. (ibid, pg. 73).

It is now impossible to say how these plans ended, as the archives relating to this were lost. On the evidence of the leaders of education on the peninsula at that time (O. M. Zhelezov, O. A. Shendel, and H. M. Panteleychuk), at the beginning of the 1930’s there were over 40 schools that taught in the Ukrainian language in Crimea. (ibid, fund R3026, desc.4, matter 736, pgs. 56, 57).

Sadly, these plans were supported only until 1932, when the well known resolution of the CK VKP(B) and the Radnarkom of the SRSR ended the process of “Ukrainization” in the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This document specifically stated that “the CK
VKP(B) and the RNK of the SRSR judges the speeches and propositions by specific Ukrainians to “Ukrainize” several regions of the SRSR harshly, (for example in the DSK, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, CChO, etc.).

Such speeches can play into the hands of bourgeois-nationalist elements who were thrown out of Ukraine and settled in different “Ukrainized” regions, and continue their divisive work”. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc.2a, matter 5282, pg. 4).

In connection with this, Moscow instructed the leadership of these regions to “immediately stop any efforts at “Ukrainization”, change all Ukrainian newspapers and publications to Russian, and prepare all schools to teach only in Russian by the fall of 1933”. (ibid, pg. 4).

Even though Crimea was not specifically named in this resolution, it was taken as a signal to discontinue the efforts at “Ukrainization” on the peninsula. At the closed meeting of the College of the Narkomat of Education of the KASRR on March 19th, 1933, it was resolved to “increase Bolshevik awareness, strengthen the direct leadership of little known organizations, and step up the war against bourgeois nationalistic tendencies. “ (DAARK, fund R-20, desc, 10, matter 113, pg. 1).

It was understood that this related to the Ukrainian issue. From that time on there was no longer any question of satisfying educational and cultural needs of local Ukrainians, in spite of the fact that the numbers of Ukrainians in Crimea continued to increase. While in 1930 there were 79,165 Ukrainians in Crimea (DAARK, fund R-663, desc.2, matter 550, pg.49), then in 1939 there were 154,123. (ibid, fund R-219, desc.1, matter 115, pg. 15).

Notwithstanding repeated instructions in the secret directive of the Narkomosvita of the RRFSR on July 9th, 1933 about changing all Ukrainian schools to the Russian language (DAARK, fund R-20, desc.3, matter 113, pg. 53), in the school year 1937—1938 there were still 2 functional Ukrainian schools in Simferopol and the Krasnoperekopsk district. (ibid, fund R-3026, desc. 4, matter 738, pg. 56).

In the 1940—1941 school year there was only one, with classes to the 10th grade, where 569 students were taught in 17 classrooms.
### Повідомлення

про стан відділів Кримської області на момент закінчення року.

За даними на 1928 рік в Кримській області відбувались такі зміни.

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Українські відділи зазначені в цій частині відділів Кримської області.

За інформацією з полога Кримського майдану на 1940-1941 роки зазначені відділи з чисел відділів в Українському відділі.

Українські відділи відділів з численими відділіми.

Зазначено зазначені відділи з численими відділіми.

За інформацією з полога на Кримському майдані на 1940-1941 роки зазначені відділи з численими відділіми.

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в та в українському університеті.

Після відновлення республіки по всьому історії розвитку зазначено значне зростання населення Криму та числа української нації його аристократії.

1918 року з'явилася газета "Радянська Крим", яка вигадувала український театр. Інші зміни не вплинули на розвиток української літератури. В цей час в різних університетах починаються громадянські університети. У навчальних планах немає середніх спеціалізовань української літератури. В навчальних планах вводяться спеціалізовані курси Української мови.

В різні організаційні та установчі організації, асоціації, управління та розповсюджувати звіти і інші матеріали, в яких сурвичають спеціалізовані українські вуз.

На першу номінацію зазнали газети, серед них організації почали видавати навчальні зниза і матеріалами для громадян Української мови а також для вчення української літератури.

Натомість, трохи пізніше, в великих університетах зазнали значних змін. Зокрема, в середні університети зазнали значного зростання студентів з української мови. Більшість з них почали займатись вузами. На плані студентської літератури відображено численні теми, з якими в навчанні Української мови століття не було значних змін.

Тим не менш, початком нового століття зазнали значного розвитку в Українському університеті. На плані студентської літератури відображено численні теми, з якими в навчанні Української мови століття не було значних змін.
(ibid, pg. 56). According to the records of the Narkomat of Education of the KARSR regarding Ukrainian children in Crimean schools, there were a total of 7,716, grades 1-4 had 4,202, grades 5-7 had 2,956, and grades 8-10 had 558 students. (ibid, fund R-20, desc. 10, matter 208, pg. 37, 37 back).

In the Ak-Sheykhsky district, where there was no Ukrainian school, there was a majority of Ukrainian children. In the Dgamnadasky and Kizibaysky districts beginning schools, in the Monaysky middle school, and others, at least one third of the children were Ukrainian. (ibid, matter 42, pg. 2—22).

Other minorities in Crimea included 7,388 German children, 3,338 Jewish, and 1,269 Armenian. (ibid, matter 208, pg 37, 37 back)

Of course, this negative attitude of the authorities towards the education of Ukrainian children in Crimea in their native language, and the development of Ukrainian culture, did not do much for the feeling of national identity. There were many Ukrainians who not only did not speak in their native language, but were totally ambivalent as to their nationality.

This, by the way, obscures the tempo of population growth. By 1930 the Ukrainian village population grew by 1,500 to reach a total of 52,950. (ibid, fund 663, desc. 2, matter 550, pg. 49). This population reached 23,930 in cities, and 2,285 in towns. (ibid, pg. 49).

The total Ukrainian population, 79,165 was third largest in Crimea, just as it was four years ago. The Russian population totaled 324,415, with 131,655 in the villages, and the Tartars numbered 196,255. (ibid, pg. 49).

During the 1930’s, the tempo of the growth of the Ukrainian population exceeded even that of the Russians. In 1939, the total Ukrainian population was 154,123, twice what it was in 1930, the growth of the Russian population decreased to a ten year low, their numbers totaling 558,481. (ibid, fund R-137, desc. 9, matter 14, pg. 1).
AWARENESS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

Ukrainian life in Crimea began a rebirth only in 1941, when Ukrainian nationalists came to the peninsula, then occupied by the Nazis. They created a “Bureau for the assistance for the Ukrainian population” in Simferopol, which worked with the local authorities. They also formed a commission that corrected passport information as to nationality, from Russian nationality to Ukrainian (almost 4,000 were corrected in a short time).

In a report of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — GZ) is seen that it was these nationalists that prepared the groundwork for creation of the Ukrainian National Committee in Crimea, which began renewing Ukrainian self awareness on the peninsula. On June 2nd, 1942, the theater in Simferopol held the first performance of the Ukrainian play “Zaporozhets za Dunayem” produced by the newly organized Ukrainian musical-drama group led by director Petrenko. (CDAVOVU, fund 3833, desc. 3, matter 2, pg. 85).

Just the fact that the Ukrainian theater became active, after being closed for 22 years, since 1918, demonstrates clearly that the Ukrainians in Crimea did not give up their identity despite very trying times.

Also, a school for beginning classes was organized, a wider school system was planned, and two gymnasiums (high schools — GZ) were built. (ibid, pg. 85).

The attention paid to Crimea was not incidental. The nationalists continued to maintain that “whoever controlled Crimea had a clear path through the Bosporus and could hope to rule the Black Sea and the southern part of eastern Europe”. (O. Stepaniv, Crimea the key to the Black Sea), Doroha, Lviv, 1943, part 3, pg. 57).

However, spreading the Ukrainian movement during wartime was not successful. The greatest obstacle was Russia, who started a tremendous campaign to renew “the one and indivisible”. The large mass of Russians that came into Crimea spread anti Ukrainian sentiment, helped by some Germans.

In addition to this, in the summer of 1942, the Banderivtsi (Ukrainian nationalists — GZ) lost the leaders Roman Bardakivsky
Репорт організації українських націоналістів про перезустріч життя в Криму під час війни. 1942 р.
from Sambir, Stepan Vankevich from Ternopil, and Mikhailo Lobak from Lviv, greatly weakening their forces. (ibid, desc.1, matter 20, pg. 27).

It must be noted that, along with the Banderivtsi, a group of several Melnikivtsi (another nationalistic group — GZ) took an active role in Crimea, led by Yaroslav Savka and Boris Sukhoversky. (ibid, pg. 27).
At the time the peninsula was liberated from the Nazis there were 615,000 residents left, down from the 1,127,000 that lived there before the war. (DAARK, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 221, pg. 1). The resettlement of the native population began — on May 13th a directive from Moscow ordered the total deportation of Crimean Tatars. Within three days all regional authorities, and by the evening of the 17th, the city authorities, were notified, just as the evacuation was begun. (ibid, pg.9). 187,859 Tatars were deported off the peninsula in one day, 168,876 from villages, and 18,983 from cities. As a result of this, 421 collectives were closed, one third of all collectives in Crimea. (ibid, pgs. 3, 4) On June 1, 1944 there remained only 420,000 residents in Crimea. (ibid, pg.1). The decrease in the village population of the autonomous republic, adding the closing of 83 Jewish collectives (almost 20,000 people) and deportation of 121 German collectives (almost 40,000 people totaled 170,594. (ibid, pg. 3).

Having approved the resolution No. 5859ss on May 10th deporting the Tatars and No. 5984ss on June 2nd 1944 deporting so called German collaborators from among the Armenians, Greeks, and Bulgarians, the National Committee of Defense of the SRSR did not consider by whom and when the places vacated by the deportees would be filled. As was outlined in resolution No.11618 of the RNK SRSR dated May 29th, 1944, the leadership in Moscow thought to compensate for the shortage of people necessary for the village sector by resettling the Spanish political refugees from Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, the cities Gorky and Kirov. (DAARK, fund 652, desc. 24, matter 23, pg. 12). There were only 511 of these, and not all could be expected to agree to resettle. Also, many villagers would end up living in cities. This was especially true in the Fridorfsk district, where many Jews were settled before the war. Actually, 8 collectives, 2 national collectives, and 2 MTS (Machine and Tractor Services — GZ) had no workers.(ibid, fund 3287, desc. 2, matter 1255, pg. 37).

The well known spy-terrorist Pavlo Sudoplatov revealed the secret plan Stalin had for resettling the Crimean peninsula. It seems
there was a project called “Crimean California” which was supported by American Jews. The Kremlin wanted to rebuild the war ravaged agriculture with monies extracted from them with the promise of creating a Jewish Republic on the peninsula. Stalin discussed his plans with American Trade Secretary Eric Johnston, painting a beautiful picture of possibilities that were promised, and said the SSR would be extended long term credit after the war. According to Sudoplatov, the project of a Jewish Socialist Republic in Crimea was openly discussed in Moscow, not only by the Jews but also by high echelon authorities. (P. Sudoplatov, Special Operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin. 1930—1950. Moscow, 1998, pg. 469).

After it became clear that America would extend credits only after the war, and meanwhile, the homes and property of 230,000 deportees stood empty, the leadership in Moscow was forced to consider immediate special approaches. On August 12, 1944, the National Committee of the Defense of the SSR passed resolution No. 6372s “About the resettlement of collective workers to Crimean regions” which planned to increase the population by 17,000 village families (about 51,000 persons) “with the aim of cultivating the fields, orchards, and grape orchards of Crimea as soon as possible”. In the development of this resolution the Rada of National Commissars of the Crimea ARSR and the Obkom of the VKP(B) sketched out a plan on August 18th, 1944, which spelled out the location of the future settlers. It was anticipated that 1,000 families from the Rostov district would be resettled in the Yalta district, 2,500 families from the Krasnodar region to the Alushta district, 2,500 from the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions to Sudak, 1,300 from the Kursk and Rostov regions to the Starokrimsk district, 2,700 from Tambov, and Kursk region to the Karasubazarsk district, 2,000 from the Orel and Bryansk region to the Bakhchisarai district, 2,000 from the Voronezh region to the Balaklava district, and 3,000 from Ukraine to the Kuybishevsk district. (DAARK, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 2217, pg. 147).

In a report to Moscow about the preparatory work involved with the execution of this resolution, V. Starchenko, the assistant head of the Rada of National Commissars, and D. Korotchenko, secretary
МОСКВА
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ КОМИТЕТ ОБОРОНЫ
ТОМУ МОЛОТОВУ В.М.

Согласно постановлению Государственного Комитета Обороны за № 63724 от 12 августа 1944 года "О переселении колхозников в районы Крыма", из областей Украинской ССР необходимо переселить в Куйбышевский район, Крымской АССР, 3000 добросовестных и трудолюбивых колхозников.

Выполняя это постановление, Совнарком УССР и ПК КП/С/У 18 августа принял соответствующее решение о переселении колхозников в Куйбышевский район Крыма.

Переселение 3 000 колхозных семей - 9 000 человек проводится из следующих областей:

на Винницкой области - 600 хозяйств - 1800 человек,
на К. Подольской - 600 - 1800,
на Батомарской - 500 - 1500,
на Киевской - 400 - 1200,
на Черниговской - 350 - 1050,
на Сумской - 350 - 1050,
на Полтавской - 200 - 600.

Report regarding the resettlement of Ukrainian collective farm workers to replace deported Tartars. 1944.
of the CK KP(B)U noted: “Taking into account the fact that 3,000 collective farm workers from Ukraine will be resettled in the Kuybishev district alone, the work load on each worker will be unusually low, as the entire region can be cultivated with 1,500 families. In addition there will not be enough housing to accommodate them, so the Radnarkom of the URSR and the CK KP(B)U asks the planned resettlement from Ukraine to be limited to 1,500 families giving them the entire region” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 23, matter 1318, pg. 8).

The authorities in Kyiv explained that the arable land in the Kuybishev district was only 3,130 hectares in 1941. Ukrainian farmers, who were used to cultivating grains, potatoes, and vegetables, would have some difficulty with the limited land area and its unusual arrangement, with arable plots scattered on hilly inclines. (ibid, pg. 4).

Also there was a lack of housing. After the Tartars were evicted from the area, there were only 156 available houses, which first had to accommodate the families of 188 dead sailors of the Black Sea fleet. In general, there were only accommodations for 2010 families. This would mean that a large portion of the resettled collective farm workers would be in worse circumstances that those they had left in Ukraine. (ibid, pgs. 6, 7).

However, Moscow did not alter the plan, even though Ukraine, devastated by Nazi occupation, was short of workers, especially in the southern areas.

Kyiv was forced to adapt to this plan: The Vinnitsa district had to send 600 families, Kamyanets-Podilsk 600, Zhitomir 500, Kyiv 400, Chernihiv 350, Sumy 350, and Poltava 200. (ibid, pg. 2).

Ukraine carried out this order, even exceeding it. Crimea got 3,023 families, totaling 10,379 persons, including 6,260 capable of work in the fields. (ibid, matter 1320, pg. 117).

Incidentally, these included 45 heads of collectives, 35 village committees, 44 teachers, 5 doctors, 4 mechanics, 11 agrarians, and 6 zoologists. (ibid, pg. 114).

When these people arrived where ordered, it was found that there was nowhere for many of them to live, something that Kyiv had tried
to tell Moscow. As a result, 700 Ukrainian families were dispersed in various areas of the peninsula. (DAARK, fund 652, desc.24, matter 27, pg. 70).

The final location of the resettled farmers in the southern areas was as follows:

- Alushta — 2,349 families from Krasnodarsk;
- Balaklava — 2,015 families from Voronezh;
- Bakhchisarai — 2,146 from Bryansk and Orel;
- Bilohirsk — 1,556 from Kursk and Tambov;
- Kuybishev — 2,349 from the Ukrainian RSR;
- Starokrimsk — 1,268 from Rostov, Tambov, and Kursk;
- Yalta — 35 from Rostov (ibid, pg. 9).

The final location of the resettled farmers in the steppe areas:

- Azov — 162 families from Zhitomir;
- Dgankoy — 27 from Kamyanets-Podilsk and Kyiv;
- Evpatoria — 150 from Kamyanets-Podilsk and Kyiv;
- Zuyusk — 212 from Rostov, Kyiv, and Vinnitsa;
- Kirovsk — 428 from Tambov;
- Nizhnohirsk — 320 from Tambov;
- Oktyabirsk — 57 from Vinnitsa and Kyiv;
- Primorsk — 204 from Tambov;
- Simferopol — 216 from Vinnitsa;
- Sovietsk — 180 from Tambov (ibid, pg. 9).

The Ukrainian villagers who were resettled expected that in 1944, the small plots of land by their houses that were left by the Tartars, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians that had lived there would have almost nothing left on them, and the harvest of the collectives would already be in government store houses. They had to live on whatever they brought with them until the next harvest. Not believing what they were told, not to bring anything with them, that everything they would need would be waiting for them in Crimea, they brought what food they could with them. They brought with them 8,021 centners (one centner is equal to 100 Kg — GZ) of grain, and 10,013 of vegetables. In addition to this, they brought 1,289 centners of animal feed, 641 cows, 204 sheep, 308 hogs, and 7,038 head of fowl. (ibid, matter 1319, pg. 5).
Those who did not leave with empty hands were not mistaken. The newly resettled villagers were not greeted very hospitably when they arrived in Crimea. After reading some of the letters written to relatives in the Novograd-Volynsk district of the Zhitomir region, describing very difficult conditions in Crimea, the secretary of the local regional committee of the party, Buyanovsky, had to ask the CK KP(B)U and the Crimean Obkom of the VKP(B) to help the newly resettled Ukrainians. (ibid, matter 1320, pg. 107).

The Crimean authorities themselves had to admit there was a serious problem, the settlers in Kuybishev did not get their promised 2 centners of wheat until September 10th, and 292 newcomers in the collective “Kisil-Kermen” had nothing to do. (DAARK, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 2218, pg. 165).

But there was a war on and everyone had to get used to the difficult circumstances, there were no funds available to properly settle the newcomers.

The next five years did not see any more organized resettlement. Of the 3,500 families who came to Crimea on their own between September 1944 and August 1949, only 1,000 received the status of settler. However, as of August 1, 1949 of these only 8,173 persons were left in Crimea, all others returned to their native homes. (CDAVOVU, fund 4626, desc. 1, matter 273, pg. 9).

The Crimean resettlement process began anew in 1949, but the URSR was not involved. There were some voluntary Ukrainian settlers, but they had no influence on the situation.

The critical situation that developed on the peninsula and continued to worsen, especially in the farming sector, forced Moscow to resume the resettlement of Ukrainian villagers to Crimea.

The URSR received orders in 1950 to send one thousand families there, three hundred each from Vinnitsa and Sumy, and two hundred each from Kamyanets-Podilsk and Kyiv. The “promotional” activity began in the first days of the new year. By the middle of January there were already 25 families willing to resettle. (ibid, matter 84, pg. 11). However, the western part of Ukraine was not targeted for resettlement due to ideological reasons, the Bolsheviks feeling that the people in eastern Ukraine were more tractable. As of
July 3rd, 1950, 972 Ukrainian families were resettled in Crimea: 200 from Kamyanets-Podilsk, 292 from Vinnitsa, 184 from Kyiv, and 296 from Sumy. (ibid, matter 273, pg. 3).

The following numbers of families were resettled from regions of the Russian Federation: Vladymirsk — 304 families, Gorky — 291 families, Penza — 513 families, Moscow — 205 families, Stavropol — 94 families, Krasnodar — 100 families, and Autonomous Republic of Chuvashiya — 106 families. (ibid, pg. 92).

The Crimean government, as in post war times, did not prepare conditions for the newly arrived settlers. There were problems with housing and availability of work, so many returned. In connection with this problem, the head of the resettlement administration with the Rada of Ministers of the SSR, S. Cheryomushkin, contacted his subordinate in Kyiv on March 9th, 1951, calling his attention to the many families that left Crimea and returned to their old homes. He instructed him to find these families and “explain to them the necessity of returning to their assigned places in Crimea”. (CDAVOVU, fund 4626, desc. 1, matter 105, pg. 4).

Actually, not all the settlers felt comfortable in their new homes in Crimea, but compared with their Russian counterparts, they were far less demanding and didn’t irritate the higher authorities. It wasn’t easy for Nikita Khrushchev, then a member of the Politbureau of the CK VKP(B), to answer people from his native Kursk region, who decided to resettle as a whole collective, and asked that he recommend an area that had “good living conditions, water, fertile land, etc.” and also “help us establish our collective in the new territory”. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 24, matter 990, pg. 39).

Convinced that the Ukrainian collective workers were very good at their jobs, Moscow not only helped them get established in Crimea, but also tasked the URSR with providing more settlers. The plan for 1951 calling for the resettling of 1,200 families was 97% completed. (CDAVOVU, fund 1, desc. 24, matter 866, pg.173). In addition, Vinnitsa contributed 754 families, and Sumy 428, (CGAVOVU, fund 4626, desc.1, matter 273, pg. 3).

A great number of settlers also came from the RRFSR, Vladimirsk — 300, Voronezh — 799, and Ryazan — 510. (ibid, pg. 93).
The following year the URSR was “asked” to contribute 1,400 families. As of October 11th, 1952, 1,549 families were sent to Crimea, exceeding the quota. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 24, matter 1716, pg. 3). The entire collectives “Komintern” and “Za Urozhay” from the Dovbisky district, comprised of 119 families, and the collective “Dzerzhinsky” from Chudniv, with 76 families, were among the settlers. (ibid, matter 2077, pg. 51).

The yearly plan was accomplished over quota; Crimea saw 1,426 families from Ukrainian collectives settle there: Chernihiv — 452, Sumy — 434, Zhitomir — 215, Khmelnitsky — 229, and Kyiv — 246. (CDAVOVU, fund 4626, desc. 1, matter 27, pg. 93).

These numbers for that year were close to those from the RRFSR: 308 families from Kursk region, 247 from Voronezh, 252 from Ryazan, 202 from Moscow, and 102 from Rostov. (ibid, pg. 93).

In 1953 there were more organized settlers from Ukraine than Russia. Voronezh (with 320), Kursk (with 309) totaled 1,004 families from Russia, while Ukrainian settlers from Sumy (617) and Chernihiv (518) alone supplied 1,135 families. (ibid, pg. 94). The total from Ukraine came to 1,285 families. (ibid, pg. 3).

The years 1944, and 1950—1953 saw 7,903 families from Ukraine resettled to Crimea (the plan called for 7,800). Vinnitsa contributed 1,657, Zhitomir 715, Kyiv 838, Sumy 2,128, Khmelnitsky 1,037, Chernihiv 1,328, and Poltava 200. (CDAVOVU, fund 4626, desc. 1, matter 273, pg. 3).

The overall numbers of Ukrainians who resettled permanently continually grew. When, in 1944 they represented one fifth of the population, by the 1950’s the percentage changed dramatically in favor of the Ukrainians.

However, the authorities in Moscow and Crimea continued to do little to help establish the newcomers. Heads of households who came to build homes for their families found that building materials were not available, and deliveries of lumber were not organized. After waiting for some time, they returned back to Ukraine. S. Cheryomushkin informed the government of the RRFSR on January 5th, 1953, that during October and November of 1952 1,254 people were brought to Crimea to start building their homes. (DAARK, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 1260, pgs. 65, 66).
The settlers who had come in 1944—1946 also found themselves in dire straits. The heads of the regional government, P. Titov and D. Polansky wrote to the Head of the Rada of Mi-nisters of the SRSR, G. Malenkov, in 1953 that “the settlers could not repay the loans they were given by the government”. (ibid, pg. 86).

Starokozhev, head of the collective “Zhdanov”, of the Sudak dis-trict, wrote to Malenkov on September 24th, 1953 “The settlers who came in 1944 are leaving the area because they found living conditions unacceptable (the homes that the Tartars left — V. S.), lacking those things that are necessary for a Russian, and renovations are not possible because there are not enough building materials”. (ibid, matter 1262, pg. 56).

The problem was that the settlers were given Tartar houses, made of clay, with earthen roofs. Not knowing how to take care of this type of dwelling, they let them fall apart.

On top of that, there was no Russian style oven. More contem-porary buildings, like those the settlers had been used to, were not often built. For example, an official document dated October 23rd, 1953, stated that “Trust” no. 38 which was to build 100 buildings for the Kirov and Doronin collectives in the Balaklava district, actually finished none. Similar unpleasant results were shown by other builders who were directed by the party organizations to build 290 buildings in different areas of the region. (ibid, matter 1261, pg. 58).

Besides housing issues, there were more important reasons for settlers abandoning Crimea. In his report for the year 1953, the head of the resettlement department of the Crimean regional executive committee, M. Puzakin, wrote “the essential problem is the poor material support of the settlers. The collectives they left gave them nothing for the work they had done, and the new collectives they joined in Crimea did not compensate them for the work they were doing. When they complained, the bureaucratic system tied them up in “red tape”. (CDAVOVU, fund 4626, desc. 1, matter 274, pg. 65).

For example, 30 families left the Stalin collective in the Sudak dis-trict because they were not paid for their work and did not get any proper housing. The authorities failed to arrange for feed for the cat-
tle, so the settlers sold their cows and left Crimea. (ibid, pg. 66). The greatest migration out of Crimea was in Sudak, Alushta, Starokrim, and Balaklava. (ibid, pg. 65).

M. Puzakin confirmed that in 1950 1,256 families of settlers left Crimea (3,049 arrived), in 1951, 849 left (3,036 arrived), in 1952, 475 left (2,979 arrived), and in 1954, 491 left (2,910 arrived). (ibid, pgs. 106, 107, 108, and 109).
AFTER TEN YEARS — CRIMEA IS STILL NOT REBUILT

Judging by Soviet documentary literature, the post war five year plan (1946—1950) succeeded in rebuilding the nation’s economy, which was ruined by World War II. The Soviet encyclopedia of Ukrainian history shows that “During the years of the fourth five year plan (1946—1950), the damage wrought by the German Fascist invaders was repaired, industry rebuilt on a modern, more highly technological level.” (REIU, Kyiv, 1972, volume 2, pg. 512).

After three years, lecturer I. Yatsenko tried to keep this spirit alive in his attempts to convince listeners in the higher party school attached to the CK KP of Ukraine. But, quoting the figures spent on capital improvement in the industrial sector, 2,886,900,000 karbovantsy, he did not mention exactly on what it was spent. (I. Yatsenko, Crimean party organization in the struggle to establish and further develop industry (1944—1950), Kyiv, 1973, pg. 11).

Instead of specific facts, the lecturer spoke of various indicators that did not answer the question of how the invested funds were spent. The lecturer constantly spoke of the “development of organizational and political work of the party in Crimea, mobilizing the workers to carry out the five year plan”, “the stakhanov movement”, “organizing young men and women”, etc. (ibid, pgs. 11—20). Continued questioning forced him to admit that in 1949 that industrial production reached only 56.9% of pre war levels, and canned fruits, tobacco, wines, and other similar products reached only 30—35% of pre war levels, 1940. (ibid, pg. 20).

Possibly, in 1950 improvements were made, but did Crimea really leave the consequences of war behind?

On February 27th, 1953 P. Titov, First Secretary of the Obkom of the KPRS, informed G. Malenkov, Secretary of the CK KPRS that “The Ministry of colored metals and construction serving heavy industry did not prepare its plans in a timely manner for even one of the planned buildings of the Kerch Metallurgical Concern.

The trust (similar to corporation — GZ) Kerchmetallurgbud was not properly prepared to complete the planned opening in 1954, and the first blast furnace, in the factory named after Voykov, will not be ready...
Kerchmetallurgbud was formed in 1946, but never had any production facilities. Quarries did not have modern equipment; the gravel and rock were mined manually. There were no factories to supply cement, reinforced concrete, asphalt, no quarries which supply sand and stone, no facilities for mechanical repairs, no base which could supply equipment where and when needed, and no support structure comprised of smaller businesses.” (DAARK, fund 1, desc.1, matter 3602, pg. 15).

Local authorities had the following to say at the beginning of 1954, days after Crimea was turned over to Ukraine: “Ten years have passed since the war ended, said Moyseyev, Secretary of the Feodosia Party Committee, and workers approach us with legitimate demands — when will the city be rebuilt, providing minimally acceptable living conditions? The city has no water, hardly any electricity, and no place to wash or do laundry. 40% of all buildings were destroyed in the war, but only one building with 8 apartments has been built. The city has only one street that is completely paved.

Many of these questions were put before the Rada of Ministers of the RRFSR and the ministers. A decision to help the city of Feodosia was issued by the Crimean government in 1953, but the ministry of communal affairs of the RRFSR is not honoring this decision and has not acted on it.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 4990, pg. 125).

Moyseyev’s opinion was that “the issue of rebuilding Feodosia should have been approached seriously earlier. We expect the CK Party of Ukraine and the Rada of Ministers of Crimea will examine the state of affairs in Feodosia and will give us real assistance.” (ibid, pg. 126).

The Party leader of this city felt that “decrees of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR, joining the Crimea region to Ukraine, is a very significant event in the life of our region. This decree meets with the requirements of the workers of Crimea who have close economic ties with Ukrainian RSR”. (ibid, pg.128).

“Who will rebuild the Kirov district of Kerch, the central part of the city?” This rhetorical question was asked by the secretary of the city committee Smorodin from the rostrum of the Crimean regional
party conference.” The answer is no one! There is no organization that can do this. We have Krimcivilbud, who has a program which spends 2.5 million per year, but they aren’t doing anything. At the rate of their progress we won’t finish rebuilding this city in a hundred years…

Back in February 23rd, 1952, one of the points of a resolution of the Rada of Ministers of the RRFSR was “the necessity of the ministry of buildings and construction of the RRFSR examining the need for a building company called Kerchcivilbud. There is no such organization today…

More than that, a resolution of the Rada of Ministers of the SSR on April 19th, 1952, “regarding means of helping the city economy of Kerch”, specified that the Ministry of the Fleet was obliged to prepare plans and cost analysis for a seaport in 1952, and yet now, in 1954, this has not even begun. This same resolution called for a dairy to be built in Kerch in 1953 — it is not being built; a meat packing plant to be built in 1954 — it is not being built; a candy and cake factory to be built in 1952 — it is not here even today”. (ibid, pgs. 115, 116).

Actually, the Crimean authorities had planned to rebuild the dairy in the first quarter of this year, and the meat packing plant by December of 1945. (DAARK, fund R-137, desc. 201, pg. 67).

It’s no wonder that G. Smorodin appealed to D. Korotchenko, Head of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, who “declared that, after the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the SSR regarding the transfer of Crimea to the URSR, proper attention will be paid to the issue of developing the local economy”. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 4990, pg. 117).

In the words of Kruhlyak, the head of the Evpatoria executive committee, “not a single meter of this city was rebuilt after the war, even though it was often promised.” (DAARK, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 1291, pg. 383).

As far as the rebuilding of cities, Sevastopol fared much better than others. After Stalin visited in 1948, the city received substantial financial support in order to build a suitable base for the Black Sea fleet. P. Titov, the First Secretary of the Crimean Obkom of the Party
and Vice Admiral S. Horshkov, commander of the Black Sea fleet, wrote to G. Malenkov, Head of the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR regarding the execution of the resolution of October 25th, 1948, “About the means of speeding up of the rebuilding of Sevastopol”. Instead of the planned 1,176,000 karbovantsy, after four years only 870,000 karbovantsy were actually used. The sectors furthest behind were the building of residential buildings for workers of the city executive committee, hospitals and clinics, libraries, and clubs. This was due to poor work on the part of Rossevastopolbud and insufficient support of the Rada of Ministers RRFSR. The project for housing the staff of the city government totaled 35,000 sq. meters but was unfinished. Space for a hospital of 267 beds stood unfinished, as were schools for 650 students, 2 movie theaters, and other projects. (DAARK, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 3604, pg. 39).

The agricultural productivity in 1953 was 38 pood per hectare, exceeding the best pre-war figures of 36 pood. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 4990, pg. 10). However, this did not signal a rebirth of agriculture in Crimea after 1944. In 1953 the land area cultivating grain was decreased by 17,000 hectares compared to 1952, and 37,000 compared to 1951. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 4990, pg. 12).

Of course, an attempt could be made to explain this by saying that more land area was devoted to grasses that were used for animal feed, but the reality was that much less feed was gotten out of the grass, and the decreased harvest of grains resulted in a dearth of feed for the livestock.

Another problem adding to the decrease in cultivated land was that a great deal of land lay fallow for many years. Collectives in Leninsk, Kirovsk, Krasnoperekopsk, and Primorsk districts had over 30,000 hectares of land that had not been used for over ten years. In addition, there were over 5,000 hectares that were still not cleared of mines. (ibid, pg. 13).

Even though there may be explanations for this, but still the fact remains that cultivated land, 661,400 hectares, in 1953 was less than the previous two years, and significantly less than past years, 1940 saw 742,300 hectares cultivated, but even in 1913 770,000 hectares were cultivated. (National Agriculture of Crimea, pg. 61).
Orchards and vineyards saw the greatest decline. The collectives had not restored orchards that had been disused since the war, and many were in extremely poor condition. The yield on average was 20 centners per hectare, when in 1940 it was 55. Vineyards yielded only 12 centners per hectare, down from 20 in 1940. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 4990, pg. 15).

The first secretary of the Yalta city party commission, S. Medunov, wrote “Visitors in sanatoriums could only get one kilogram of grapes, and two kilograms of fruit, and even then of poor quality, during the month they spent there.” (ibid, pg. 147).

He wrote in a regional newspaper “The majority of vines were planted many years ago. The collective “Hurzuf” had 80 hectares of grapes which were planted 80—100 years ago, and the vines in the “Horniy” collective were planted 60—70 years ago. These vineyards were in poor condition, with yields of less than 12 centners per hectare. Only about 10% of the vineyards in the region were “re-constructed”; many vines were not properly supported, and much of the crop was infested with mildew and other blights. (Crimean Pravda, 1953, September 1).

This newspaper informs us that local wines such as “Sonyachna Dolyna”, “Sudak”, “Kahor”, and “Tashli” could not be bought, even in higher class stores. Almost half the wine production had to use imported grapes because there was not enough local product. (ibid, 1953, June 7).

Regional authorities had to admit that “The last years saw a very poor harvest and the vineyards could not supply the needs of the winemakers. New plantations are being established slowly and the older ones are dying. Instead of encouraging the planting of new vineyards, the growers are told to write off the old ones as economically not viable. “Sonyachna Dolyna” wrote off 30 hectares of vineyards, and “Feodosia” wrote off 24. The reasons were always the same, they weren’t productive. “Sonyachna Dolyna” saw yields of only 16.1 centners per hectare, when the yield was 60 before the war. The vineyards were poorly taken care of. Over 316 hectares let weeds grow between the vines. Older vines were not cleared of underbrush at all. New vineyards were planted very slowly. In one example in-
stead of the 210 hectares that were planned, only 31 were actually
planted. (ibid, 1953, June 7).

Strange, but true — the regions hit hardest were those that had the
best natural conditions. This included the Simferopol, Bakhchisarai,
Kuybishev, and Zuysk regions.

Fruit orchards were located in river valleys, the Alma, Kachi, Bel-
bek, and Salhir. These took on a decrepit appearance. The areas be-
tween the trees were not kept clear, drainage was not enforced,
allowing them to become muddy. (ibid, desc. 53, matter 136, pgs. 9,
10).

In November of 1944 the Plenum of the Crimean Obkom of the
Party was forced to admit that the settlers were not able to deal with
the agricultural conditions in Crimea. “They had no idea how to
look after Crimean orchards, and no local authorities instructed
them in proper technique. For example, in the collective “Lenin”, the
workers covered the bases of the trees on twenty hectares with soil
rather than tilling around them as they should have”. (DAARK, fund
1, desc. 1, matter 2213, pg. 8).

However, the Ukrainian settlers from the northern areas of
Ukraine were praised for being very hard working. (ibid, pg.21).

The dedication of Ukrainian workers has always been praised in
Crimea. The regional newspaper wrote “The late fall of 1952 saw the
arrival of 86 families from Ukraine from Chernihiv to the Kalinin
collective in the Zuysk region. The care of cattle had been neglected
and the situation was terrible. (Crimean Pravda, 1954, January 12).
But over a year and a half the picture changed dramatically, in-
formed the correspondent of this paper. Unfortunately, this was not
seen everywhere in Crimea. As a scholar from Simferopol, Petro
Volvach, noted “not every Crimean village in 1952 had Ukrainian
settlers.” (Village time, 1999, April 2).

The foothill regions, the principal regions for fruit orchards and
vineyards, were settled by people from farmlands (after that Tartars
were displaced in 1944 — V.S.) “where a tree was used only for fuel
in their cooking stoves, and they had no idea how to care for an or-
chard”, said Maksimenko, Secretary of the Bakhchesarai Party Com-
mittee in 1956. (ibid, pg. 43). It was strange to see corn and oats
growing where orchards and vineyards once stood. (ibid, pg. 42).

The situation with other crops was even worse. In 1953, areas used for cultivation of high value crops such as tobacco, dropped from those in pre-war times by 1,800 hectares, and the productivity fell by half, yielding a poor quality product. (ibid, pg. 16).

Even in 1954 tobacco was not being raised by qualified farmers. The crop was not taken care of properly, resulting in sickly plants and very slow growth. How can a region, for example Azov, count on any income from a crop that was planted 45 days late? (ibid, matter 4997, pg. 14).

The Crimea region, in general, had little success with vegetables, including potatoes. The yield was less than half of pre-war times and the collectives could not produce enough for requirements in the local areas. The cities Sevastopol, Kerch, and Feodosia were especially hurt. (ibid, matter 4990, pg. 17).

Animal husbandry seemed to be successful at first glance, but actually the productivity was poor. For example, cows gave 200 liters less per season than previously. (ibid, pg. 20).

The lack of progress in Crimea gave rise to serious discussions at the CK KPRS on January 9th, 1954. The First Secretary of the regional party committee, Titov, was dismissed. (ibid, matter 4990, pg. 11).

The resorts in Crimea were not spared. The First Secretary of the Yalta party committee, S. Medunov, who today talks of “Krushchev’s stupidity”, spoke quite differently then, “It has to be admitted that the resorts in Crimea are worse than those in the Caucasus, especially those on the Black Sea.

Until the transfer of Crimea to the URSR the resorts of Crimea received far less attention than those in the Caucasus… At the peak of the season, when all workers came to vacation here, Yalta, the largest resort center, had a daily water allotment for one person of only 50 liters, when it was 300-400 in the past. The general population got even less, and the sanatoriums in Alupka and Miskhor had water for only one or two hours per day. By comparison, Sochi provided 500 liters per day.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 5003, pgs. 28, 29).
The Ministry of Communal Economy of the RRFSR started a program of exploratory work to find the best places in the northern mountains of Crimea for building reservoirs and pipelines to bring water into the southern coastal area, and provide water to the villages and farming areas. But instead of completing this work, said Medunov, the Ministry in Moscow broke up the exploratory groups, took most their equipment, and sent them to Novorosiysk. (ibid, pg. 29).

Reconstruction of the electrical system in Yalta was scheduled to begin in 1950 but was never started. In 1954 there were only 800 buildings that had power, compared to 1,200 before the war. (DAARK, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 1291, pg. 329).

There were 131 sanatoriums in Crimea in 1939, with accommodations for 23,594 people. In 1954 there were only 110 functioning, with accommodations for 17,409. From 1949 not one new one was added. (National Economics of the Crimean Region, pg.265). Rest homes numbered 40 in 1939, for 5,976 people, but in 1953 only 19 for 2,358. (ibid, pg. 265).

One of the largest hotels in Yalta, “Crimea”, was left in disrepair. (DAARK, fund R-3287, matter 5003, pg. 30). The hotels of Yalta had 2,200 rooms before the war, but only 400 in 1954, according to Medunov. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 5003, pg. 30). The catastrophic situation was described by P. Titov and D. Polansky in a letter to Moscow dated October 22, 1953, “Before the war there were 24 hotels and now there are only 15. There were 2,703 stores, and now only 871, restaurants were respectively 428, and 149. Vacationers have to stand in long lines to buy food in the stores. The supply of food and other necessary items is proceeding very badly. The sanatoriums, rest homes, and stores don’t have any fruit, grapes, vegetables, local wine, beer, and other products. This is because several resolutions passed to help Crimea are not being carried out.” (DAARK, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 3609, pg. 21).

Education was in terrible condition, especially of younger children. Attempts on the part of Crimean authorities to solicit assistance from the Moscow government proved fruitless. Budget items requested by Crimea for the building of new schools in Alushta and
Simferopol were not included in the discussions of the national plans of the RRFSR for 1953. At that time, secretary Titov informed Malenkov, Simferopol needed four more schools, the present ones being overcrowded, with 46—48 students in each class. (DAARK, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 3601, pg. 24).

Alushta was even more crowded. The entire region, continued Titov “has one middle school with almost 1,000 students. The school occupies four small buildings. The region is overpopulated, and with the influx of more people this year there will be no more room for additional students.” (ibid, pg. 24).

Similar requests flowed to Moscow from every sector of Crimea. The local authorities realized they were approaching a huge crisis and had no hope of coming out of it without assistance from the central government. Stepanov, a member of the executive committee of the regional Rada, stated that “because of the flood of people coming into our area from other regions, especially Simferopol, asking for work, housing, monetary assistance, and passes to the sanatoriums, we are overburdened and cannot hope to resolve this problem without help from the Moscow government.” (ibid, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 1302, pg. 26).

What were the reasons for this catastrophic state of affairs ten years after the end of the war?

Stalin, counting on money from America to rebuild Crimea, realized in 1946 that “Crimean California “was not going to happen, and he had to settle Crimea with working villagers rather than rich Jews. This eventuality was not anticipated in his budget, already burdened with the arms race with the USA, and the government simply had no funds to spend on Crimea.

Once again history proves the point that Crimea has no real future without a close association with Ukraine. The disintegration that followed Crimea’s separation from Ukraine in 1921 could be resolved by re-uniting the two again.

One of the contemporary defenders of a Russian Crimea, the ex secretary of the Yalta Party, Medunov, spoke on April 23, 1957 at the meeting of the Plenum of the Crimean Regional Committee, protesting the re-unification of Crimea with the Kherson region.
(Ukraine) saying that “it was like entrusting a father to his adolescent son for bringing up (general laughter)”. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 53, matter 534, pg. 31). He was answered by the current secretary of the Crimean Party executive committee Vasily Komyakhov “The subject of uniting the Crimean, Kherson, and Mikolaev regions into one economic zone is being reviewed. These regions have a common commercial base (shipbuilding, fruit canning, etc.), good transportation connections, and are soon to have a common electrical grid. I feel that Medunov’s comment about the father and the son was not very correct. If this “father” had water and electric energy, a common region would have been created, and development would have gone much faster and smoother”. (ibid, pg. 45).

Crimea had neither, nor was there enough food for the population, so once again, Ukraine had to come to the rescue.

The government in Moscow began to understand the extent of the problem only in 1954, but today many have forgotten the details of this re-unification. The authorities in Ukraine were not aware of the catastrophic nature of the situation in Crimea in 1954. A report stated the general statistical information associated with development; the territory included 25,881 square kilometers, population (aside from the army) was 950,000. More detailed information about the population was only given by party membership, 69% Russians, and 18.7% Ukrainians. (CDAHOU, fund 1—24, matter 3599, pg. 91).

The economy of the region was comprised primarily of 552 businesses, which produced goods worth 3,318,000,000 karbovantsy in 1953. 125 factories did not meet quotas established the previous year.

Foodstuff was the largest category with 44% of the gross product, shipbuilding was 14%, industrial cooperatives produced 14%, products of general use was 13%, metals at 4%, building materials at 4%, and energy at 3%. (ibid, pg. 91).

This report evaluates the metals industry in Crimea as follows: “Located by the iron ore mine in the Kerch peninsula (with ore resources estimated at 2 million tons), the Voykov steel works had three blast furnaces with an annual capacity of 500,000 tons of cast
СООБЩЕНИЕ О КРЫМСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ.

Территория Крымской области составляет 25891 кв.км. На 1 января 1954 года в Крымской области проживает 950 тысяч человек (кроме военных).

В настоящее время данные о национальном составе населения отсутствуют.

В составе членов Коммунистической партии Крымской области имеется русских 65%, украинцев 18,9%.

В административном отношении область делится на 24 района и 6 городов, включенных в самостоятельные административные единицы, из них - 1 (Севастополь) республиканского подчинения, а остальные 5 - областного.

Из общего количества населения в городах живет более половины.

ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ КРЫМСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ.

В Крымской области имеется 552 промышленных предприятий, которые выпустили валовой продукт в 1953 году на 3318 млн. руб., выполнив годовой план на 101,5%.

Из 552 предприятий годовой план не выполнило 125 предприятий.

Наибольший удельный вес в промышленности Крымской области занимает пищевая промышленность — 44%.

Судостроительная промышленность занимает 14%.

Промышленность строительных материалов — 10%.

Промышленность строительных материалов — 13%.

Металлургическая промышленность — 6%.

Промышленность строительных материалов — 3%.

На базе железорудного месторождения Керченского полуострова (около руды) ожидается развитие 2-3 шахт, открытие которых обеспечит 15% металлургических заводов.

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iron, and five converters with an annual capacity of 350,000 tons of steel. A separate department produced rail, rebar, and other steel products, with fertilizer as a by-product. But, this factory has not been rebuilt.

This factory was planned to be rebuilt four times larger than it was before the war, 50 million karbovantsy were allotted for this construction in 1954.

The factory includes a casting operation which makes products for general use (frying pans, pots, irons, etc.). 1,300 people work there producing goods worth 8.5 million karbovantsy annually. The casting and metal forming departments are almost completed and it is anticipated that a machining department will be finished in 1954.

This area also has the Kamish-Burunsky iron ore works, and the Kirov coke works. The Kamish-Burunsky works have been restored and produce 1,400,000 tons annually, three times as much as before the war. 4,000 people are employed there. The Kirov works produced 400,000 tons of coke before the war. It has not been rebuilt.

A factory that produced lime in Balaklava was rebuilt with a projected capacity of 850,000 tons annually.” (ibid, pgs. 91, 92).

In January, 1954 there were 5 companies that engaged in building transport and heavy machinery:

“Zavod (factory) no. 497, named after Ordgonikidze (Sevastopol), built barges and small boats for inter city transport, and included a boat repair facility. It employed 6,000 people, and produced goods worth 190 million karbovantsy annually;

Zavod no. 532 (Kerch) builds small transport vessels. 3,000 people are employed and produce goods worth 130—140 million karbovantsy.

Zavod 831 (Feodosia) built torpedo boats. 1,500 are employed producing a revenue of 15—16 million karbovanstsy annually.

Zavod 832 (Feodosia) employs almost 1,000 people and produces revenue of 15—16 million karbovantsy annually.

Zavod no. 5 was involved in electrical assembly with annual revenues of 30 million karbovantsy.” (ibid, pgs. 92, 93).

Beside these there were 4 other smaller companies:

The Simferopol factory named after Kuybishev, employed 430,
built automatic equipment for the canning and preserves industry with an annual production of 17 million karbovantsy.

The Simferopol factory “Holovenergozapchastina” built parts electrical distribution applications. Employing 113, they produced annual revenues of 5.7 million karbovantsy.

The Kerch boat repair yard, under the Ministry of the sea and river fleets, produced revenues of 17 million karbovantsy and employed 874 people.

The Feodosia port maintenance yard no.1 built port maintenance and construction products, and had a boat repair facility. Employing 200 people, it produced revenue of 7.7 million karbovantsy. (ibid, pg. 93).

There were two factories engaged in chemical production in Crimea:

The factory in Saki employed 773 people and produced various bromine, potassium, and calcium products valued at 22—23 million karbovantsy annually.

The factory at Perekop employed 145 people and extracted bromine and chlorate products from the waters of lake Sivash, with annual revenues of 6.4 million karbovantsy. (ibid, pg. 93).

The food industry in Crimea was comprised of 160 companies, employing 20,600 people with annual revenues of 1,310,000 karbovantsy. (ibid, pg. 93).

Fishing is a large potential industry in Crimea, but carried out only 63% of the plan for 1953, according to the report. There were 10 fish packing factories and 1 large processing plant, served by 1,380 boats. (ibid, pg. 94).

The largest winery, “Masandra”, supplied by 16 vineyards with a total area of 1,607 hectares, produced 5,000,000 liters of wine annually.

Krimvintrest was an association of 4 large plants and 4 wineries with vineyards totaling 970 hectares. In 1953 they produced 1,810,000 liters of grape wine, 2,760,000 liters of berry wine, and 2,210,000 liters of juice.

Crimea also produced Champagne (annual sales of 14 million karbovantsy), and had 2 distillers (sales of 35 million karbovantsy).
The canning industry, loosely united as Krimkonservtrest, included 3 companies in Simferopol and 1 in Dgankoy, together producing 78 million cans annually. This group included 3 agro-collectives with an area of 635 hectares. (ibid, pg. 94).

Other agricultural producers, in 1953, were: Krimmyasotrest produced revenues of 115 million karbovantsy, Krimmolokotrest 52 million, Krimroskhlib 261 million, and Krimefirolio 33,000 kilograms of oil from roses and levande. (ibid, pgs. 94, 95).

A very noticeable statement in the report was that, at the beginning of 1954, none of the ports, neither passenger nor commercial, in Yalta, Feodosia, Kerch, and Evpatoria were rebuilt. (ibid, pg. 97).
RUSSIA ASKED UKRAINE TO TAKE CRIMEA

Nikita Khrushchev was among the first, including the government of the URSR, to find out and understand the serious crisis in Crimea. After his election as First Secretary of the CK KPRS in September 1953, he took a vacation in Yalta. As his son-in-law Aleksiy Adgubey confirmed, he didn’t rest much, but after a few days, decided to tour the northern steppe region, about which he knew very little. “Here, on the plateau, everything still had the terrible smell of war”, wrote Adgubey. “Brocken tanks and artillery littered the roadside, and small grey stone obelisks, erected to mark fallen soldiers, stretched to the horizon. The land itself looked dead, dried out, and covered with weeds. Abandoned villages and Tartar auls (Tartar clay hut dwellings — GZ) were seen everywhere, their owners sent to faraway, cold, places by Stalin’s evil will, with no hope of returning…

Despite advice that he rest from the trip, Khrushchev did not hurry back to Simferopol. He continuously turned off the main road, spread rough canvas on the ground to take meals, as if the war was still raging. Nikita Sergeyevich (Khrushchev) was very moved by the throngs of settlers, who somehow heard about his visit, and greeted him along the way.

Silent, grey, masses of people stood in the road and waited for the automobiles to stop. They did not say anything, waiting for Khrushchev to begin. Afterwards a question would be heard from the throng, then a second, a third. They asked about food, housing, assistance. They were all resettled from Russia, from the Volga region, from the northern regions.” (A. Adgubey, How Krushchev Gave Crimea to Ukraine, Novoye Vremya, 1992, no. 6, pg. 21).

“I now write arrived” continues Adgubey, “but they shouted that they were driven, the lament of people who lost their hope for any sort of life. Hysterical outcries were heard, “potatoes won’t grow here, cabbage rots”. Or, suddenly “the bugs are eating us alive”. Krushchev asked them “Why did you come here”, and the throng replied “They lied to us”. (ibid, pg. 21).

The plight of these people can be easily understood: When the resettlement plans first became public, the people were promised anything and everything, if only they agreed to resettle. In the Arzamask
region of Russia 250 families were registered to be resettled, two thirds of whom were industrial workers or bureaucrats, many others had no connection with farming, and several signed up just to see the world. (CDAVOVu, fund 4626, desc.1, matter 274, pg. 2).

After the Plenum of the CK of the KPRS, which decided to increase benefits to collective farms workers, fewer could be found that were willing to resettle, especially after hearing stories about the “promised land” from returning settlers. Seeing the situation getting worse, Khrushchev and Malenkov flew to Kyiv to convince the leadership of the URSR to help in the Crimean disaster. He repeated (no doubt remembering conversations with Russian peasants from the depths of Russian woodlands who never even saw a grapevine) that people from the south who “loved orchards, and corn rather than potatoes” were necessary in Crimea. (ibid, pg. 21).

However, he did not begin any formal discussions about turning Crimea over to Ukraine. P. Volvach was correct in his statement that the transfer of Crimea from the Russian Federation to Ukraine was the idea of the higher leadership of the SSR. Without the old Stalinist group, Malenkov, Molotov, Kahanovich, Voroshilov, and Bulganin, it would never happen. Khrushchev’s position in the Party was not solid enough that he could decide such a strategically important move by himself. As an expert in agrarian economy, and one time head of the URSR, Khrushchev knew well that even though it was in the organization of the RRFSR, Crimea was economically tied to Ukraine. (Silsky Chas, 1999, April 9).

Khrushchev did not take part in the Crimean transfer officially. Being witness to Moscow’s pre-war “reorganizations”, which ignored ethnic divisions and the will of the people involved (taking Ukrainian regions Slobozhanshchina, Starodubshchina, and Tahanroh in the 1920’s, Berest in 1939, and Pridnistrovya in 1940), not even bothering to obtain agreement of the URSR leadership, as was required by the constitution, it was clear that Khrushchev wanted this transfer to be done legally, according to the constitution.

According to V. Butkevich, “the transfer of Crimea is perhaps the first instance in the history of the Soviet Union where the decisions were made in strict accordance to legal and democratic principles.
First, this issue was discussed by the Rada of Ministers of the RRFSR, which came to the conclusion that it would indeed be effective to transfer Crimea to Ukraine. This decision was presented to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR, which first solicited the opinion of the Ukrainian government, and receiving agreement in principle, issued the resolution: “The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR, with the participation of representatives of the executive committees of the Crimean region and Sevastopol Radas examined the proposition of the Rada of Ministers of the RRFSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian RSR.

Taking into account the close economic ties, territorial closeness, and common cultural interests, and the agreement of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Republic, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR feels that it would be expedient to transfer the Crimean region to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic”. (Soviet Ukraine, 1954, February 27).

After this, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR (Russian Federation — GZ) forwarded its resolution to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR (Soviet Union — GZ).

On February 13th, 1954, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR (Ukraine — GZ) reviewed the issue: “About the resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian RSR”.

Examining this issue, the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR approved the resolution: “After discussing the proposition of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region from the RRFSR to the Ukrainian RSR, and its presentation for consideration to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian RSR expresses sincere thanks to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic for this gracious and noble act of the Russian brotherly people.

Ukrainian people will greet this transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian RSR with deep satisfaction and gratitude, seeing a bright expression of the trust and love the Russian people have for the Ukrainian people, a new confirmation of the unshakeable brotherly friendship between Russian and Ukrainian people.
Ukrainian government will see to the development of Crimean economy.

The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian RSR, in accordance with the presentation of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, resolves:

To request the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Union of the RSR to transfer the Crimean region from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic”.

The fact of agreement of resolutions of the Presidiums of the Verkhovna Radas of two republics formed legal relationships between them in the form of a “gentleman’s agreement”. From the point of view of international law, it must be signed by parties having the full plenary powers to do so. (V. Butkevich, pg. 46).

The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR acted strictly in accordance with part 15-b of the Constitution of the URSR of 1937, and the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR, in accordance with part 16-a of the Constitution of the RRFSR, giving them plenary powers to sign such agreements. The Soviet Union formed many international agreements in this way (with the MNR (Mongolia) in 1934 to mutually inform each other of any military threats, in 1953 with Austria, Algeria, and NDR (German Democratic Republic — GZ) to establish Embassies, in 1946 with the permanent members of Security Counsel, etc.).

Canceling this “gentleman’s agreement” or any signed agreement can only be done with a new agreement between these nations. However, this agreement concerned changing the borders of two republics, and because this issue was presented to the Union of these republics, the final approval should rest there. (ibid, pg. 46, 47).

With this mind, a meeting of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR was called on February 19th, 1954, inviting representatives of all interested parties.

Representing the Russian people: Head of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR M.P. Tarasov, assistant Head of the Rada of Ministers of the RRFSR V.O. Maslov, and the Secretary of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR I. M. Zumin.
Representing the Ukrainian people: Head of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada URSR D.S. Korotchenko, first assistant Head of the Rada of Ministers of the URSR M.S. Hrechukha, Secretary of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR V. E. Nizhnik.

Representing the Crimean region: first assistant of the head of the executive committee of the Crimean regional Rada of deputies, M.M. Lyalin, head of the executive committee of the Simferopol city Rada M.M. Katkov, head of the executive committee of the Sevastopol city Rada S. F. Sosnitsky.

The first person to speak at this assembly, Head of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR, M.P. Tarasov, stated:

“The Crimean region encompasses the entire Crimean peninsula and is adjacent to the Ukrainian Republic almost as a natural extension of its southern steppes. The economy of the Crimean region is closely tied to the economy of the Ukrainian Republic. Geographic and economic considerations make it expedient to transfer the Crimean region to the fraternal Ukrainian Republic and is in concert with the interests of the Soviet Nation.” (Soviet Ukraine, 1954, February 27).

M. P. Tarasov ended with a reading of the resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada RRFSR and asked the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SSR to confirm the presentation.

The Head of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, D. S. Korotchenko, said that the resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR is greeted with gratitude and approval by the Ukrainian people, and assured Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SSR that the Ukrainian government will do everything necessary to develop the economy of Crimea, and improve the material and cultural prosperity of the workers of the Crimean region.

He ended by reading the resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR of February 13th, 1954 which formally accepted the Crimean region into the Ukrainian RSR.

In the course of discussions, Sh. Rashidov, assistant Head of the Verkhovna Rada of the SSR, and members of the Presidium O.V. Kosinen, and M.M. Shvernik also spoke in favor of the resolution by RRFSR to transfer the Crimean region to Ukraine.
Last to speak was the Head of the Presidium of the SRSR, K. E. Voroshilov. Immediately following, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada SRSR voted unanimously for the Decree that transferred the Crimean region from the RRFSR to the URSR. This Decree read as follows: “Regarding the transfer of the Crimean region from RSFSR (Russia — GZ) to the URSR (Ukraine — GZ).

Decree of February 19th, 1954

Considering the economic and territorial closeness, and similar cultures of the Crimean region and Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics resolves:

Confirm the mutual resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada RSFSR and the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada USSR about the transfer of the Crimean region from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” (Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SSSR, 1937—1975, Moscow 1975, volume 1, pgs. 104, 105).

For this Decree to be legally binding, according to the laws (of the Soviet Union — GZ), it had to be approved by the entire Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR (not just the Presidium — GZ). On April 26th, 1954, in separate meetings of the Rada of the Union and the Rada of the Nationalities, the Law transferring the Crimean region to the URSR was approved.

Attempts at finding any illegal procedure in this transfer of Crimea would be fruitless, states V. Butkevich. International law allows two countries to alter their borders by mutual agreement. International law recognizes this as secession. The only requirement of the country receiving territory is to allow the residents involved to choose which country they would rather be citizens of. This transfer did not do this because, according to part 21 of the Constitution of the SRSR of 1936, “all citizens of the SRSR have common citizenship”. (V. Butkevich, ibid, pg. 49).

As a matter of fact, official documents involved with this transfer never referred to “the 300 year old union of Ukraine with Russia”. This was merely mentioned in speeches by M.P. Tarasov, D. S. Ko-

The authorities on the peninsula commented very positively about this transfer. The first secretary of the regional committee, D. Polansky, in a speech on May 5th, 1954, said “Crimea with Ukraine will be able to develop more quickly”. (DAARK, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 1292, pg. 12).
SEVASTOPOL WAS ALSO TRANSFERRED TO UKRAINE

Even though Sevastopol was officially transferred to Ukraine along with Crimea, many in Moscow (and some in Crimea) thought otherwise. They felt that Sevastopol answered to Moscow directly, and should be considered under the rule of Moscow, rather than Ukraine.

In fact, Sevastopol was put directly under the control of Moscow in 1948, and from that time was not included in the political organization of the Crimean region which was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.

Did Sevastopol really stop being a part of the Crimean region in 1948? Our neighbor would like this to be the case, but documents prove otherwise.

After Stalin visited Sevastopol on October 8th, 1948, the Russian authorities voted to make the city what was essentially a separate republic, answerable only to Moscow. This only meant that Sevastopol received funds directly from Moscow, and not through Simferopol, and the Crimean executive committee no longer managed day to day, or party activities in the city. The head of the Sevastopol city council, Filipov, spoke at the city party conference on January 29th, 1949, saying: “In connection with the transformation of Sevastopol into a separate entity, the responsibilities of the city executive committee have grown. It can be said that we have lost a governess in the loss of the regional executive committee.” (DAARK, fund 35, desc. 1, matter 385, pg. 45).

However, the connection between Sevastopol and the Crimean region never really changed, and from all evidence, the authorities of the Russian Federation did not want interfere with that relationship. Sevastopol did not get actual autonomy from Simferopol, but remained in its administrative control.

If indeed Sevastopol was an independent autonomy, it would not be possible to appoint Judges from there to the Crimean regional Court. But, documents show that on January 6th. 1951, the Crimean regional Rada selected 8 judges from this city. (DAARK, fund R-3287, desc. 2, matter 845, pgs. 213, 214).

In addition to this, this session of the regional Rada had mem-
bers who were elected from Sevastopol. Like members representing other parts of Crimea, they took part in electing officials, and formed permanent commissions. For example, assembly member Nikorin, representing Sevastopol, was named head of the commission of the Crimean regional Rada on cultural affairs. (ibid, pg. 140).

In view of this, can it be said that Sevastopol existed as a separate republic? Of course not. The actual facts became clear on the first day of the first session of the third meeting of the Crimean regional Rada held on February 28, 1953. P. Titov, a member of the Rada, along with other members from Sevastopol, proposed the election of Dmitro Polansky head of the regional Rada. (ibid, desc. 2, matter 1154, pg. 182). Havril Ponomarenko, a member from Sevastopol, was elected assistant head of the executive committee of the Crimean regional Rada. (ibid, pg. 90).

Members of permanent commissions of the regional Rada included Sevastopol representatives Mykola Khlamon, Prosecutor of the Crimean region, and Victor Honcharenko, manager of regional communications. (ibid, pgs. 14,15). If Sevastopol was truly separated from the Crimean region, wouldn’t the prosecutor Khlamov have said something, having been elected prosecutor from a region totally apart from Crimea? No comments were ever recorded.

There was no prosecutorial protest regarding the following precedent: While Crimea was still a part of Russia, newly elected First Secretary of the executive committee of the party, Polansky, agreed to the election of Mikhailo Kuzmenko, who was not a member of the Rada at that time, head of the Crimean regional Rada. This awkward situation was quickly rectified by electing him a member of the Rada representing Sevastopol. Then it was only a matter of technical details that Kuzmenko, technically outside of Crimea, also became head of the city executive committee. (ibid, matter 1291, pg. 97).

As we can see, during the time when Crimea was part of the RRFSR, no one in Moscow, Simferopol, or Sevastopol acted as though they acknowledged the separation of Sevastopol from Crimea. Sevastopol, as the headquarters of the Black Sea fleet, had its own internal economic administration, but this did not extend to
УКАЗ
ПРЕЗИДИУМА ВЕРХОВНОГО СОВЕТА РСФСР
О выделении города Севастополя в самостоятельный административно-
хозяйственный центр

выделить город Севастополь в самостоятельный административно-
хозяйственный центр со своим особом бюджетом и ответственности за
историю городов республиканского подчинения.

Подписатель Президиума
Верховного Совета РСФСР — Н. БЕЛКОВ

Управляющий Президиумом
Верховного Совета РСФСР (Н. Белков)

Майкоп, 29 октября 1948 года
1.З.76/2

Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Russian Federation of October 29th, 1948, regarding the categorization of Sevastopol as a part of the Republic as an administrative and economic entity, without its exclusion from the Crimean region.
Решение Совета Министров РСФСР от 29 октября 1948 года о построении города Севастополь,
ванной республиканского подчинения.

В связи с выделением города Севастополь в самостоятельный, административно-хозяйственный, центр и отнесением его к категории городов республиканского подчинения, Совет Министров РСФСР постановляет:

1. Объявить Министерство финансов РСФСР и Крымский областной бюджет города Севастополь на бюджет Крымской области на 1948 год и на 20 число 20 ноября 1948 года, представить его на утверждение Совета Министров РСФСР.

2. Объявить договоры РСФСР, заключенные Министерством финансов РСФСР и Крымским областным бюджетом, в пределах платежной хозяйственно-культурного отстроения и планов материально-технического обеспечения Крымской области на 1948 год, выдавать план хозяйственно-культурного отстроения и план материально-технического обеспечения города Севастополя и представить его 20 ноября 1948 года на утверждение Совета Министров РСФСР.

3. Объявить договоры РСФСР, Министерства финансов РСФСР, Министерства и отдельных городов Севастополь в государственном плане и бюджетах отдельных отраслей.

Председатель Совета Министров РСФСР

[Подпись]

[Расшифровка]
territorial matters. It was with this status, a separately administered part of Crimea, that Sevastopol was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.

Sevastopol understood this, and immediately proclaimed itself part of Ukrainian territory. For example, the newspaper “Slava of Sevastopol”, in its headline article, “National Budget of the Ukrainian RSR” wrote: “This current year, we have before us great challenges in the development of industry, agriculture, housing construction, transport, increasing trade, and a general improvement of the material and cultural lives of our working people. A large part depends on the budget of the Ukrainian RSR”. (Slava of Sevastopol, 1954, June 19). The newspaper continued to list the budget as it related to the various regions of Ukraine, showing Sevastopol right after Kyiv.

This showed the unusual status of Sevastopol, as different from other cities of Crimea. As was during 1949—1954, when it was part of Russia, Sevastopol occupied a separate place within the economy of Ukraine. But, as was under Russia, it was a part of the local Crimean government.

In the elections of the Crimean regional Rada in 1954, 14 members were elected from Sevastopol. A member of the election committee, Oleksander Ishchenko, was selected from the Sevastopol volunteer society for the support of the army, air force, and fleet. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 5001, pg. 9).

The bureau of the Crimean regional committee of the KP of Ukraine recommended on February 4th, 1956, its new first secretary, Vasil Komyakov, as candidate for member of the regional Rada from the Korabelny voting district of Sevastopol. (ibid, desc.53, matter 138, pg. 46).

If we look at the statistical handbook “Economy of the Crimean region” (Simferopol, 1957), chapter titled “Division of territorial administration” we will see Sevastopol listed among other cities of Crimean region (pg. 19) as of July 1, 1957. Even though some statistical data are listed for Sevastopol separately, emphasizing its separation, many categories include Sevastopol in the general statistics of the Crimean region. (ibid, pgs. 211—221, 236, 239, 241—242, 247—248, 251—252, 255—256, 265, 267—270, 272).
For example, the national economic plan for 1952 included the following Sevastopol collectives: Sewing factory no. 4, army store, supermarket, jewelry store, trading center for household items, restaurants, building materials outlet, etc. (Crimean Pravda, 1953, February 1).

An interesting fact, especially for the residents of Sevastopol, was that an award for heroism in defending the city in 1854, marking a hundred year anniversary, was proclaimed by the government of the URSR. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 24, matter 3503, pgs, 51—53). The government of the URSR approved 100,000 karbovantsy for the festivities. On the main day of festivities, October 17th, 1954, a bas-relief of Lenin and Stalin was unveiled at the Graphski port, framed by the flag of the SRSR and the Ukrainian Republic. (Glory of Sevastopol, 1954, October 19). There was no flag of the Russian Federation. There were no authorities from the Russian Federation. Attending were the First Secretary of the CK KP of Ukraine O. Kiriichenko, the assistant Head of the Rada of Ministers of the URSR I. Senin, the first secretary of the executive committee of the Crimean KP of Ukraine D. Polansky, and the head of the Crimean region executive committee M. Kuzmenko.

Several speakers mentioned the memorable transfer of the Crimean region to the URSR. The festivities ended with the sounds of the hymn of the Ukrainian RSR. (ibid).

At that time, the residents of Sevastopol celebrated important dates in Ukrainian history, feeling themselves a part of Ukraine as well as Crimea. For example, the headline article in the local newspaper “Famous victory of Lenin-Stalin national politics” wrote: “The workers of our decorated city, as all the workers of Crimea, the new region of the Ukrainian RSR, together with all soviet people celebrate the 15th anniversary of the unification of Ukrainian people (joining of western areas with Ukraine in 1939 — GZ) into one Ukrainian Soviet Nation and wish many new successes.” (ibid, October 31).

An important fact (perhaps the most important) must not be forgotten when discussing the administrative changes of 1948, the position of the Crimean regional committee of the party. After 1954, no request from the authorities in Sevastopol to Moscow could be ac-
cepted without the blessing of the Crimean communist party committee, and approval from Kyiv.

Taking this into account, it could be brought to the attention to the “great reviser” of documents regarding the transfer of Crimea and Sevastopol to Ukraine, that his city (Moscow — GZ), during its designation as an independent administrative and territorial entity, never resolved any issues with the Moscow obkom (regional committee — GZ) of the KPRS, because the Moscow city miskom (city committee — GZ) and Moscow obkom had the same status. This was also true of the other cities in this situation, Leningrad and Sevastopol. (These three cities, Moscow, Leningrad, and Sevastopol were organized under the direct control of the Soviet Union government — GZ). Looking at historical facts, it would be absurd to challenge the inclusion of Crimea and Sevastopol in the Ukrainian RSR. The head of the Sevastopol city Rada, S. F. Sosnicky himself attended various meetings on this subject in Moscow. He also took part in the meeting in the Kremlin at which the Decree about transferring the Crimean region to the Ukrainian RSR was approved. (Soviet Ukraine, 1954, February 27).

If the matter went before the international court, documents and records that certify Sevastopol’s inclusion in the administrative framework of Crimea would be brought to the court’s notice. The referendum held in Ukraine in 1991, supporting the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence, included overwhelming support by the voters of Sevastopol.

The transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian RSR did not go unnoticed by the West. The British press called this “gift” from Moscow a bribe to Ukrainian nationalism. Some Ukrainian nationalists themselves agreed that there was some truth in this statement. What prompted Russia to take this action? Obviously not “territorial proximity and cultural closeness” as was stated in the resolution. Moscow never acted with Ukrainian interests in mind, quite the opposite. But this time, for the first time in the history of its colonial politics with Ukraine, it saw “economic expediency and cultural ties”. More than this, Ukraine’s equality with Russia was stressed at the ceremonies celebrating this “gift”. Voroshilov said “this famous act of great national importance confirms that relations between sovereign republics of the Soviet Union are based on true understanding and respect of each other’s interests, directed at the flowering of all the republics in the Union”.

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It is understood that these are empty words, lies, but what prompted Moscow to give Crimea to Ukraine? (Herald of the Organization of the Defense of the Four Liberties of Ukraine. New York, 1954, part 4, pg. 2).

This journal felt the real reasons for this were: “The national wave, that separatism, which is becoming more and more obvious, is becoming more dangerous to the Empire. Bourgeois nationalism, as the soviet press calls it, but really the nationalism of the Ukrainian people, not only is not destroyed, but has become a threat to the entire Bolshevik system. Its voice is becoming mightier throughout the system, heard even in Vorkuta, where many are imprisoned, united in their nationalist ideals, dreaming of the day when Ukraine would separate from Russia. This voice can be stilled neither by a “masquerade of friendship”, nor by thousands of agents sent by Moscow in January to try to calm and stop this process, because they are faced with the opposition of the underground, and public nationalism, which continuously hammer at the Imperial cliff”. (ibid. pg. 2).

Ukraine sustained great losses from Moscow, it continues, “but, after the military battles there were some gains. Moscow was forced to some compromises: called on the underground fighters to lay down their weapons, promised amnesty, permitted a flag, a national hymn, and other things. Ukrainians who lived in Ukraine understood that Moscow made promises because they were faced with strength. Moreover, these promises, maneuvers of a war between Russia and Ukraine, gave rise to an understanding of the justice of nationalist demands, that what was promised was only a small part of what was deserved. In the last years, especially during and after the Second World War, the average Ukrainian became more aware of the desire for sovereignty, the feeling of being master in one’s own house. Political ideas, formed in the bunkers of the underground, found their way into the psyche of the people. When the people have this feeling of deeply rooted independence, they become a force which is not easily defeated, and must be dealt with by the Empire. Only this can explain the Kremlin’s actions regarding Crimea.” (ibid, pg. 2).

These Ukrainian nationalists saw a second reason for the transfer of Crimea. According to them “The strategists in the Kremlin knew
that Crimea was an important part of an independent Ukraine. They knew that, during World War II, Hitler parcelled out trans-Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary, Transdnister and Odessa to Romania, and made a Guberny of Galicia, thereby pitting Ukraine against itself, and, objectively, helping Moscow. During its colonization Moscow learned that dividing Ukrainian lands caused immediate resistance. Thus, getting ready for a future attack (Moscow does not believe in peace), politicians in the Kremlin were afraid of the proverbial knife in the back from Ukraine and so transferred Crimea from Moscow to Ukraine. This far reaching action was aimed at pacifying the people, so that Ukraine would side with Russia in case of war”. (ibid pg. 2).
UKRAINE LIFTS UP CRIMEA

Of course, there must be a grain of truth in these thoughts about the different political games Moscow played with the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. The leadership in the Kremlin probably considered some of these, if only subconsciously. The object of the transfer, in the opinion of many, was that Ukraine utilizes her resources to rebuild a ruined Crimea, resources that Russia could not afford.

It was this task that was placed before Ukraine. This is what Dmytro Polansky, one time Russian communist, now the first secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the Party of Ukraine, said at the 18th convention of the Ukrainian KP (Communist Party — GZ): “In order to accomplish difficult and complex tasks…the assistance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the government of the URSR will be essential, especially in the rebuilding of Kerch and Feodosia, continued development of the resort areas, construction of the North-Crimean canal and increasing farm production”. (Crimean Pravda, 1954, March 26).

“That is why”, continued D. Polansky, “the workers of Crimea greeted the remarks made by Kirichenko, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine with unusual enthusiasm. He assured everyone that the government of the Ukrainian republic and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine will do everything necessary to improve the economy of Crimea and improve the living conditions of the workers in the region. The workers of the Crimean region have complete faith in this.” (ibid).

Ukraine did not wait long to react. On orders of the Presidium of the CK KP of Ukraine on April 7th, 1954, a special commission, composed of M. Pidhorny, M. Hrechukh, I. Senin, and D. Polansky prepared a proposal for the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR about “The means for future development of the farming industry in the Crimean region of the Ukrainian RSR”. This proposal included a detailed report along with a letter to G. Malenkov and N. Khrushchev. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 24, matter 3672, pg. 1).

The leaders of the URSR asked the SSR (Soviet Union — GZ) gov-
ernment to allocate capital funds in the years 1954—1957 in the sum of 4,817,400,000 karbovantsy for the economic recovery of Crimea. This included 818 million for the rebuilding of Sevastopol. (ibid, pg. 4).

The immediate goal was the “delivery of meat, dairy products, fresh vegetables, fruits and grapes to the cities, towns, and resorts. (ibid, pgs. 34, 35).

In order to accomplish this in the 1954—1958 time frame, it was necessary to establish 13,970 hectares of orchards, 900 hectares of berries, and 15,195 of vineyards. In addition, it was planned to renew 2,130 hectares of orchards and 1,975 of vineyards; complete rebuilding of viable orchards totaling 5,500 hectares in the existing collective farms, and 580 hectares in processing collectives.(ibid, pg. 35).

An important goal in developing orchards and vineyards in Crimea was to establish them in the river valleys of the peninsula. This was a complex project, requiring detailed cost analysis and engineering plans. The rivers Alma, Kachi, and Belbek had to be dredged, and their banks reinforced, and intricate regulatory reservoirs built. To be started in 1955, this project was necessary to assure the proper conditions for orchards and vineyards in areas that were prone to flooding, which left the soil wet and muddy. (ibid, pg. 36).

A great deal of attention was devoted to the preparation of land for vegetable farming. It was planned, by 1956, to increase the area for vegetable cultivation to 18,600 hectares, and for potatoes to 7,000 hectares. Supplying the resorts with early produce required the construction of hothouses and greenhouses under the auspices of the Crimean processing collectives. 1,800 square meters of hothouses were planned for 1955, and up to 20,000 in 1956; 24,800 greenhouses in 1955 and 39,550 in 1956. (ibid, pg. 41).

Large increases in productivity depended on irrigation. The area under irrigation was planned to be increased by 17,000 hectares within two years. Building a large system of irrigation on the peninsula would require significant effort. The URSR government proposed to “renew the civil engineering concern “Ukrvodbud” located in Dgankoy and Krasny Perekop and begin preparatory work plan-
ning the North-Crimean canal, and allocate 12 million karbovantsy for capital construction”. (ibid, pgs. 47, 48).

Preparing this proposal for the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR, the leaders of the URSR knew full well that the completion of these plans would have to be at the expense of the reserves of the republic, especially the people of Ukraine. This was exacerbated by the return of many settlers to their native villages, beginning in the fall of 1953, where they were taxed far less. The situation continued to worsen when, in 1954, the Russian regions began to decrease the numbers of settlers for Crimea. (In the entire year, only 142 families left Kursk, Belhorod 72, Voronezh 48, Ryazansk 130. At the same time Ukrainian regions added 317 families from Vinnetsa, 327 from Sumi, and Chernihiv 261). At the same time 1,652 families left Crimea. (CDAVOVu, fund 4626, desc. 1, matter 274, pgs. 94, 105).

The leaders of the URSR asked that the national plan from 1955 on did not include resettling Ukrainians to other republics because they were all needed in Crimea, the current plan calling for 17,800 families to resettle in Crimea from 1955—1958. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc.24, matter 3672, pg. 54).

For the task of building various commercial, communal, and cultural facilities, the CK KP of Ukraine and the Rada of Ministers of the URSR, in the midst of the crisis that Crimea found itself, saw no other way but to engage the common resources of the different ministries and agencies. For example, the ministry for colored metals was to build an auditorium for culture in Kerch over the next three years. The ministry for transport and heavy machinery building was obliged to build housing, water mains, water purification equipment, sewers, schools and pre-schools in Kerch for a total of 65 million karbovantsy in those same three years. The ministry of electric distribution of the SRSR was to build the Newcrimean DRES (Electric generating plant — GZ), including housing, public buildings, and stores, and also a transmission line running Simferopol-Feodosia-Kerch. (ibid, pgs. 132, 133).

The rebuilding of seaports began immediately after the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. Contemporary ports began to be built in Yalta, Kerch, and Fedosia. This required a financial allotment of 90.8 million karbovantsy over the period 1955—1957. (ibid, pg. 134).
Due to the efforts of Ukraine, a large agricultural processing capability was established, one which could produce more than the peninsula needed for its own requirements. In 1954 a meat packing plant was built in Simferopol, meat processing plant in Yalta, meat packing plants in Kerch and Feodosia, and fowl processing plants in Dgankoy and Evpatoria. (ibid, pg. 138).

The building of many food related plants was begun. Dairies were built in Kerch, Dgankoy, Bakhchisarai, Nizhnahirsk and Krasnogvardiysk. Beer and soda bottling plants were built in Yalta and Kerch, a beer brewery in Dgankoy, and a mineral water bottling plant in Feodosia. Canning plants were built in Dgankoy, Nizhnahirsk, and Chistopol, as well as many fish processing plants. Wineries were built in Stary Krim, Nizhnahirsk, Sonyachna Dolyna, Feodosia, and Sudak. (ibid, pgs. 138—141).

Detailed listings of proposed new construction were included on separate pages attached to the resolution proposed by Kyiv. For example, the budget of the Ministry of Education for 1955—1957 included building 41 schools and 4 kindergartens. (ibid, pgs. 164, 167).

Kyiv felt that 534,600,000 karbovantsy were necessary in 1955—1957, with an additional 50,300,000 in 1954, to rebuild the resort and sanatorium facilities. (ibid, pgs. 181—199).

Ukraine not only lobbied in 1954 for money for Crimean development, but actually began allocating funds from its own budget. The head of the Crimean regional executive committee, M. Kuzmenko, spoke at the session of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR on June 17th, 1954, saying that the budget of the Crimean region already increased by 20% compared to 1953. Funds for education, health, and other social needs rose by 24 million karbovantsy, and the capital investment in these tripled. (Slava Sevastopolya, 1954, June 22).

The head of the Crimean regional executive committee asked the authorities in Kyiv to request that the Ministry of commercial building materials of the URSR complete the construction of the Kerch and Balaklava brick and tile factory by 1954—1955, begin the reconstruction of a similar factory in Feodosia, and add a new lime factory. (ibid).
Kyiv immediately reacted to the requests from Crimea. In order to promote Crimean building, Ukraine provided a factory that made construction tile, previously used for Ukrainian building needs, exclusively for Crimea. All southern areas of Ukraine no longer had tile shipped from Crimea. (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 1261, pg. 68).

A great deal of attention was devoted to supplying Crimea with lumber. The Rada of Ministers issued a special resolution to this effect. Oleksy Kirichenko, First Secretary of the CK KP of Ukraine watched over this personally. (ibid, pg. 149).

The change in attitude toward Crimea's problems after the transfer to Ukraine was so pronounced, and the assistance so substantial, that it was impossible not to notice, especially by those who had an opportunity to compare Moscow's “kindness” with Kyiv's efficiency. Speaking at the September, 1954, plenum of the CK KP of Ukraine, Polansky, first secretary of the Crimean regional party committee, said “The transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian republic, and the help from its Central Party Committee had a serious effect on the growth of our economy”. (ibid, pg. 152).

He later commented again on the positive influence of the transfer: “From the very first day of the transfer to Ukraine, the CK KP of Ukraine and the Rada of Ministers of Ukraine gave great assistance to Crimea. At this time Crimea is receiving enormous help from all ministries and other agencies, giving an opportunity to develop our economy and social life far more quickly than would have been possible.” (ibid, pg. 153).

At the convention of the regional party on September 16, 1954, Polansky again praised Ukraine: “After the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian republic, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the government carefully studied the problems of our region together with regional organizations, and prepared a plan for our economy and took these propositions to the CK KPRS and the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR.

CK KPRS and the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR examined and approved these propositions and on July 26th of this year resolution was issued “About the means for continued development of the
agrarian economy, the cities, and resorts in the Crimean region of the Ukrainian RSR”. At the same time, the resolution of the CK KP of Ukraine and the Rada of Ministers, which detailed the developed the economy and cultural life of Crimea, was approved.” (ibid, desc. 52, matter 5003, pg. 3). Nowhere did Polansky ever refer to “Khru-
shchev's foolishness”.

Other speakers expressed themselves in similar terms. This was not the result of some political obligation, but a genuine reaction to the assistance that came from Ukraine. For example, the Kerch first secretary of the city party committee, G. Smorodin, was able to say as early as September of 1954 that “thanks to the aid from the government of the URSR, we will have 12 new housing units by the end of the year, allowing us to provide proper housing for families in the Ordgonikidze district, that have been living in underground hovels, with pipes sticking up out of the ground marking their homes.” (ibid, pg. 41).

Ukraine approached the Crimea project very seriously. In addition to the rebuilding of the general economy, attention was directed to cultivating the steppe areas. For thousands of years they were covered with wild grasses, and now we see orchards and vineyards. This task was daunting, requiring the cultivation of land that has grown wild for a very long time. An area known to be almost without orchards is now covered with them. This scale of agricultural development has never been seen in the history of Crimea. (ibid, fund 1, desc. 53, matter 136, pg. 21).

Bolgarov, professor at the Crimean agricultural institute, discussing the plans for rebuilding the orchards and vineyards in 1956, said that it was too bad that it wasn't begun at least five years earlier. (ibid, pg. 120).

He was right, in 1954 there were already 800 hectares of new orchards planted, and 200 renewed. In the years 1954—1955 there were over 6,000 hectares of new orchards and vineyards planted, exceeding the cultivated area of pre-war times.

Assistance from Ukraine continued to increase from year to year. A special report by the Crimea regional party committee on July 27th, 1957, confirmed that capital investment in the last three and a half years increased by 227 million karbovantsy, to a total of 3 billion
These three years saw industrial production rise by 36%, with heavy industry increasing by 52%. The first half of 1957 saw 51% higher commercial production than the first half of 1953. (ibid, pg. 117). Compared to 1953, iron ore production rose 36%, electric energy 57%, canning 54%, wines 104%, building stone 72%, gypsum 39%. (ibid, pg. 117).

The agrarian sector also showed great gains. Milk production increased by 69%, meat products 42%, vegetable 62%, fruits and grapes 32%. 1956 saw the end of imported vegetables because the local farmers could supply all that was needed. (ibid, pg. 118).

Changes in the housing industry were likewise impressive. During the years 1945—1953, almost 90 million karbovantsy were invested, but in 1954—1956 there were 146.5 million.

Auto transport in 1956 was 4.7 times that in 1953. Rail transport also grew, especially after a ferry was opened at the Kerch peninsula. Trade increased by one third.

Ukraine’s efforts were quite obvious in ten years. Speaking at the plenum of the Crimean commercial regional committee of the KP of Ukraine on July 9th, 1963, its first secretary, M. Surkin, said: “The last ten years saw an increase of 3.4 times in the production output of the region. Capital investment tripled to a total of 1.5 billion karbovantsy. 76 large firms were formed.

The cities and villages saw an additional 2.8 million square meters of new structures built. 78 new schools were built to accommodate 37,550 students, 11,500 places were added in the kindergartens. Crimean resorts saw 1.5 million more people visiting them.

Great strides were seen in the agricultural sector of the region. The production of meat was at 160% that of 1953, milk production doubled, and 14 times more grapes were produced. The areas dedicated to orchards tripled, and vineyards increased by 9 times.

And the people! In 1953 we had 12,000 specialists with higher education credentials, and now there are over 30,000. Specialists with a high school education doubled, now totaling 46,000.”(CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 53, matter 3037, pgs. 3, 4).
UKRAINIAN FLOW OF SETTLERS TO THE PENINSULA

Ukraine provided the majority of the people required for the rebuilding of the war torn peninsula. It was the Ukrainian who provided the backbone of the working force in Crimea, even though there was a shortage of workers in the southern regions of Ukraine. With the addition of the Crimean region to Ukraine, the leadership was able to dissuade the central leadership from continuing to resettle Ukrainians to the Kokchetav and Kustanai regions in Kazakhstan. All re-settlers were then directed to Crimea. In 1955, 150 families from the Kyiv region were settled there, Sumi contributed 591, Cherkasy 258, and Vinnetsa 500. (CDAOVU, fund 4626, desc. 3, matter 50, pgs. 1, 31, 39, 60).

Just as immediately after the war, so in 1954, there was no resettlement from the western regions of Ukraine, but 1957 saw a massive resettlement from those regions. The plan for that year anticipated resettling 600 families from the Volyn region, 100 from the Rivno region, 600 from Drohobich, 950 from Stanislaviv, 300 from Lviv, 1,150 from Ternopol, and 500 from Chernivtsy. (ibid, matter 51, pg. 49).

A discussion of various problems took place at a special gathering called on April 7—8, 1957 in Simferopol. The URSR government defined certain directions that resettlement efforts were to take, and the establishment of housing for the new settlers. The Head of the Rada of Ministers of the URSR N. Kalchenko confirmed the protocol drawn up at the conference, which required “that assistance with oversight in housing construction be provided by “Krimsilbud” so as to insure that obligations that were agreed to with collectives were carried out, and that housing construction would begin no later than June 15th of that year, so that all settlers that were planned would have housing in a timely manner.” (ibid, matter 45, pg. 5).

With a planned number of 6,000 families, 6,101 families arrived in Crimea by January 1, 1958. (CDAOVU, fund 4626, desc. 3, matter 52, pg. 5).

24,968 families settled in Crimea between 1950 and 1954, and from 1955 to 1957 there were already 39, 878. They occupied the
agricultural areas as follows: Yalta, 1,063, Azov, 1,326, Balaklava 2,871, Bakhchisarai 3,576, Bilohir 4,022, Evpatoria 1,035, Zuysk 3,995, Krasnoperekop 1,885, Kuybishev 1,100, Oktyabrsk 2,464, Primorsk 2,460, Saki 1,359, Simferopol 1,572, Sovietsk 1,151, Sudak 1,850, and Chornomorsk 1,356. (DAARK, fund 3026, desc.4, matter 516, pg. 20).

Using various means to establish the settlers on the peninsula, the URSR government was able to maintain some semblance of stability, allowing them to plan the settlement of 50,000 families from Ukrainian regions in the next seven year plan (1959—1965). (ibid, matter 152, pg. 94).

One source that provided large numbers of people was the wholesale resettlement of villages that were in the way of a large reservoir that was built on the Dnieper north of Kyiv. For example, the collective named after Vatutin in the Chernobil area of the Kyiv region moved in its entirety to the Oktyabirsk district in Crimea. Many residents in the Kyiv region, Vishchedubechansk and Chernobil districts, and the Chernihiv regions, Ostersk and Mikhailo-Kotsubinsky districts that lived in areas that were to be submerged were asked to resettle to Crimea. (ibid, matter 178, pg. 52). The director of the collective “Krupskoy” in Azov, Cherfas, asked the Rada of Ministers of the URSR to resettle a group from the Pridnieprovya area to his collective. (ibid, pg. 520). This sort of attention to the Crimean village showed definite results. The census of 1970 showed 361,500 people living in the villages of Crimea, 113,000 more than the census of 1959. (CDAVOVU, fund 4626, desc. 3, matter 851, pg. 54).

This was the only example of such a population rise in Ukraine. With the only exception in the Zakarpatsky region, where the village population rose by 28,000, all other regions showed a marked decrease in village populations, the total across Ukraine being more than 2 million less village residents. (ibid, pg. 54).
THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CRIMEA
ASKED THAT THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE
BE INTRODUCED

Answering delegate Sushchenko’s question at the Crimean regional party conference on March 10th, 1954 as to the introduction of the Ukrainian language on the peninsula, in heretofore Russian agencies, schools, press, radio, etc., the second Secretary of the CK KP of Ukraine, Mykola Pidhorny, said: “This question was of concern to the workers in the Crimean region even before the Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SSR about the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian SSR. Perhaps rumors slowly penetrated public awareness and gave rise to a certain general attitude. People wondered how “Ukrainization” might proceed, how will newly arrived Ukrainian workers from other regions react, and a whole list of similar questions disturbed the people in the Crimean region.

I must say that such thoughts are without basis. There are many regions the same as Crimea, or almost the same, in Ukraine. Regions such as Voroshilovgrad and Stalin and many others all conduct classes in Russian, all official agencies conduct their business in Russian. Obviously, the same will be true in the Crimean region.

Even in western regions of Ukraine, as in all Ukraine, the schools are Russian, but have Ukrainian as a course of study. I am not prepared to confirm this, but I believe the same will be true here. I see nothing wrong with Ukrainian being taught in Russian schools. Other languages are also taught. It is said that the children will be overburdened, but it will be no different than with the children of workers in other regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

The commercial and government language will have to remain Russian. There is no reason to change to Ukrainian. After all, how can the official language change to Ukrainian when many people don’t know this language? For this to happen, the people involved have to learn Ukrainian, be fluent in Ukrainian, and this can’t happen in one or two years, not even in ten.

As to radio, movies, and publications, all will remain the same as it was. We never saw the necessity, when the Crimean region was
transferred, to turn everything upside down, change everything over to the Ukrainian language.

In addition, I must say that the business of the CK party is conducted in Ukrainian, but at the same time all correspondence with the CK KPRS, all protocols, requests, etc., are done in Russian, but I don't really know in what language, Russian or Ukrainian, tovarish Polansky receives his protocols. Therefore I don’t think that this question should disturb either the workers or party members of the Crimean region.” (CDAHOu, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 4990, pg. 184).

The issue regarding the Ukrainian language on the peninsula was addressed by the authorities a half year later. In a letter to the CK KP of Ukraine dated September 13th, 1954, confirmed by a resolution of the bureau of the regional committee, it was stated: “In connection with the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian RSR, the Crimean regional committee of the KP of Ukraine feels that it is necessary to introduce Ukrainian language and literature as a course of study in the 1955—1956 school year in the schools of the Crimean region”. (ibid, matter 4998, pg. 247).

The one year delay in the introduction of Ukrainian in the schools was explained by a lack of teachers who could teach it. Of the 2,193 teachers in the lower classes of the school system, only 94 knew Ukrainian. But even they had no experience in teaching this subject. In all, 1,500 teachers had to be prepared for classes 2—4 with short term, intensive courses, and provide books for 320 seven-year schools, and 140 high schools.

In addition, every seven year school had to have one teacher of Ukrainian, and the high schools two, totaling 600 teachers. By the way, they were to teach the children in schools serving the villages and working classes. (ibid, pgs. 247, 248).

In order to insure proper methodology and supervision of the Ukrainian teachers, three inspectors were added to the staff at the regional department of education, with one each for the Sevastopol, Simferopol, Kerch, Yalta, Evpatoria, Feodosia, Dgankoy, Bilohirsk, Krasnogvardiysk, and Saki departments of education. The institute for teacher education should have a separate department for Ukrainian education comprised of three members.
It must be understood that not everyone was thrilled to see the introduction of Ukrainian in Crimea. A comment was made at a meeting of the regional committee: “We must not underestimate misunderstandings relative to the transfer of Crimea to the URSR, even though these may be individual instances of bad attitudes.

Some our workers mistakenly see the efforts to teach Ukrainian in schools as “Ukrainization”. It is necessary to explain to these people that these efforts have nothing at all to do with any “Ukrainization”. (ibid, matter 5813, pg. 21).

The assignment given to city and regional party committees, local party organizations, local organizations, and educational organizations was to show both the parents and teachers the importance of this effort, and convince the teachers of the beginning classes that they must treat their obligation seriously. (ibid, pg. 22).

Teachers of the lower classes were expected to really devote themselves to learning the new subject matter, and use the summer break to qualify themselves. For the seven year and high schools, the Ministry of Education of the URSR was committed to providing 640 teachers of Ukrainian language and literature by the start of the school year. (ibid, pg. 21).

As it turned out, the people in Crimea did not wait for the start of the new school year to begin teaching Ukrainian subjects. These subjects began to be taught on November 25th, 1954 in five beginning classes in Simferopol schools number 21 and 24, and also the beginning school number 12. The Ministry of Education of the CK KP of Ukraine commented: “the first day of Ukrainian language classes went rather well. The children showed great interest in the subject and began to pronounce the Ukrainian words properly.” (CDAVOVU, fund 166, desc. 15, matter 1436, pg. 253).

In order to help this effort, one day seminars were held in the region, at which the teachers were given the schedule for the year, the outline of the course program, and one copy of the textbook they were to use. The contents of the text were reviewed with the teachers.

The introduction of Ukrainian as a course of study in the 1955-1956 school year required preparing 2,150 teachers of the earlier
List of schools in the Crimean region that began teaching Ukrainian in 1955.
grades with intensive courses, assign 700 instructors for classes 5—10, and make sure all students had the necessary textbooks. (ibid, pg. 253).

A report at the plenum of the regional party committee on January 27th, 1955 stated that after the transfer of the Crimean region to the URSR, the residents of Crimea “showed a marked interest in learning about life in our republic, its economy, education, and culture…this is seen in the enthusiasm with which the working people attended Ukrainian theater and choreographic productions; over 100,000 people attended these spectacles and concerts. This increased interest is seen in the purchase of books by Ukrainian authors with sales totaling 376,000 karbovantsy. Especially popular was the “Kobzar” by T. G. Shevchenko, books by Ivan Franko, Olga Kobilanska, and various books by Ukrainian soviet writers. Also, 23,011 copies of newspapers and journals in Ukrainian were bought by subscribers; Ukrainian movies drew many people.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 52, matter 5813, pg. 20).

When he read this report, the secretary of the regional committee V. Klaznika noted: “Our regional, city, and local newspapers, should pay more attention to describing life in our republic, help the workers of this region forge close ties with those of Ukraine; collective farm workers, mechanics working on farm equipment, with people involved with education and culture, with businesses and collectives; use your pages to tell of their lives and achievements. Send people out to visit different areas in the region, cities, collectives, machine repair stations, and businesses to exchange ideas, and perhaps suggest improvements they can use in their work.” (ibid, pg. 21).

However, these comments made by the secretary of the regional committee did not really capture the attention of the attendees of the plenum. None of the other speakers even touched on this subject, and no mention of it was seen in the resulting resolutions.

Under these circumstances, there was no question of introducing Ukrainian into official usage in regional agencies. The first time Ukrainian was heard at the regional level was on March 12th, 1957, when the secretary of the Dgankoy party committee, Kuts, used it in
a speech. Following this, Ukrainian was used by the secretary of the regional party committee Chirva, and also the secretaries of party committees in Saki, Kulik, and Kirovsk, Lisy. (ibid, desc. 53, matter 546, pgs. 36—38, 41—46, 49—53, 74—76).

In his closing comments, first secretary of the regional committee Komyakhov, speaking in Ukrainian, evaluated this step thus: “Several of our tovarishy (friends — GZ), Kuts, Chirva, Kulik, and Lisy spoke publicly in Ukrainian. This was the first time Ukrainian was used at a meeting of the regional party. We feel that this is entirely proper. We also feel that it would be proper that our tovarishy who know Ukrainian use it various area meetings, in the collectives, machine repair stations, businesses, in creative organizations, educational institutions, and in schools. After all, there are over 250,000 Ukrainians in Crimea.

We know that many of our tovarishy in the regional organization, Kornitsky, Korovchenko, Stenkovy, Pyatak, Maksimenko, Tsimbaluk, Levchenko, Sosnitsky, Skorodinsky, Runak, Melnik, Sorokovsky, Mazurets, Kravets, Klaznika, Prikordonny, Humper, Rudenko, and many others know Ukrainian, but do not use it publicly. This is too bad, the people love and respect the Ukrainian language.” (ibid, pg. 81).

Komyakhov himself did not dare to use Ukrainian in public reports until April 28th, 1959. Following his example, the previously mentioned Kuts and Chirva, the secretaries of the committees of Zuysk and Bilohir, Parkhomenko and Pankryatev, and the head of the regional department of culture, Karpenko spoke out in Ukrainian. (ibid, pgs. 1—28, 29—32, 36—39, 51—57, 76—79, 83—87).

The acceptance of Ukrainian in the schools spread from year to year. The first year Ukrainian was taught in 38 classes of 24 schools to 619 students. In the next two years, per the plan of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, these numbers rose to 115 classes in 70 schools with 2,383 students taking part.

After three years, schools, regional and city departments of education, and the Crimean regional Institute for teachers acquired enough experience, that it became possible to spread the teaching of Ukrainian to all the schools on the peninsula. ( CDAVOVu, fund 166, desc. 15, matter2358, pg. 97).
Increasing the number of classes that taught Ukrainian did not solve all the problems. Children of the recent settlers, especially students in classes 5—10, had been taught mathematics, physics, chemistry and other subjects in Ukrainian, and had a difficult time in these subjects when taught in Russian. As a result, many were held back a year, forced to repeat a class, or quit school altogether. This was recorded in August of 1957 by O. Kosyak, director of the department of regional education. (DAARK, fund 1, desc. 1, matter 3956, pg. 195).

“Many villages” he continued “where Ukrainians are settled have enough students to justify parallel classes with Ukrainian used as the language in all courses of study. The Verkhnesadovska seven year school in the Bakhchisarai area has 13 Ukrainian students in the first grade, and from September 1st 17 more Ukrainian will be added. In the Skalistivska beginning school in that same area for 72 students, 30 are Ukrainian children, including 12 in first grade, and 10 in second grade. In the Krenkivska beginning school in the Kuybishev area, out of 17 students, 14 are Ukrainian. Similar situations are found in Simferopol and many other areas in the region.

The lack of organization of schools that teach in Ukrainian today is caused primarily by passive attitudes of directors of these schools and departments of education, but also by the lack of supervision on the part of party and soviet organizations. Beside this, the establishment of beginning classes taught in Ukrainian is prevented by the lack of seven year and 10th grade schools in general. Neither the students, nor the parents see any possibility for a proper education.

The regional department of education decided to conduct an analysis of the children of Ukrainian settlers that wanted to be taught in Ukrainian. This showed that there were 496 that wanted this, 217 students in classes 1—4, 201 in classes 5—7, and 68 in classes 8—10. In Saki the number was 65, Dgankoy 68, Oktyabrsk 51, and Simferopol 59.” (ibid, pg. 196).

As a solution to this problem O. Kosyak proposed opening a school in Simferopol which would accept students from different parts of the region and include a dormitory for the students. He suggested a facility with a capacity of 180—200 students using a building that had been an orphanage. (ibid, pg. 197).
His report was reviewed by the bureau of the regional party committee on August 16th, 1957. In its decision “About opening a school teaching in Ukrainian in the city of Simferopol” it was noted that many Ukrainian settlers had come into the area, many now living in the regional center. In 1953 this included 9,457 children, most of whom had been taught in Ukrainian and wanted to continue being taught in their native language.

Continuing, it was noted that the lack of seven year and ten year schools severely hampered the ability to satisfy the entirely proper wishes of the parents that their children be taught in their native language. This also interferes with the establishment of the settlers in their new homes, and slows down progress in organizing separate beginning classes in Ukrainian, inasmuch as there are no 7 to 10 year schools where they could continue their education in their native language.

This situation led the bureau of the regional party committee and the executive committee of the regional Rada to decide that a school for 280 students with classes 5—10, taught in Ukrainian, and including a dormitory, will be organized in Simferopol by September 1st, 1957.

O. Kosyak reported to the plenum of the regional committee on October 8: “Since the inclusion of Crimea into the structure of the Ukrainian RSR, the schools of the region are making constant progress in achieving the plan of the Ministry of Education of the URSR. In the current school year, Ukrainian is taught as a course of study from the 2nd class in all schools of the region, in 117 schools from the 5th to the 7th class, and in Simferopol, by the decision of the regional party committee and the regional executive committee, the first school in which all subjects are taught in Ukrainian with 214 students.

This school will be staffed with highly qualified teachers. Owing to the initiative of the KP of Ukraine in Simferopol, the school has a very good building. There are some problems, however. First of these is the shortage of dormitory space, which precludes many students from being accepted. The reason for this is that many of the places intended for students are now occupied, and the city execu-
The authorities in Crimea paid little attention to the problems related to the Ukrainian language. The question was not even brought up during the meeting of the Simferopol and regional leadership on August 13th, 1958, when they reviewed the issue of “Rebuilding the system of education”. (Ibid, fund 1, desc. 53, matter 975, pgs. 1—73). The Ukrainian language was mentioned by Ananyev, secretary of the city party committee, and then only as information that Ukrainian was taught in 5 classes as a subject. (Ibid, pg. 28).

Even in these difficult circumstances, Ukrainian continued to make headway. In the 1958—1959 school year it was taught in all 2nd, 3rd, and 5th grades, with a total of 19,766 students participating. (CDAVOVU, fund 166, desc. 15, matter 2591, pg. 75).

This process continued until a new law was enacted by the Soviet Union confirming the right of parents to choose the language with which their children will be taught. This meant that the Ukrainian language could be taught freely, but this led to some tragic consequences on the peninsula.

The impetus to the limiting its spread was a letter from several parents to the CK KPRS and CK KP of Ukraine complaining that their children were forced to learn Ukrainian. This was enough for the party to call a meeting to discuss “The facts of violation of the law about the voluntary nature of learning the Ukrainian language in school number 15 in the city of Simferopol.”

First secretary of the regional committee Vasil Komyakhov, secretary of ideology Ivan Chirva, and other members, that only recently spoke so fervently in favor of the Ukrainian language angrily said “different schools in Simferopol had violations of statute 9 of the law “about strengthening the relationship of the school with ac-
### List of schools in the Crimean region that taught classes in Ukrainian. 1957.

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<th>Class</th>
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Note: The above table lists the number of students in each class for different types of schools in the Crimean region in 1957.
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tual life and continuing development of education in the Ukrainian RSR”.

Serious falsifications were seen regarding the issues at the 15th school in Simferopol. The leadership and party organization of this school had made no effort to explain this new law to the parents. Instead of applying serious efforts to educating the people, especially the group who wanted to abolish Ukrainian and return to the Russian educational program, about the new law and its ramifications, they decided to deal with this issue administratively. The director of the school Shalin, and the secretary of the party organization Ruskol, allowed poor behavior to mar their discussions with the parents and students who wanted to be exempt from learning Ukrainian, trying

List of schools in the Crimean region that taught classes in Ukrainian. 1959.

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different ways to dissuade them from exercising their rights.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 53, matter 140, pg. 241).

Not only the directors of the school had problems, “O. S. Kosyak, head of the regional department of education, is to receive a letter of reprimand for lack of demonstrating party principles in dealing with adherence to statute 9 regarding schools.

For reacting very slowly to the violation of the principle of voluntary choice of learning the Ukrainian language in school number 15 and others, the head of the education department of the regional committee, M. S. Pastushenko, is to receive a letter of reprimand…” (ibid, pg. 243).

After this meeting of the bureau of the regional committee, many lost their enthusiasm for promoting Ukrainian on the peninsula. From then on it began to be squeezed out by various methods. For example, this bureau liquidated the newspaper “Soviet Crimea” (published in Ukrainian — GZ) citing financial losses, closed Ukrainian editions of dual language papers “Activists Notebook”, and “Vineyards and Orchards of Crimea”. (ibid, matter 1442, pgs. 26—29).

Publication of Ukrainian books was not even mentioned in the January 27th, 1960 special resolution of the bureau of the regional committee and regional executive committee “About the means to improve the dissemination of books in the Crimean region”. (ibid, matter 1895, pgs. 118—121).

A similar resolution about the improvement of libraries also has no mention of Ukrainian publications. (ibid, matter 1896, pgs. 43—47).

There was not a word about Ukrainian in the schools in the meeting of the bureau of the regional committee on April 8th, 1960, when they discussed “About the rebuilding of the schools in Saki by the area party committee in the light of the laws of the Verkhovna Radas of the SRSR and the URSR regarding schools”. (ibid, matter 1895, pgs. 219—222).

The bureau, however did mention, in the resolution on February 26, 1960, that the “newspapers Crimean Pravda and Crimean Komsomolets should take full advantage of distribution in the Ukrainian language versions.” (ibid, matter 1895, pg. 213).
This was at the time when, according to officials of the department of education, “the law about schools was enacted, and the general population expressed a great deal of interest in learning Ukrainian. Only a small group was opposed, for various reasons.” (CDAVOVU, fund 166, desc. 15, matter 3205, pg. 100).

Experience has shown that learning Ukrainian not only presented no problems for the students, but also actually contributed to the learning of Russian. For example, the rating of Russian only schools in 1954 was 91.1%, and after Ukrainian was introduced, the rating in 1960 was 91.6%. It would seem the introduction of Ukrainian raised the student performance in both languages. (ibid, pg. 101).

Nevertheless, the numbers of students learning Ukrainian began to decrease. In the 1960—1961 school year 24,075 students in the fifth grade took Ukrainian courses, but in that year, in the sixth grade, only 22,868 continued. (ibid, matter 3542, pg. 55).

Outside of schools, Ukrainian was used in Crimea only when speaking to Ukrainian visitors from abroad. It was proposed that a sign in Ukrainian be posted in the train station in Simferopol greeting Ukrainian visitors from Canada. (ibid, matter 2309, pg. 174).

First secretary of the CK KP of Ukraine Mykola Pidhorny tried to speak in Ukrainian at an official function in Yalta on August 21, 1960, but he confused Russian words with Ukrainian so badly that Khrushchev said “Nikolai Viktorovich, why don’t you speak in Russian so we can understand you.” (Crimean Pravda, 1998, April 21).

Of course, after such an admonition from Khrushchev, no one wanted to even touch the subject of Ukrainian language. Only after a year, when the CK KP of Ukraine and the Rada of Ministers of the URSR approved a resolution “About the reception of Soviet and foreign tourists in Sevastopol”, Ukrainian was used again in Crimea, albeit in a unique way: the bureau of the regional party committee required, in its resolution, “that signs on major roads in Yalta and Sevastopol be in Russian, Ukrainian, and Latin”. (ibid, matter 2303, pg. 158).

The use of Ukrainian was discussed at a meeting of the bureau of the regional committee on June 10th, 1961, when arrangements to
receive a group of Ukrainians from the USA were made, but the official protocol made no mention of it. (ibid, 2305, pg. 158).

No one took any pains to further the use of Ukrainian. At a meeting of the regional officials on November 10th, 1961, where development of the schools was discussed, it was mentioned that students “showed poor performance in basic essential subjects, especially Russian, mathematics, and physics”. (ibid, matter 2308, pg. 35).

The Crimean authorities were more interested in proficiency in mathematics. A meeting of the bureau on December 1st, 1961 was held to discuss this, where it was announced that “there is a great deal of attention paid to the education of the students in ideological-political matters in the mathematics classes. Many teachers have prepared materials relating to the 22nd conventions of the KPRS and the KP of Ukraine, the seven year plan for the SRSR, Ukraine, and Crimea, showing the students the greatness of our nation, and the tremendous success in establishing communism”. (ibid, pg. 130).

I. Chirva, secretary of the regional committee, in a meeting on January 26th, 1962, said in his report that “very little attention is paid to the learning of Ukrainian”. (ibid, matter 2709, pg. 30). This remark, however, went practically unnoticed.

It was only at the September 6th, 1962 plenum, which discussed ideological issues, the editor of the Crimean Pravda, V. Klaznika, returned to the problems with Ukrainian on the peninsula. “I feel that Ukrainian literature is not sufficiently promoted in our region. We are a young region of Ukraine, but our roots are inexorably connected with Ukraine. Belinsky, Chekhov, Gorky, and others valued Ukrainian culture very highly. We have institutes, technical colleges, schools. This youth will one day be working outside Crimea, in other regions of Ukraine, and the knowledge of the Ukrainian language will make it easier for them to work. Amateur concerts in Ukrainian are rarely seen in our clubs. I visited a collective recently. In the evening, girls are returning from work, singing Ukrainian songs, very pleasant to hear. Here are people, a living force that carries with them the culture of Ukraine. Why not feature Ukrainian concerts on TV, showing songs, music, dance. I feel that we should promote Ukrainian arts. Our newspapers in Ukrainian, Crimean Komsomo-
lets and Crimean Pravda are published in very small numbers, and are not being read. This is unconscionable. (ibid, matter 2712, pg. 102).

Nothing was done in reaction to this speech. There was no official interest in any further development of Ukrainian. It was only later, after Petro Shelest became leader of the republic, that introductory addresses at meetings of the CK KP of Ukraine were made in Ukrainian, as were those at the regional party conference. (ibid, matter 3280, pgs. 136, 137). Greetings to important guests were spoken, from memory, in Ukrainian. For example, at the April 1964 meeting of the bureau of the Crimean regional committee, greetings to Khrushchev were extended in Ukrainian. But the president of Algeria, Akhmed Ben Belli, who was with him, was greeted in Russian. (ibid, matter 3612, pg. 283).

This was the attitude towards Ukrainian, who wanted to, learned it, and who didn’t, well it wasn’t important. The result was that the number of schools that taught in Ukrainian continued to decrease. In the 1966—1967 school year there were only 3 schools with dormitories — Dgankoy 8 year school with 210 students, Simferopol high school with 308 students, and Gvardiyska with 175. (CDAVOVu, fund 166, desc. 15, matter 5407, pgs. 76, 175, 397).

Within a year the school in Dgankoy was closed, and in the 1970—1971 school year only the school in Simferopol was left, with 412 students. (ibid, matter 7787, pg. 130). The following year, no new students were accepted into the first grade, and 9th and 10th grades were to be cancelled. (ibid, matter 8185, pg. 105).

What this meant was that the Ukrainian school ceased to exist. Following intense criticism of Our Soviet Ukraine, the book by Petro Shelest at the meeting of the regional party authorities on April 10th, 1973, thinking about any future for the Ukrainian language was impossible.
Further plans for developing the Crimean peninsula could be done only with Ukrainian labor. For example, 19,650 families were resettled from northern and western parts of the republic in the years 1971—1975, 2,000 more than was called for by the original plan. Aside from these, 788 Ukrainian families were resettled into the Sevastopol area. Together, this was about one fifth the total of all the resettlement by the URSR. (ibid, matter 850, pg. 153).

During this time, none of the areas of the Crimean region, or in Zakarpatia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivno, and Chernivtsy experienced a decrease in population. (ibid, matter 851, pg. 55).

The next five year plan (1976—1980) called for settling 8,000 more Ukrainian families in Crimea. Already in 1976 2,174 families arrived, the plan calling for 2,000. (ibid, pg.153). A population rise of 47,100 on the peninsula during this five year plan was entirely reasonable. This represented about 10% of the general figures for all of Ukraine. (ibid, pgs. 47, 48). In comparison, the adjacent regions, Mikolaev, Kherson, and Zaporizhia showed increases of only 21,500, 25,800, and 23,300 respectively.(ibid, pgs. 47, 48). Demographically, Crimea was the only region in Ukraine where the village population had risen, numbering 437,300. (ibid, pg. 54).

In 1979 the village population in Crimea reached 723,436 (Summary of the Soviet census of the population in 1979. Moscow, 1990, volume 10, pg. 184). Ten years later the population increased by 23,000 — the census in 1989 showed the village population in Crimea at 746,226.

Once again a, by now, classic example of Russian counting is seen. It is generally known that, beginning in 1954, primarily Ukrainian families were settled in Crimea, with only a tiny percentage of other nationalities. However, in the 1989 census, amazingly enough, Russians outnumbered Ukrainians 417,619 to 252,500.

This becomes even more problematic when the statistics of population growth are examined. The areas of Crimea showing the greatest growth were those that were primarily Ukrainian. When the average growth in the region was 16,000, the Ukrainian areas,
Dgankoy was 20,700, Krasnoperekopsk was 21,700, Pervomayusk was 22,800, and Rosdolnensk was 22,700. (CDAVOVU, fund R-582, desc.11, matter 1529, pg. 2).

The census of 1989 showed a total of 625,919 Ukrainians, with 181,819 born on the peninsula (Russians numbered 828,761), others were resettled: 33,956 from the Vinnetsa region (2,366 born in Crimea), 9,936 from the Volyn region (948 born in Crimea), Voroshilograd (Luhansk) 9,580 (7,893 born in Crimea), Dniepropetrovsk 16,047 (6,271), Donetsk 16,851 (14,658), Zhytomyr 24,662 (2,370), Zakarpatia 2,148 (398), Zaporizhia 17,725 (10,831), Ivano-Frankivsk 6,930 (767), Kyiv (city) 2,585 (1,564), Kyiv (region) 16,808 (2,779), Kirovograd 11,534 (2,391), Lviv 9,534 (1,985), Nikolaev 9,338 (3,680), Odessa 10,253 (5,976), Poltava 24,878 (2,551), Rivno 10,212 (1,039), Sumi 30,034 (5,076), Ternopil 7,679 (593), Kharkiv 11,724 (5,668), Kherson 35,552 (11,340), Khmelnitsky 28,217 (1,902), Cherkasi 15,526 (1,437), Chernihiv 21,733 (1,987), and Chernivets 2,967 (601).

Ukrainians resettled to Crimea from other parts of the SSR where they had previously settled. For example, resettlers from Belorussia, 1,971 Ukrainians (8,901 Russians), Uzbekistan 1,590 Ukrainians (8,945 Russians), Kazakhstan 8,426 (31,953), Georgia 915 (6,642), Azerbaijan 460 (5,848), Lithuania 855 (3,713), Moldova 2,012 (2,745), Latvia 855 (3,713), Kirgiz 739 (3,699), Tajikistan 627 (3,333), Armenia 195 (3,172), Turkmenistan 432 (2,325), Estonia 125 (982), and from abroad 2,026 (4,904).

Many Ukrainians came from the Russian Federation, 31,299 (Russians 603,797). The figures from the census show that Ukrainians were resettled from areas where they were in the local majority. The census figures confirm that the Ukrainians, living in compact communities and represented only about 10% of the total population, were diluted by resettling more than half of each small community. Of the 37,950 people who came from the Krasnodarsky region, 1,632 were Ukrainians. Analysis of the regions of the Russian Federation where Ukrainians had been living for some time produced similar figures: Krasnoyarsk region had a total of 13,207, and 829 Ukrainians, Primorsky 12,362 total, and 1,397 Ukrainians,
Khabarovsk 7,718 and 861, Amur 4,765 and 420, Belgorod 10,657 and 724, Bryansk 27,203 and 521, Voronezh 25,885 and 2,205, Volgograd 9,708 and 571, Kursk 33,090 and 569, Omsk 8,714 and 824, Orenburg 10,563 and 983, Rostov 18,583 and 1,213, and Saratov 11,441 and 756...
ALONG WITH CRIMEA, UKRAINE WAS GIVEN THE PROBLEM OF DEPORTED PEOPLE

Analyzing the facts of the transfer of Crimea, Ukrainian scholars abroad drew attention to another consequence of Moscow’s “generosity”. The genocide of the Tartars perpetrated by the Kremlin government affected the Tyurk people and the Moslem world in general. A noted scholar, Panas Fedenko, wrote that Moscow cannot find an excuse for the Tartar genocide, especially because many of the Tartars that were deported (and died) were communists, and so it was convenient for the Bolshevik government to transfer the problem to Ukraine, along with Crimea. (P. Fedenko, Ukraine After Stalin, Munich, 1956, pg. 35). And so, “giving” Crimea to Ukraine, Moscow turned over a large and complex problem, that of dealing with the Tartars, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans, and Armenians that were suddenly deported by the Bolsheviks.

Moscow wasted no time in drawing attention to this issue. Literally weeks after the transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine, the first secretary of the regional party committee, D. Polansky, contacted the first secretary of the CK KPU, O. Kirichenko, asking him to ask Moscow not to allow deportees to return to Crimea. It is not known if a similar request was made to the CK KPRS because the archives of the past CK KPU did not have this information.

In any event, a civilized return of the deportees to Crimea was not being resolved. To make things worse, on April 28, 1956, a Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR stated that the Tartars were declared innocent of any reason for deportation, but did not have the right to have their confiscated property returned, nor did they have the right to return to their former homes. This intensified the problems for Ukraine, knowing the Tartars would not accept their fate easily.

This situation was further exacerbated by resolution No. 1501-050 of the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR “About the settlement of the Tartars, Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, and others who had lived in Crimean region and are now returning to their former areas”, which forbad them to live in the Zaporizhia, Odessa, Kherson, 254
Приложение к реферату

СЕКРЕТАРЬ ЦК КП УКРАИНЫ
товарищу КРИЧЕНКО И.М.

Крымский обком партии просит Вас вести о

ходатайством в ЦК КПСС о запрещении всем административно-хозяйственным в 1944 году возвращаться к проживать на территории Крымской области.

Прошу письма за имя товарища Грушец Н.С.

предается.

Секретарь Крымского
обкома КПУ

Petition of the First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Party, Dmytro Polansky, regarding the barring of Crimean Tartars from returning to the peninsula.
Mikolaev, Crimean, and Zakarpattia regions. (ibid, desc. 25, matter 218, pg. 29).

As of March 1957, 714 Crimean Tartars arrived on the territory of the URSR: Zaporizhia 628, and Kherson 86. (ibid, desc. 24, matter 4544, pg. 54). The local authorities tried to force them to leave, by either returning to wherever they came from, or go to other regions. The Zaporizhia region sent 5 families to the Stalinsk region, and 2 to work in a lumber company, “Pechoralis”. (ibid, pg. 54).

Even though such strict controls were in place, the authorities were forced to accept 27 Tartars by 1967. (ibid, desc.25, matter 218, pg. 29).

After this, restrictions to the settlement of deported Tartars in Crimea were lifted by a Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR on September 5th, 1967, and they returned in large groups and turned to the local party and Soviet organizations for housing and living assistance.

Representatives of the Tartars demanded the publication of the Decree of September 5th, 1967 in the Crimean Pravda, and the Resort Gazette, which allowed the returning Tartars to be given housing and assistance first, before anyone else, without being restricted by current norms, permitting them to buy and construct buildings. In addition the Decree authorized other benefits for the Tartars, including the halting of settlement from other regions…

The Tartars also demanded the removal of literature that “described them as traitors during the occupation of Crimea by the German-fascist invaders”. (ibid, matter 72, pgs. 6, 7).

Various representatives of the Tartars, in defense of their rights, threatened with protests. Hero of the Soviet Union Abzhuraim Reshidov sent a telegram in November of 1967 to Chief Marshal of Aviation Vershinin, saying that he will set himself on fire if he isn’t given housing by the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. In the village of Heneralsky in the Alushta district, Seir Dgemaladinov announced that he, along with his family of 6, are beginning a hunger strike because were not given housing. (ibid, pg. 10).

Only with these kinds of actions were the Tartars able to get the attention of local government. As of November 15th, 1969, there were 2,365 living in Crimea, but only 867 were officially registered,
citing lack of space (there being a “sanitary norm” of 13.5 square meters per person). A part of the returning Tartars began to settle in adjacent regions. The Zaporizhia region had 1,169 people, Kherson 830, Odessa 40, and in Krasnodar 6,680. (ibid, matter 218, pg. 30).

It is understandable that such restrictions on their return to their ancestral homeland provoked a very negative reaction, leading to continued acts of protest. On June 28th, 1968, 30 people gathered in the premises of the regional executive committee, demanding to see the head. They were not granted an audience, and police were used to evict them from the premises. On August 15th, 1968, a crowd of almost 100 people, with children, gathered by the entrance to the regional committee premises, demanding their rights to return to their homeland, in some cases calling out anti soviet slogans. The government reacted by forcibly evicting them and started court proceedings against one of the protestors, Ismailov. (ibid, pgs. 30, 31).

In an attempt to establish themselves in Crimea, the Tartars began to buy large numbers of buildings, in some cases those very buildings out of which they were deported. The government reacted to this quickly, starting court proceedings to annul purchase and sale agreements, and again beginning to deport the Tartars. The court decisions were met with protests and acts of civil disobedience. When the families of Tartars Osman Mambetov and Ali Tabakh in the village of Voinka in the Perekop district were to be evicted, a crowd of over two hundred gathered to prevent this. The authorities were forced to suspend the eviction. (ibid, pg. 32).

The resolute steadfastness of the Tartars in the pursuit of their rights had a definite effect on the authorities. The Minister of Internal Affairs of the URSR I. Holovchenko, had to consider a proposition about “the possible settlement of a select group of such people in regions where there was a need for workers and had housing available”. (ibid, pg. 33).

However, the government of the URSR could not organize a large scale resettlement of the Tartars to their ancestral homes for various reasons. In 1969, out of a planned 150 families, only 104 were placed, in 1970 100 were planned and only 45 placed, in 1971 100 and 65 respectively. In 1972 the Rada of Ministers of the URSR au
Report about the deportation of Crimean Tatars by the Communist regime. 1972.
authorized another 50 Tartar families to resettle from Uzbekistan. (ibid, matter 702, pgs. 2, 3).

The politics of restricting the repatriation of Tartars did not work very well for the government; the number of unauthorized settlers continuously increased. 32 unauthorized Tartars entered Crimea in 1973, 128 came in 1974, 605 in 1975, and 901 in 1976. (ibid, matter 1401, pg. 26).

Because the local authorities acted to prevent the Tartars resettling in Crimea, the Tartars were forced to appeal to higher offices in Moscow. Because of this, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the SRSR M. Sholokov informed the First Secretary of the CK KPU V. Shcherbitsky in December 1976: “Complaints are being received from people who claim that the Crimean regional authorities are preventing them from registering at the homes they selected, interfering with purchase and sale agreements, refusing to examine their complaints in these matters, and even evicting them from their homes and forcibly deporting them outside the region”. (ibid, pg. 26).

M. Sholokov wrote of one such example, the family of war hero Faisulin was taken out of the village Divne in the Bilohorsk district in an automobile at night. (ibid, pg. 16).

As instances of forced evictions increased, so did suicides by self immolation. One of these suicides came to be well known. Musa Mamut killed himself on June 23rd, 1978, after he and his family were evicted from the village of Donske in the Simferopol area. V. Shcherbitsky, who had earlier asked Moscow to do something about the illegal returnees, informed the CK KPRS that at the funeral he saw “unrolled banners with black ribbons displaying nationalistic statements: “He burned himself alive to protest discrimination in our native land”, “Dear Musa Mamut — a sacrifice for the rights of the Crimean people”. 4 men spoke at the funeral, one saying: “Musa died for a righteous cause. We swear to continue his cause until Crimea, our homeland, once again is ours”. (ibid, matter 1668, pg. 50).

Many archival entries show that the Tartars fought bravely, and with great sacrifices for right to return to their homeland. It was important for them that they were supported by son of Ukraine, General Petro Hrihorenko. Eventually they won.
WHEN THE CRIMEANS VOTED, THEY DID NOT LISTEN TO BAKHARYEV OR THE “CRIMEAN PRAVDA”

The tragic consequences of the 74 years of Bolshevik rule were not limited to innocent sacrifices. They also leave the inheritance of entire peoples transplanted into territories where they were outsiders, leaving these areas scarred with ethnic strife. Ukrainians could neither build their own nation nor express themselves where they were deported.

When the Soviet Union began disintegrating in the latter 1980’s, the communist leadership grasped at the idea of Russian nationalism like a life preserver. Understanding that the fate of the SRSR depended heavily on Ukraine, Moscow began a series of provocations, attempting to inflame separatism in different regions. Suddenly there was a problem with Russians living in the trans-Carpathian region, a movement for a separate republic, Donetsk-Krivorisk Republic, fanned by foreign political interests… Especially intense efforts were made to break Crimea away from Ukraine.

According to Mykola Porovsky, well known political analyst, this was only natural because the 160,000 registered communists were typically the most conservative in the communist party. Fully half of them were retired army officers, Black Sea fleet officers, KGB, political employees, and retired communist officials. They were afraid of any democratic processes in Ukraine, and did what they could to stop them on the peninsula.

The nationalistic resurgence in Ukraine was especially troubling to them. To counter this in Crimea, the idea of a Crimean autonomy was forged at the 1988 party conference. Autonomy would allow them to fence themselves off from the freedom movement in Ukraine.

The drive for autonomy took on a faster pace with the declaration of sovereignty approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 16, 1990. The attempts to divide Ukraine were intensified by the communist party. At the October 22nd, 1990 meeting of the secretariat of the CK, headed by G. Kharchenko, it was proposed “The communist leadership in the Verkhovna Rada should examine the
national status of Crimea; the Crimean regional party committee should start an initiative for a declaration of status of Crimea.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 11, matter 2240, pg. 17).

The secretariat of the CK KPU and the Crimean regional party committee were told (by Moscow — GZ) to use extraordinary means to “motivate public opinion about changing the political-administrative status of Crimea.” (ibid).

Even though the communist majority in the URSR parliament assured passage of whatever law the Kremlin wanted, for insurance, they decided to organize a referendum in Crimea. Obeying instructions, the Crimean press began a propaganda campaign, saying that all the economic problems brought about by a planned economy would be fixed if Crimea achieved its new status.

What exactly was to be gained by transforming Crimea into an autonomous republic was not clear. No one, neither lawyers, nor economists, nor historians thought about this. No one really knew what they were voting for, it was said, “we’ll figure it out later”. Crimean veterans called for excluding all western Ukrainians from visiting the peninsula, forbidding the youth oriented newspaper Crimean Komsomolets from printing any articles that went contrary to the established line regarding the referendum.

This newspaper, having analyzed the situation that developed in Crimea, declared on January 1, 1991, in the words of S. Sophnovsky, the peninsula is preparing “an apparatus of autonomy, behind which is hiding an autocracy”. The head of the press center of the regional party committee, V. Kozubsky, commented, at a special meeting of the press club Crimean Pravda, on the upcoming referendum: “I’m sure that reason will prevail, that Crimeans will not forego the opportunity to be masters in their own house.” (Crimean Pravda, 1991, January 8).

Emphasizing the regional success in building a great economic potential, the Crimean Pravda, which continuously tried to show the necessity of Crimean autonomy, in pointing out the large capital value (9 billion) and gross product (11.4 billion karbovantsy), forgot to mention the incredible investments made by Ukraine starting in 1954.
Its pages continued intense anti Ukrainian propaganda. A delegate to the 28th convention of the communist party of Ukraine, M. Chernishov, from the company “Photon” appeared in the pages of this newspaper with the words: “It was very unpleasant to see the blue and yellow flag flying over the Kyiv executive committee building.” (Crimean Pravda, 1991, January 1). I see nothing wrong with displaying national colors, but when “established national symbols are discarded there is only the feeling of anarchy”.

This type of press was disseminated among the uninformed people of Crimea and led to increased tensions between Ukrainians and Crimeans. This was done purposefully, for example neither Chernishov, nor H. Tomashevska, reporter for the Crimean Pravda who interviewed him, mentioned that next to the Ukrainian flag on the Kyiv city committee building also flew the red flag of the URSR.

The Crimean resort industry brought in over one billion karbovantsy annually, but the Crimean budget saw only one million of this. The local authorities decried this as taking advantage of a resort colony. But, was Ukraine responsible for this?

There were some voices of reason. G. Ponomaryov, head of the economic planning commission, explained the lack of Crimean income from the resorts: “In the 1960’s the VCRPS (in other words, Moscow — V. S.) turned over control of Crimean resorts and other businesses to over 450 companies, registered in various regions of the Soviet Union. Local associations had control of only 16% of the total and from this they paid taxes. Crimean residents did not have a right to use the resorts, nor did they have the right to construct anything on the coast itself. (Crimean Pravda, 1991, January 10).

“The Rada of Ministers of the SRSR”, continued Ponomaryov, “instead of working to save the resorts in Crimea, they approved, without any notice to the local regional committees, the construction of many new sanatoriums which belonged to various companies and agencies... The local authorities were not included in any budget planning meetings, and the central government showed no inclination to do so in the future. If only the various resorts paid some minimal rent for the land they used, Crimea would see an income of over 400 million karbovantsy annually. (ibid.).
The Crimean Pravda, however, made no attempt to analyze economic relations with other regions of URSR (Ukraine). An attempt at this was made by V. Probiyholova, assistant head of the agricultural association. The figures he produced were not what the ideologists wanted to see. He demonstrated that the water diverted from the Dnieper river helped to increase the wheat harvest by more than double, fruits 1.8 times, grapes and berries by 4.5 times, meat by 3.5, and eggs by 4.9.

Thanks to the irrigation projects by Ukraine, the agricultural production in general rose by 2.5 times in 1963, the income for the collectives grew by 5 times.

This success, continued V. Probiyholova, is also due to the large amounts of fertilizer brought in from Ukraine, without which such intensive cultivation could not be attempted. Ukraine also supported this agricultural development by supplying all the metal products needed, cast iron parts, steel and plastic pipes...

Another resource without which Crimea could produce anything was electric energy. The Crimean region imports 7.3 billion kilowatt hours (91%) from Ukraine. All these facts showed that breaking away from Ukraine would be very unwise.

These reports took a correspondent, O. Bazyuk, by surprise. He asked, nervously, “does this mean that you are against autonomy?” Probiyholova replied, “Absolutely not, but as part of Ukraine.” (Crimean Pravda, 1991, January 11).

These comments by Probiyholova were not incidental. The Crimean authorities, while claiming they had no intention of being a part of the Russian Federation, set up the referendum in such a way as to preclude union with Ukraine in any relationship whatsoever. It was planned that as soon as the referendum was over, there would be an announcement that the Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada in 1954 is rescinded (the fact that this Decree was part of a special law of the SRSR was not mentioned by the Crimean press).

After achieving desired results in the referendum of January 20th, 1991, the Crimean party apparatus claimed another victory — on February 12th, the communist majority in the Verkhovna Rada of
the URSR approved a resolution granting Crimea the status of an autonomous republic.

Another step in the attempt to separate Crimea from Ukraine came with the Soviet Union referendum on support of a renewed Soviet Union (no one knew what this really meant, but the voting went on nevertheless — GZ). Ramifications of this referendum were quite interesting, as was explained by professor P. Khrienko at the plenum of the Crimean party committee on April 11th, 1991: “84.6% of those that voted on March 17th upheld the proposition that Crimea should remain within the SRSR with a declaration of sovereignty. While this is a fact, there is another. Over two thirds of the people who voted had no idea what was included in this declaration. This is the result of research that I conducted. I am sure that many seated here today are also unfamiliar with its contents. It seems that our current politics promoted a vote on a subject the large majority knows nothing about.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 55, matter 7021, pg. 65).

At this time, the local communist leadership, with the head of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, Mykola Bahrov, acted quickly to prevent access to the peninsula by any Ukrainian newspapers and journals, TV channels or radio stations. Local media began a vigorous attack on all things Ukrainian, especially any criticism of the separatism that was planned.

In order to create an illusion of popular support, the KGB and the Black Sea fleet agents formed puppet organizations that adamantly supported Russia. The members of these groups were mainly older pensioners. The substantial funding for these organizations was provided by shadowy sources, sometimes overtly illegal, as in the case of the firm “Impeks 55”. (Holos of Ukraine, 1995, June 1).

The Crimean — now Republic — plenum of the party committee had as its next goal: “The absolute right of the Crimean ARSR to own the land and natural resources, sovereignty of its territory, regulating all forms of ownership, determine issues of language and culture, maintain its own budget, determine pricing, taxes, credit, investment, and manage its own foreign affairs.” (CDAHOU, fund 1, desc. 55, matter 7021, pgs. 89—91).
All this was done to a scenario written in Moscow. The actors, both in Simferopol and Kyiv played their roles well. It is little wonder that they supported the revolt against Gorbachev.

While the communists in Kyiv, trying to save their own skins, voted to support the Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine, the communist leadership in Crimea, always close to the elite in Moscow, was ready to do whatever they were told. Crimea had provided fine resort establishments for which they were well paid. Crimea also received large sums of money from the party treasury for various businesses. Now the debt had to be paid. To help stave off Ukrainian influence on the peninsula, the Verkhovna Rada of the new autonomy voted in support of national sovereignty for Crimea on September 4th, 1991.

This document stated that Crimea was a part of the Soviet Union as a member republic, and makes no mention of being a part of Ukraine. (Crimean Pravda, 1991, September 6th).

This was possible because the Crimean communist leadership felt confident in their position, even though they supported the GKCP (the group who tried to depose Gorbachev on August 19th, 1991 — GZ). They even elected their head, Bagrov, to head the Crimean Verkhovna Rada.

This turn of events encouraged various impromptu political outbursts. The newspaper Komsomolska Pravda never mentioned that Ukraine had already declared independence and continued to show maps with Crimea part of Russia.

This newspaper, on August 24th, 1991, printed the following: “Having stopped the tanks, Russia preserved freedom. But Russia will not come into Crimea. (This referred to the tanks in Moscow advancing on the protesting people — GZ)” The problem will have to solved from the bottom up.

The sentiment favoring Russia still continued. The Komsomol Pravda published an article on September 12th by a member of the KARSR (Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic — GZ), V. Mezhak, titled “The return of Crimea to Russia”. This article emphasized that Crimea should be autonomous within the Russian Federation, have its separate car in the train. The fact that they al-
ready had their car in the Ukrainian train did not satisfy the author. But, he could not explain to the readers what would be the advantage of changing trains.

This did not interest the ideologists that wanted Crimea to be separate from Ukraine. During the preparations for the Ukrainian vote on the issue of independence, they continued to stress that Crimea was not Ukraine.

One of these, the correspondent of the Crimean Pravda (the paper stopped publishing a Ukrainian edition after independence was announced, citing lack of readership) M. Bakharyev, wrote laughingly on October 5th “Will the Crimeans want to live under a blue and yellow flag?”.

Quoting a similar publication of a year ago, M. Bakharyev referred insultingly to the ambitions of the Ukrainians: “There’s a crowd, all heated up with nationalistic ambitions, they are just a mixture of nations, who cares what they think. They are bound to get a negative reaction from the Crimean people who were given to them 36 years ago in honor of their union with Russia 300 years ago,” (Crimean Pravda, 1991, October 18).

This newspaper became the pulpit of Russian chauvinists, almost choking on its anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. The day before the Ukrainian referendum its pages proclaimed that no one in Crimea will vote for Ukrainian independence, and later declare itself a part of Russia. A feature article by Bakharyev titled “Homesick for my native country” ended with the words “I will cross out the words “Yes, I approve” as a protest against Ukrainian independence.” This edition also showed a copy of the ballot with the word “Yes” crossed out. (Crimean Pravda, 1991, November 30).

The population of Crimea was primarily Ukrainian, and even though they had been forced to call themselves Russian, their roots were deeply Ukrainian. They went to the polls and expressed their true feelings. On December 3rd, Crimean Pravda was forced to publish the results — 54.2% voted for Ukraine.

Not listening to the propaganda of Bakharyev and the Crimean Pravda, 57% of the voters in Sevastopol voted for Ukraine. Bakharyev did not comment on these results in the newspaper. He,
and the Russian chauvinists simply failed to understand that Crimea was Ukrainian and its future is with Ukraine.

Another separatist ideologist, Mezhak, also had to admit “the train has left and Crimea’s car is solidly attached to the Ukrainian train.” (Crimean Pravda, 1991, December 26).

History and the Crimean people have once again decided, Crimea is Ukrainian.
The population of Crimea and Sevastopol took part in the Ukrainian referendum on December 1, 1991, regarding independence, and supported it with a majority vote. This determined their future. However, even today, some politicians cannot accept this. Crimean and Russian publications continue to cast aspersions on the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.

Political analyst Aleksander Formanchuk asserts that it was not the economic situation, but the 300th anniversary of the Pereyslav Agreement that prompted Nikita Khrushchev to transfer Crimea to Ukraine. That is why the discussion of this issue at the meeting of the Presidium of the Communist Party “did not include any explanations from Khrushchev. He simply decided. It was important to him that it be approved by those people that he would soon dispose of. This was the kind of logic instituted by Stalin. Khrushchev used the Crimean issue to judge his strength as a leader. He wanted to be a leader, and leaders are known for their propensity to distribute political favors.” (A. Formanchuk, Crimea Within Soviet Ukraine, A Book About the History of Crimea. Simferopol, 2010, pgs. 258, 259).

These were the opinions of Formanchuk, who did not seem to know that the issue of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was discussed in the Kremlin already in 1943. Necessary documents were being prepared by the second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Demyan Korotchenko, documents that formed the legal basis for the transfer of Crimea into the governmental structure of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, when the possibility of American credit for the building of “Crimean California” appeared, the Ukrainian version was set aside.

That Formanchuk’s logic was shaky can readily be seen: he wrote that Khrushchev and Malenkov were in Kyiv in 1953 to decide the Crimean issue with the cooperation of Ukraine, yet in January of 1954 Khrushchev couldn’t explain why Crimea should be transferred to Ukraine. Who needed this explained, Malenkov, who together with Khrushchev tried to convince the leadership in Kyiv in the Autumn of 1953?
Even though the issue was not openly discussed, the documents were already being prepared at the end of 1953. The leadership in Ukraine studied the economic situation in Crimea, how it can be revitalized, and the ethnic makeup of the peninsula; documents confirming this have been saved. One need only to spend some time working in the archives in order to get at the facts, rather than translating and manipulating figures compiled by associate professor of the Tauridian University, Vladislav Pashchenya. Following this course of action placed Formanchuk in an untenable position. He writes “As a whole, the tempo of efforts at rebuilding Crimea in 1953 would not have permitted returning the peninsula to even pre-war conditions. Only a few commercial establishments were an exception.” (ibid, pg. 255).

And here he cites Vladislav Pashchenya: “In 1953, 38 different companies in Crimea were rated in the top three categories of their type of business, as judged in ratings across the entire Soviet Union. These facts contradict the notion that Crimea was transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 because of economic shortcomings. What shortcomings could there be when in the years 1951—1953 the average growth of heavy industry was 24%, and general production rose 15%.” (ibid, pg. 255).

As we can see, the comparative figures showing the change from pre-war (1940) economy to 1954 (when Crimea was transferred) are not presented by associate professor Pashchenya. Instead he confuses the reader with figures taken from selected individual types of businesses, and only for the years 1951—1953. Pashchenya, in his book, dedicated to Ukrainian hero Mykola Bahrov, adds “the fate of Crimeans, still not completely decided, hangs in the air”. (V. Pashchenya, The Crimean Region During the Soviet Period (1946—1991), Simferopol, 2008, pg. 351).

Perhaps the professors at the Tauridian University, who approved the book written by Pashchenya, realized this, but the fate of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol was decided by their vote on December 1, 1991, as confirmed in the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996. It seems very strange that facts such as these are ignored by a National University in Ukraine.
The referendum which approved Ukrainian Independence and its results in Crimea was also ignored by Russian Andriy Fedorov, who published a book titled The Legal Status of Crimea. The Legal Status of Sevastopol. (1999, Moscow University). He writes “The Soviet leadership, having lost their ability to think clearly, tried to combine the transfer of Crimea with the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Agreement (January 8th, 1654), where it was decided to join eastern Ukraine to Russia. (not exactly! V. S.) (A. Fedorov, The Legal Status of Crimea. The Legal Status of Sevastopol. Moscow, 1999, pg. 9).

For some reason, this author (Fedorov) does not mention the fact that when the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR (Russia) approved the transfer of Crimea to the URSR (Ukraine) on February 5th, 1954, a separate request was made to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR regarding this matter, which was discussed on February 13th, 1954, in Kyiv. The resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, issued on this date, begins with the words: “Having discussed the proposition of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RRFSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region from the Russian RFSR to the Ukrainian RSR, and submitted for examination to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR, the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian RSR, from its side, feels that the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian RSR, taking into account common economy, territorial proximity, and close cultural relations, is entirely reasonable, and shows the faith of the great Russian people in the people of Ukraine.”

However, from the words of Fedorov it would seem that Ukraine was the initiator of the transfer: “The Presidium of the VR of the RSFSR feels that it would be possible to support the request of the Presidium of the VR of the URSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region to the URSR”. (ibid, pg. 7).

One can agree with Fedorov on one point, “Russia’s current position regarding Crimea and Sevastopol must be based on legal principles.”(ibid, pg. 9).

All documents confirm that the transfer of the Crimean region, including Sevastopol, was done in strict accordance with law. The
Резолюція Президії Верховної Ради Української РСР

Про подання Президії Верховної Ради Російської РСР по питанню передачі Кримської області до складу Української РСР

Оголошено подання Президії Верховної Ради Російської РСР по питанню передачі Кримської області з складу Російської РСР до складу Української РСР, внесене на розгляд Президії Верховної Ради СРСР, Президії Верховної Ради Української РСР з одного боку вважає, що передача Криму Українській РСР, яка виражає спільність їх економіки, територіальну близькість і екологічну ладу, яка відповідає ідеалам співробітництва, визнається єдністю безмежного довіри як великого російського і українського народу.

Український народ з сердечною здячністю і схваленням здійснює рішення про передачу Криму Українській РСР як новий міський статус, визнаваючи Центральний Комітет Комунастичної партії Радянської Союзів Українського Уряду про дальнє зміцнення не- воєнних зв'язків між російським та українським народами.

Переведено з української

Resolution of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine regarding the agreement to accept the Crimean region from the Russian Federation. 1954.
розвитку народного господарства Криму, піднесення матеріального і культурного доброго трудящих Кримської області.

Відповідно до подання Президії Верховної Ради Російської РФР, Президія Верховної Ради Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки постановляє:

Просить Президію Верховної Ради Союзу РСР передати Кримську область з складу Російської РФР до складу Української РСР.

ГОЛОВА ПРЕЗИДІЇ
ВЕРХОВНОЇ РАДИ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР

СЕКРЕТАР ПРЕЗИДІЇ
ВЕРХОВНОЇ РАДИ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РСР

м. Київ
3 листопада 1954 року
attempts by Fedorov to argue that Sevastopol was not transferred to the USSR because it was taken out of the Crimean region in 1948 are refuted by the very same documents he cites as a basis for his argument. He writes that “In accordance with Decree No. 761/2 of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RSFSR of October 29th, 1948, Sevastopol was taken out of the Crimean region and made a part of the republic (Russian).

However, this status for Sevastopol was not recorded in the Russian Constitution, because it did not have such a category and, at that time, there were no definite guidelines for a city to be part of a given republic. (ibid, pg. 32).

If the Constitution of the RSFSR did not contain a provision for separate cities to be a part of a republic directly, how can it be argued that Sevastopol, as an administrative-economic center, rather than an administrative-territorial center, could be taken out of the region in which it was located? Fedorov himself writes, two pages later, on what basis Sevastopol was considered to be part of a republic rather than a region: “The Decree of the Rada of Ministers of the RSFSR No. 1082 on October 29th, 1968, “Question regarding the city of Sevastopol”, Sevastopol is to be included in a separate line in the national plan and budget.” (ibid, pg. 35).

Fedorov can neither deny Sevastopol's connection to Crimea in 1948 nor to Ukraine in 1954. This is why he looks for an explanation on unconstitutional grounds: “Perhaps the only, more or less important, circumstance that ties Sevastopol to Ukraine to 1978, when the Ukrainian RSR, unilaterally, extended its jurisdiction to include the city of Sevastopol, is that, in 1948, the Sevastopol Party Organization remained within the Crimean regional Organization.” (ibid, pg. 35).

He continues: “Obviously, the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the administration of Sevastopol (this is not true, the Communist Party ruled over everything at that time — GZ). Therefore, there was no legal basis for the inclusion of Sevastopol in the Ukrainian government in 1978, and confirming its status as a city governed directly by the Republic of Ukraine in the Constitution of Ukraine in 1978”. (ibid, pg. 35).
There can only be one reply to this “explanation” offered by Fedorov, that he is deliberately misleading the reader — representatives to the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR from Sevastopol were elected as part of the Ukrainian contingent beginning already in 1954. Indeed, the Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR of January 11, 1954, “About electoral precincts voting for representatives to the Rada of the Soviet Union” in the territory of the Crimean region (Kerch No. 208, Simferopol No. 209, Simferopol village No. 210, and Sevastopol No. 211) are formed as part of the RRFSR. (News of the worker’s representatives of the SRSR, Moscow, 1954, January 13). The electoral precincts to the Rada of Nationalities included Crimea and Sevastopol in the Krasnodarsk precinct No. 12, as part of the RRFSR (ibid, January 13th).

However, the Crimean region was transferred to the Ukrainian RSR while preparations for the elections were underway, and the representative from the Krasnodar precinct, Dmytro Shepilov, stayed with the RRFSR delegation. (ibid, March 18th). Those who were elected from the Crimean region to the Rada of the Soviet Union, as reported by the Central Election Commission about the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the Soviet Union on March 14th 1954, were included in the delegation from the Ukrainian RSR. These included: Maria Oleksandrivna Brintseva — Kerch precinct, Sergei Georgiyevich Horshkov — Sevastopol precinct, Volodymir Illyich Kositsky — Simferopol village precinct, and Dmytro Stepanovich Polansky — Simferopol city precinct. (ibid, March 18th).

In 1958, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR of January 4th, 1958, the electoral districts of Sevastopol No. 481, Simferopol city No. 478, Simferopol village No. 479, and the Kerch No. 480 are included in the Crimean region, which, in turn, is included in the Ukrainian RSR (precincts for election of representatives to the Rada of the Soviet Union were from 418 to 569).

A similar situation developed in the elections to the Rada of Nationalities. A Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR on January 4th, 1958, formed 25 electoral precincts in the ter-
ritory of the Ukrainian RSR (from No. 25 to No. 50), including Crimean No. 34 (Sevastopol and the Crimean region) with the center in Simferopol. (ibid, 1958, January 5th).

The people of Sevastopol were represented in the Rada of the Soviet Union by the commander of the Black Sea fleet, Admiral Volodymir Kasatonov. The representative to the Rada of Nationalities from the Crimean region and Sevastopol was Olena Marchenko, who worked in the collective named after Voykov in the Nizhnohirsk district of the Crimean region. (ibid, March 19th).

The elections for the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR in 1962 divided the Crimean region into five voting precincts: Simferopol No.508, Evpatoria No. 509, Kerch No. 510, Sevastopol No. 511, and Yalta No. 512. (ibid, 1962, January 5th).

The Rada of Nationalities of the SRSR saw the assistant to the chief medical doctor of the Sanatorium “Krasny Mayak”, Evgeny Zakutna, elected from Crimean electoral precinct No. 36. (ibid, March, 21st).

This was possible only because Sevastopol was in the Crimean region both until 1954 and also after the transfer to Ukraine. Many legal documents are available to confirm this during the period after 1954. The most indicative are the documents regarding the elections to the Crimean regional Rada from Sevastopol in March, 1955. Kostyantin Nikirin was elected from the Striletsky precinct No. 90, Nadia Klyaznika from Pidhirny No. 91, Mikhailo Karpenko from Primorsky No. 92, Victor Kolesnikov from Chapayevsky No. 94, Evgen Danilov from Prirohosky No.95, Oleksander Anikin from Ordgonikidzevsky No. 96, Ludmila Sokolova from Zavodsky No. 97, Claudia Korotkova from Korabelny No. 98, Andriy Korovchenko from Petrovohirsk, Elisaveta Pivovarova from Zaliznichy No. 100, Mikhailo Kuryanov from Inkerman No. 101, Sergei Sosnitsky from Nakhimovsky No. 102, and Evgeny Popovkin from Kachinsky No. 103. (Slava Sevastopolya, 1955, March 8th).

There is further proof that Moscow recognized Sevastopol being attached to the Crimean region, and therefore to the Ukrainian RSR. A Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the SRSR on July 31st, 1954, announced the awarding of citations and medals to
У К А З

Президії Верховної Ради Української РСР

Про нагородження орденами "МАТЕРІНСЬКА СЛАВА" та медалями "МЕДАЛЬ МАТЕРІНСТВА" багатодітних матерів м. Севастополь

На підставі Указу Президії Верховної Ради Союзу РСР від 18 серпня 1944 року нагородити від імені Президії Верховної Ради СРСР:

Матерів, які народили та виховали вісім дітей

ОРДЕНОМ "МАТЕРІНСЬКА СЛАВА" ІІ СТУПЕНЯ

I. БАХАРОВУ Марію Василівну — робітницю, Сталінський район.

Матерів, які народили та виховали сім дітей

ОРДЕНОМ "МАТЕРІНСЬКА СЛАВА" ІІ СТУПЕНЯ

I. БЕРЛИНКОВУ Ганну Яковівну — домашню господарку, Сталінський район.

Матерів, які народили та виховали шість дітей

МЕДАЛЬЮ "МЕДАЛЬ МАТЕРІНСТВА" ІІ СТУПЕНЯ

I. ДЕБЕВСКІЙ Марія Пилипівну — домашню господарку, Северний район.

Decree of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine about recognizing the mothers of Sevastopol. 1954.

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railroad workers of the Crimean region. Awards were given to Vasil Tkachenko, personnel manager of the Sevastopol station, Vira Blizetska, manager of the Krasnoflotska station, Oleksander Hlinka, manager of the Sevastopol section of the rail line, Paraska Puha-chova, rail crossing guard at the Sevastopol station, and Oleksander Timchenko, manager of the Sevastopol station. (Crimean Pravda, 1954, August 27th).

Other documents confirm the relationship of Sevastopol with Ukraine in accordance with the Constitution. First of these — approved by the session of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian RSR — the national budget which included the budget for Sevastopol in 1954, totaling 116,695 karbovantsy, the sum of 1,500 karbovantsy was left over and subsequently added to the Sevastopol budget on January 1st, 1955.

Income from national taxes collected locally was allotted as follows: 25.2% of tax collected on sales went to the budget of Sevastopol (Crimean region budget received 7.5%), 30% of personal income tax went to Sevastopol (25% to Crimean region), 50% of the tax from unmarried, single persons, and families without children went to Sevastopol (37% to Crimean region), 100% of the tax on agricultural sales collected in Sevastopol were kept in the Sevastopol budget (60% in the Crimean region), 50% of loans to the government (virtually everyone had to loan a certain amount of money to the government, these loans were eventually repaid — GZ), ( 50% to the Crimean region). (Soviet Ukraine, 1954, June 18th).

Another significant confirmation of Sevastopol's status as part of the URSR was the awarding of medals to women in Sevastopol by the SRSR (Soviet Union) at the request and recommendation of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR. Medals honoring women as mothers were awarded to women in Sevastopol who had many children: Maria Vasilivna Zakharova and Hanna Yakimivna Berlinkova from the Stalinsky district of the city.

Other documents which establish Sevastopol as part of the legal system of Ukraine are those which govern elections, whether to local Radas, courts, or to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. On November 18th, 1954, the executive committee of the Sevastopol city council
approved a resolution organizing electoral precincts in the election of judges in Sevastopol. This resolution document begins with the words: “Based on paragraph 89 of the Constitution of the USRS and paragraphs 14 and 15, “the principles of election of judges in the URSR”, the executive committee of the Sevastopol city council has decided…” (Slava Sevastopola, 1954, November 20th).

One month later a local newspaper describes the election campaign for the Sevastopol city council: “On the basis of paragraph 121 of the Constitution of the URSR and pages 40 and 41, the principles of election of representatives to regional, district, city, village councils of workers of the Ukrainian RSR”, the executive committee of the Sevastopol city council decided…” (ibid, December 28th).

At the opening of the first session of the Sevastopol city council, the head of the mandated commission, Divavin, said: “the election in all precincts was carried out properly, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of local elections to local councils of the URSR.” (ibid, 1955, March 13th).

As a matter of fact, with the transfer of the Crimean region to the URSR, all local administrative offices received new seals prepared by the Rada of Ministers of the URSR, which were distributed by the executive committees of the Crimean region and Sevastopol. For example, on January 12th, 1955, the secretary of the Sevastopol executive committee, V. Taranin, notified the director of the department concerned with the matters of the Rada of Ministers of the URSR, Zlobin, that “we received a round seal and corner stamp for the executive committee of the Korabelny district council of the city of Sevastopol.” (CDAVOVU, fund P-2, desc. 9. Matter 413, pg. 5).

In its continuing work, the executive committee of the Sevastopol city council had to abide by the directives previously issued by the Rada of Ministers of the URSR. Therefore, beginning on June 29th, 1954, the department overseeing the matters of the Rada of Ministers of the URSR sent many different resolutions to the Sevastopol executive committee, which related to the local economy. (ibid, desc. 8, matter 10302, pgs. 91—107, 133—137, 157, 183—204).

The statement made by A. Fedorov, that “the financial and organizational functions of the city of Sevastopol until December 8th,
1991, were directly controlled by the Rada of Ministers of the SRSR and without any participation whatever on the part of the Rada of Ministers of the URSR” was patently absurd. (A. Fedorov, Legal Status of Crimea. Legal Status of Sevastopol, pg. 34).

In addition, in March of 1955 two men were elected to the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR, Andriy Korovchenko from the Sevastopol-Stalinsk voting precinct and Mykola Kulakov from the Sevastopol-Korabelny voting precinct. (Slava Sevastopolya, 1955, March 4th).

The people of Sevastopol themselves demonstrate the reality of the situation, when S. A. Kosakovich appealed to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian RSR in 1955 with a complaint about being fired from his job unjustly.

There many other facts testifying to the inclusion of Sevastopol in the governmental structure of Ukraine. It is a pity that these are not known more widely. Sergei Tsihipa writes on the internet “Any one of a number of former Soviet officers can aver that in 1948 Sevastopol was pronounced an independent economic entity with direct control by the RFSSR, this Decree was never rescinded and Russia’s rights to Sevastopol, even formally, were not abjured.”

Anyone can say “authoritatively” whatever they like, but documents are stubborn: Sevastopol is Ukrainian.
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Художнє оформлення Михайла Черненка

Комп’ютерна верстка Миколи Сергійчука

Підписано до друку 17.11.2014 р. Формат 84х108 1/32, Гарнітура Міньйон. Друк офсетний. Умов. друк. арк. 32,76. Обл. вид. арк. 16,38. Наклад 1000.
Зам.

Оригінал-маєт виготовлено в ПП Сергійчук М. І., 07300, м. Вишгород Київської області, вул. Грушевського, 1, пом. 31.
Свідоцтво про внесення суб’єкта видавничої справи до Державного реєстру видавців, виготівників і розповсюджувачів видавничої продукції — серія ДК №2448 від 24.03.2006 р.

Віддруковано в ПАТ "Віпол", 03151, м. Київ, вул. Волинська, 60. Свідоцтво про внесення суб’єкта видавничої справи до Державного реєстру видавців, виготівників і розповсюджувачів видавничої продукції — серія ДК № 4404 від 31.08.2012 р.